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Essays on the Distributive Politics of Bureaucracy
Tara Slough
Bureaucrats are hired to produce public goods. Yet, despite the distributive implications of this
canonical rationale, bureaucrats are generally absent from theories of “who gets what.” The three
papers in this dissertation advance a role for bureaucrats in the distribution of public goods and
services premised on their work in policy implementation. I provide new theory and evidence to
answer three questions. The first paper asks the question: under what conditions do bureaucrats’
actions generate inequalities in the provision of public services? The second paper inquires: how
does the design of bureaucratic oversight institutions influence a state’s capacity to implement policy
and citizen access to services? The third essay asks: how does the co-production of public goods
by politicians and bureaucrats influence voters’ ability to hold politicians to account?
In the first paper, I study the conditions under which bureaucratic bias (discrimination) in the
allocation of services generates inequality in access. I argue that citizens’ principal mechanism of
control over bureaucrats is to complain to a politician. When politicians respond to complaints by
tightening oversight of bureaucrats, differences in citizens’ access to complain induce bureaucrats
to devote more effort to groups with the loudest voices. I test this theory using a national-scale
factorial audit experiment of Colombia’s two largest national social welfare programs to measure
bureaucratic effort behaviorally. I find that bureaucrats provide less information about social welfare
programs to poor citizens and internal migrants. Consistent with the theory, such bias manifests
most strongly in places with greater inequalities in citizens’ ability to access the state and on tasks
where oversight from politicians is most likely. These results are unlikely to reflect taste-based
discrimination or screening. This paper shows that inequality in access to public goods and services
can emerge even when politicians’ budget allocations to public goods are equitable.
In the second paper, I examine the distributional consequences of the use of citizen complaints in
bureaucratic oversight. I study the adoption and consequences of bureaucratic oversight institutions
in the context of service provision. Specifically, I consider a politician’s choice to use (or ignore) in-
formation generated by complaints when monitoring a bureaucrat. Complaints generate information
that direct a politicians’ remediation of bureaucratic decisions and may increase bureaucratic effort.
However, when costs of complaint vary across the population, the use of this information generates
inequality in the distribution of service outputs, improving the access of citizens that can complain
while reducing the access of citizens that cannot. Further, relying on citizen information can build
or erode a state’s capacity to accurately implement public policies, depending on the distribution
of these costs across the population. This paper introduces citizen complaint systems as an insti-
tution that shapes both policy implementation capacity and distributional outcomes in comparative
perspective.
In the final paper, I start from the observation that in many theories of electoral accountabil-
ity, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality through the observation of public goods outcomes.
However, politicians rely on bureaucracies to produce public goods. Across contexts, politicians
work with bureaucracies of markedly different qualities. In this paper, I argue that accountabil-
ity relations between voters and politicians yield different empirical implications at different levels
of bureaucratic quality. I introduce a model of electoral accountability with a voter, a politician,
and a bureaucrat. The model identifies observational equivalencies between (i.) the implications
of pooling equilibria that emerge at high and low levels of bureaucratic quality (with informed,
rational voters) and (ii.) the findings of existing studies that are interpreted to indicate a lack of
accountability due to uninformed or irrational voters. I demonstrate the plausibility of the model
by introducing and validating an original measure of bureaucratic quality in Brazilian municipal-
ities. I use this measure to extend four studies on corruption and accountability. I conclude with
implications for the comparative study of accountability across the world’s democracies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last 30 years, social policy across Latin America has expanded dramatically to encompass
vulnerable populations that formerly received little non-discretionary support from the state (De la
O, 2015; Garay, 2016). In particular, the extension of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), pensions,
and health care to millions of poor citizens in the urban periphery and rural areas represents a
stark transformation in the relationship between these citizens and the state. Given the magnitude
of socioeconomic inequality in the region, possible beneficiaries from these expansions of social
policy comprise up to 80% of national populations, respectively (Portes and Hoffman, 2003).
One consistent observation across the region holds that implementation of these programs has
been uneven (e.g., Soares, Ribas, and Osório, 2010; Camacho and Conover, 2011; Parker and Todd,
2017; Niedzwiecki, 2018). While modest in absolute terms, the benefits afforded by CCT pro-
grams, pensions, and health care are non-trivial for the populations that they intend to serve. As
such, uneven implementation can generate substantial welfare losses when vulnerable populations
are unable to access these benefits. Our present understanding of implementation has generally
focused on the behavior of politicians (Camacho and Conover, 2011; De la O, 2015; Niedzwiecki,
2018) or potential beneficiaries (Parker and Todd, 2017). Yet, given the scale of and targeting in-
herent to these social programs, most administration is done by bureaucrats. Less is known about
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bureaucrats’ role in implementation (or implementation failures), even as administration remains a
salient concern to program architects.1
Consideration of bureaucrats’ role in social program implementation makes clear that bureau-
crats’ actions influence “who gets what” from the state. Conceptualization of the distributive role of
bureaucrats in the provision of public goods and services raises questions about interactions between
bureaucrats and other, more frequently studied actors. In particular, I examine a set of strategic in-
teractions between bureaucrats, political principals (elected politicians), and citizens. This setting
motivates a large set of unanswered questions. For example, under what conditions does oversight
of bureaucrats exacerbate or mitigate disparities in service delivery? What motivates politicians
to engage in different forms of bureaucratic oversight? What recourse do citizens have to contest
bureaucratic decision making or performance? When do bureaucrats provide cover for malfeasant
politicians?
This dissertation develops theory and evidence on strategic interactions between politicians,
bureaucrats, and citizens to develop a role for bureaucrats in the study of distributive politics. While
the first paper is situated in the context of Latin American social policy, the dissertation is not a case
study of these policies. Instead, the dissertation aims to speak more generally to bureaucrats’ role
in policy implementation by generating hypotheses that are applicable in different geographic and
policy domains. Perhaps the best-developed application in existing literature examines policing,
studying how variation in police officer behavior yields uneven implementation of policies with
substantial – even life and death – welfare consequences (for recent examples in a large literature,
see Ba, 2018; Streeter, 2019; Rivera and Ba, 2019; Magaloni, Franco-Vivanco, and Mello, 2020;
Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo, 2020). The papers in this dissertation collectively advance an agenda
1This observation comes from a series of interviews with employees of the Departamento Nacional de Planeación and
Prosperidad Social in Bogotá, Colombia in 2017 and 2018.
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on the distributive consequences of policy implementation by bureaucrats.
1.1 Bureaucracy and the Politics of “Who Gets What”
This dissertation consists of three essays on the distributive politics of bureaucracy. It is motivated
by a general paucity of bureaucrats in accounts of “who gets what” from the state. This omission
stands at odds with the canonical – and inherently distributive – rationale for bureaucrats, which
holds that bureaucrats are “hired to produce public goods.” This dissertation examines bureaucrats’
role in the implementation and delivery of public goods and services, deriving implications for
distribution, efficiency, and equity of state-provided goods and services.
The distributive politics tends to “star” politicians in its efforts to understand patterns of taxa-
tion and spending. As Golden and Min (2013) write, “distributive policies [are] those that involve
taxes and transfers, and in particular the decisions about allocations of government goods and ser-
vices to identifiable localities or groups” (p. 74). Focusing on transfers, most existing work equates
allocation of transfers by politicians with the outputs received by citizens.2 We typically measure
distribution in terms of budget allocations or the outputs (i.e., public goods) accessed by individuals
or districts. The former measure can miss substantial slippage between funds allocated and ultimate
outputs when assessing “who gets what.” The latter measure may mislead inferences about politi-
cians’ allocative considerations. As such, I focus on bureaucrats’ role in policy implementation – the
mapping of a budget allocation into a policy output. This dissertation provides theory and evidence
that equating allocations and outputs can produce misleading assessments of “who gets what” and
why. Further, it demonstrates that distinguishing allocations from outputs is not only consequential
for understanding of bureaucratic behavior; it also generates new predictions about the behavior of
2Work on taxation more frequently acknowledges fiscal capacity as a constraint on politicians with distributive conse-
quences. There is not consensus about whether fiscal capacity is a measure of bureaucratic capability/output or a different
technology altogether. For example, Kasara and Suryanarayan (2015) equate fiscal capacity and bureaucratic capacity.
The bureaucratic nature of fiscal capacity is less clear in works such as Tilly (1990) and Besley and Persson (2010).
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both politicians and voters.
The essays provide answers to three central questions. First, under what conditions do bureau-
crats’ actions generate inequalities in the provision of public services? I begin from the observation
that bureaucrats produce and distribute public goods and services, with wide scope to influence
“who gets what.” I contend that citizens’ principal mechanism of control over bureaucrats is the
complaint to a politician. When politicians respond to complaints by tightening oversight of bu-
reaucrats, differences in citizens’ access to complain induce bureaucrats to devote more effort to
groups with the loudest voices. I test this theory using a national-scale factorial audit experiment of
Colombia’s two largest national social welfare programs to measure bureaucratic effort behaviorally.
I find that bureaucrats provide less information about social welfare programs to poor citizens and
internal migrants. Consistent with the theory, I show that bias manifests most strongly in places
with greater inequalities in citizens’ ability to access the state and on tasks where oversight from
politicians is most likely.
Second, how do institutions stipulating bureaucratic oversight influence a state’s capacity to
implement policy and inequality in the distribution of public goods and services? I start from a
similar observation to the previous paper that bureaucratic oversight frequently relies upon informa-
tion provided by citizen complaints. I propose a model of service provision to study the adoption
and consequences of oversight institutions. Specifically, I consider a politician’s choice to use (or
ignore) information generated by complaints when monitoring a bureaucrat. Complaints generate
information that direct a politicians’ remediation of bureaucratic decisions and may increase bureau-
cratic effort. However, when costs of complaint vary across the population, use of this information
generates inequality in the distribution of service outputs, improving access of citizens that can
complain while reducing access of citizens that cannot. Further, relying on citizen information can
build or erode a state’s capacity for policy implementation, depending on the distribution of these
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costs across the population. In this paper, I introduce citizen complaint systems as an institution that
shapes both policy implementation capacity and distributional outcomes in comparative perspective.
Third, how does the co-production of public goods and services by politicians and bureaucrats
influence voters’ ability to hold politicians accountable? How does this co-production affect our
ability to diagnose accountability failures empirically? In many theories of electoral accountabil-
ity, voters learn about an incumbent’s quality through the observation of public goods outcomes.
Globally, politicians rely on bureaucracies to produce public goods, but politicians across contexts
work with bureaucracies of markedly different qualities. In this paper, I argue that accountability
relations between voters and politicians yield different empirical implications at different levels bu-
reaucratic quality. I introduce a model of electoral accountability with a voter, a politician and a
bureaucrat. The model identifies observational equivalencies between the implications of pooling
equilibria that emerge at high and low levels of bureaucratic quality (with informed, rational vot-
ers) and the findings of existing studies that are interpreted to indicate a lack of accountability due
to uninformed or irrational voters. I demonstrate the plausibility of the model by introducing and
validating an original measure of bureaucratic quality in Brazilian municipalities and using it to ex-
tend four studies on corruption and accountability. I conclude with implications for the comparative
study of accountability across the world’s democracies.
1.2 Organizing Insights
The essays in this dissertation are united by three overarching insights that represent a departure
from modal approaches to the study of bureaucracy and comparative politics more generally. In
the following discussion, I contextualize and justify these developments as they relate to the three
essays.
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1.2.1 Insight #1: Bureaucrats and Politicians Do Different Things
In each essay in this dissertation, politicians and bureaucrats “do different things.” More specifically,
the strategies available to bureaucrats and politicians are distinct. In the first essay, the bureaucrats
distribute a service and a politician monitors the bureaucrat’s decision. In the second essay, the
politician designs a contract by which to monitor a bureaucrat’s service provision to a citizen. In the
final essay, the politician allocates a budget while a bureaucrat produces the public good with that
budget.
Standard approaches to modeling the agency relationships between bureaucrats and politicians
in the last two decades have emphasized the study of administrative policymaking (Gailmard and
Patty, 2012). While the precise strategies available to bureaucrats and politicians do generally differ
slightly (i.e., a politician could set policy or delegate the policy determination to the bureaucrat),
ultimately, politicians and bureaucrats do very similar things with respect to policymaking. Further-
more, both are motivated by by ideological preferences over policy. Studying ideological conflict
between politicians and bureaucrats in this setting has generated many insights. For example, new
ideas about delegation have emerged from this body of literature (e.g., Epstein and O’Halloran,
1994; Gailmard and Patty, 2007; Lewis, 2008; Fox and Jordan, 2011). Yet, these models ultimately
focus on one task of bureaucrats among many. In so doing, models of this sort implicitly restrict
attention to a comparatively small set of high-level bureaucrats who participate in policymaking.
Empirically, the vast majority of bureaucrats (ideally) do not have the power to make policy. More-
over, the focus on ideological preferences of politicians and bureaucrats further limits scope to poli-
ties where ideology is more salient as an organizing feature of politics. The latter concern simply
reflects the challenges inherent to transportation of a US-centric literature to other settings.3
3Comparative applications of delegation models of this class including Huber and Shipan (2002); McCarty (2004);
Huber and McCarty (2004) are important contributions to this literature, but represent a small proportion of models of
this type.
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The approach I adopt in this dissertation provides a complementary perspective. By studying do-
mains in which politicians and bureaucrats do different things, I move from a focus on bureaucratic
policymaking to bureaucratic policy implementation. This move ultimately broadens attention to
the actions of a larger set of bureaucrats. For example, in the Colombian study (Chapter 2), I mea-
sure the behavior of the public servants that enroll citizens in two social programs in municipalities
across the country. This stands in contrast to the heads of the agencies running these programs who
have the power to determine some aspects of social policy design. Obviously, these local program
administrators individually have less ability to influence outcomes than the respective agency direc-
tors. However, I contend that in the aggregate, their actions have substantial implications for access.
As such, this work reorients our focus to a set of bureaucrats that is emergent in the empirical lit-
erature (Rasul and Rogger, 2016; Brierly, 2020; Raffler, 2019), but underrepresented in existing
theories about bureaucracy in Political Science.
1.2.2 Insight #2: Bureaucrats, Politicians, and Citizens
The models advanced in these papers characterize strategic relationships between a politician, a bu-
reaucrat, and a citizen.4 The papers incorporate all three actors by nesting two frequently-studied
strategic interactions. First, they consider accountability relationships between citizens and politi-
cians. The papers collectively study two forms of accountability relations. Chapter 4 studies ac-
countability relations in an electoral setting (Fearon, 1999; Ashworth, 2012). Chapters 2 and 3
study a more quotidian manifestation of these relationships, that of citizen complaints. The study of
complaint- or claim-making as a form of widespread engagement between voters and politicians has
grown in recent years, particularly in the context of developing democracies (Kruks-Wisner, 2018;
Bussell, 2019). These interactions mark an regular feature of constituency service by politicians.
Second, I examine moral hazard problems in bureaucracies. The canonical framework empha-
4In the electoral context in Chapter 4, the “citizen” is a “voter.”
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sizes the interactions between politicians and bureaucrats (or principals and agents) in which the
politician cannot (fully) observe the actions of the bureaucrat. While the literature is replete with
accounts of moral hazard, the papers in this dissertation join a small group of papers that integrate
both voter-politician accountability relations with studies of moral hazard in bureaucracies. Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 draw substantial inspiration from the emphasis on citizen complaint in bureau-
cracies put forth by Prendergast (2003, 2007). Chapter 4 joins a small set of models of electoral
accountability with a bureaucrat (Fox and Jordan, 2011; Yazaki, 2018; Li, Sasso, and Turner, 2019).
I draw observable implications from these theories and present new data measuring (across chapters)
the behavior of politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens to expand this nascent body of literature.
1.2.3 Insight #3: On the Study of “Bad Politics”
In conducting preliminary fieldwork for this dissertation in Colombia, I talked to a number of public
servants. When I introduced myself, I started by explaining that I was a PhD student studying
“bureaucracy.” An early response was a stated aversion to the bureaucrat/bureaucracy language. The
word “bureaucrat,” I was told, conjured images of a lazy, inept, or corrupt government employee.
The polite language was “public servant” (servidor público) and “public administration” (función
pública), respectively. I changed my pitch accordingly.
The study of bureaucrats in low- and middle-income countries would suggest that my inter-
locutors’ fear of being characterized as lazy, corrupt, or inept is well-founded. Dominant themes
in the study of developing country bureaucracies emphasize patronage-laden cronyism and petty
corruption (Leff, 1964; Mauro, 1995; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Rasul and Rogger, 2016;
Brierly, 2020). While there is ample evidence that these features present in some bureaucracies, we
have much less evidence on the prevalence of cronyism and corruption across countries, agencies,
or even bureaucrats. Moreover, we do not know whether these features are the primary drivers of
inefficiency or welfare loss.
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This characterization of bureaucracries is reflective of what I refer to as “bad politics” frame for
the study of politics. In this frame, scholars look to an actor with “bad” motives that map directly
onto inefficient or normatively undesirable outcomes. The literature is replete with examples of
venal politicians, corrupt bureaucrats, and know-nothing voters. It is, after all, easy to identify
examples of individuals that personify these descriptions. Yet, an immediate embrace of “bad”
motives as drivers of bad outcomes absent other possible explanations limits our understanding of
why bad outcomes emerge.
“Bad politics” weakens the project of Comparative Politics, in particular, because of the asym-
metry in the frequency of its application across regions. Bad outcomes (as we define them) are
more prevalent in the Global South. When we overemphasize bad motives explanations of these
outcomes, we cede unnecessary ground in explaining similarities and differences of political phe-
nomena across polities. For example, consider the comparatively benign treatment of pork in Amer-
ican Politics vis-a-vis work studying the scourge of targeted redistribution (i.e., clientelism) in de-
veloping democracies.5 Similarly, while debates about voters’ capacity for rational retrospection
continue globally, we implicitly or explicitly attribute worse outcomes to uninformed or irrational
voters in regions where politician malfeasance is (traditionally) more apparent. For example, when
American Politics scholars provide evidence of limits to rational voter retrospection in the United
States (Campbell et al., 1960; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo, 2010; Achen and Bartels, 2016), the con-
sequences – in terms of political outcomes – are never as dire as the consequences attributed to
low-information voting in the Global South (Dunning et al., 2019).
The observation of “bad politics” alongside its asymmetric application is far from new. In a
5The quid pro quo exchanges signified by the term “clientelism” could be argued to be normatively worse than other
forms of targeted distribution. Yet, evidence of quid pro quo exchanges is exceedingly rare in the empirical literature
(Hicken and Nathan, 2020). The distinction between forms of targeted distribution across contexts seems, to me, to be
weaker than generally conveyed.
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blistering critique of a 1969 book drawing comparisons between Colombian and US politicians,
Hirschman (1970: p. 331) summarized the author’s argument, writing:
“Colombian politicians are selfish..., ambitious, unscrupulous, unprincipled, exceed-
ingly demagogic-interested exclusively in increasing their own power, always ready
to betray yesterday’s friends and allies, and, to top it all, incapable of having friendly
personal relations with anyone because they feel comfortable only with abject suppli-
cants... On the other hand, there is the politician with a [genuine interest in programs
and policies] whose preferred habitat is the United States of America. He enjoys work-
ing on concrete policies and achieving a stated goal; hence he is principled, willing
to defend unpopular causes, always ready to come to constructive agreements, hard-
working, and generally lovable.”
Certainly, there is now more subtlety in the description of politics of developing countries and
greater skepticism about the benevolence of United States politicians than when Hirschman wrote
fifty years ago. Hirschman and others have proposed a variety of remedies to such issues in the study
of Comparative Politics. The remedies I attempt to embrace in this dissertation focus on developing
theories that are both symmetrically applicable across contexts and which advance mechanisms for
bad outcomes that are distinct from “bad politics.”
First, I intend for the theories in each chapter to be symmetrically applicable across contexts.
While the evidence is largely drawn from single cases, namely Colombia and Brazil, the theories
offer predictions as to why outcomes may differ across contexts. Chapters 2 and 3 emphasize dif-
ferences in the underlying population as a determinant of levels of service provision. Chapter 3
further considers how oversight institutions may yield different outcomes across contexts as a func-
tion of existing public personnel systems. Chapter 4 derives predictions for distinct manifestations
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of electoral accountability at different levels of bureaucratic quality.
Second, I endeavor to step away from “bad politics” explanations for bad outcomes. The disser-
tation studies three phenomena that would likely be classified as normatively bad political outcomes:
bias in access to state services; capture of the state and erosion of its ability to serve the population;
and corruption and underinvestment in public goods. In contrast to many explanations for these
phenomena, I do not assert the presence of “bad politics” in the form of an ill-intentioned political
actor seeking to produce a bad outcome. Specifically, I do not rely on necessarily venal politicians,
corrupt bureaucrats, or uninformed voters to generate these outcomes.6 This is not an argument that
any actor maximizes welfare: they do not. Instead, I study a series of agency problems that can
generate these sub-optimal outcomes.
My argument is not that “bad politics” explanations are wrong or not useful. I simply posit
that these accounts must be evaluated against other explanations that generate similar patterns of
outcomes. The design of policies or interventions to improve outcomes depends on the mechanism
that generates such outcomes. As such, there are very practical justifications for considering a wider
class of potential mechanisms.
1.3 Approach and Methods
1.3.1 Theory and Empirics
The papers in this dissertation reflect the conviction that theory and empirical work can produc-
tively be integrated. Each paper contains a game theoretic model and the empirical papers draw
inspiration from the identification (or credibility) revolution. The idea that these two approaches
can productively be combined has been a matter of debate over the last decade (Clark and Golder,
2015; Ashworth, Berry, and de Mesquita, 2015; Samii, 2016; Huber, 2017). The move toward
6The models in Chapters 2 and 4 do allow for some aspects of “bad politics.” Chapter 2 allows for bureaucrats or
politicians with biased tastes and Chapter 4 allows for uninformed voters. In the empirical applications, however, I do
not find evidence in favor of these manifestations of “bad politics” in the contexts that I study.
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design-based inference has focused scholars’ energy on the assumptions invoked to identify select
causal estimands. These assumptions are typically viewed as empirical, not theoretical. In other
work, I argue that in a wide subset of applications, basic theoretical assumptions govern whether
oft-estimated causal estimands are defined (Slough, 2019). In this sense, the models help to support
claims of causal identification. In keeping with the design-based motivation, with one exception, all
of the empirical results reported in this dissertation are estimates of reduced-form quantities (with
respect to the models).7
Beyond considerations of identification, situating a research design within an equilibrium offers
much greater clarity about what is being estimated empirically (under the assumptions of a model).
In design-based research, mapping the treatment assignment onto the model provides implications
for whether a given causal quantity tests an implication of interest (Bueno de Mesquita and Tyson,
2019). It also guides assessment of which empirical comparisons (observational or experimental)
“make sense” in light of a researcher’s model of the world and which comparisons do not “make
sense.” Finally, the models give clarity on the question of whether causal estimands estimate equi-
librium or partial-equilibrium effects. The distinction is not necessarily obvious in the absence of a
model and helps to clarify why we observe the effects, which is particularly important for informing
policy.
1.3.2 Original vs. Secondary Data
Finally, the dissertation as a whole reflects multiple approaches toward the data collection and anal-
ysis. As a field, we often place a premium on the collection of original data. Importantly, these
incentives push researchers to tackle new questions and and pursue novel answers. However, it be-
comes much more challenging to adjudicate between theories/arguments when each theory is tested
in its own context with its own data. One approach to this problem, captured by the push for im-
7The structural parameter ∆ in Chapter 2 also admits a clear reduced-form interpretation.
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proved external validity, emphasizes replication of studies in multiple contexts, as in the Metaketa
initiative by Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP). In either case, the tendency to resort
to “getting new data” as a discipline imposes costs, reinforces some inequities, and, in the case of
human subjects research, raises some ethical questions. In working on these papers, I have taken
the view that a slight reduction of emphasis on original data in favor of secondary analysis of exist-
ing data may be productive. The secondary analyses here are made possible by the generosity and
transparency of the authors that collected the original data. The broader disciplinary move toward
reproducibility is certainly helpful in this regard.
In Chapter 2, I document the results of an original audit experiment conducted in Colombia. The
motivation was to directly measure bureaucratic effort in a matter not captured by existing measures.
I complement the original experimental data with several sources of administrative data collected
from various Colombian government agencies to probe the mechanisms underlying bureaucratic
bias. I designed the experiment in consultation with government agencies overseeing the two social
programs I audit and worked to minimize the costs and harms of the experiment to subjects through
design decisions enumerated in more detail in Chapter 2. In sum, I endeavor to justify for the value
of the experiment and data collection where measures were not previously available.
In Chapter 4, I take a very different approach to data collection. I introduce and test new theory
using secondary analyses of several existing studies. In particular, I develop a new measure of bu-
reaucratic quality from administrative data to adjudicate between my theory and existing arguments
in order to demonstrate the plausibility of the model. The literature information and accountability
in low- and middle-income democracies has grown quite large in the last 15 years. The growing
availability of reproducible data and code comprise a body of evidence that can be further used to
probe new theories on “classic” questions. I view projects like the Metaketas as a one argument to
many studies research design. In contrast, the approach pursued by this paper is a many (several)
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arguments/theories to one study type design. I see work to better understand the properties of both
approaches as a ripe agenda for further work.
Part of this reflection on the merits of collecting original data versus conducting secondary anal-
ysis of existing data is purely pragmatic. I write this Introduction during the COVID-19 pandemic,
which will likely curtail many field-based projects for at least the next year. This represents a chal-
lenge to most field-based research agendas (Wood et al., 2020). As such, the present represents an
opportune time to think creatively about how we can learn more from data that has already been
collected.
1.4 Takeaways and Future Research
I see two central takeaways from this work, which I intend to develop in future research.
First, I argue that the study of policy implementation merits a more prominent role in the study
of “who gets what” than it currently occupies. By increasing the salience of implementation, we
open opportunities to learn more about what bureaucrats do and how bureaucracies are organized.
This dissertation posits two paths to advance this agenda. First, we need better measurement of the
distortions that occur in the mapping of budgets into public goods and services outputs. Chapter 2
provides one approach to this problem focused on measuring bureaucratic behavior directly. Exam-
ining more closely the correspondence between allocations and outputs represents a complementary
approach (Williams, 2017). Second, better understanding of these processes opens questions about
how bureaucrats’ efforts to implement policy influence the behavior of other actors to shape broader
political outcomes. For example, in Chapter 3, I examine how politicians design oversight in an-
ticipation of these actions, and the consequences of these oversight institutions for distribution. In
Chapter 4, I consider how variation in bureaucrats’ ability to produce public goods alters a politi-
cian’s budget allocation strategies and, consequently, a voter’s ability to learn and select competent
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politicians. Understanding variation in bureaucratic implementation processes in the context of
broader equilibria in this way widens the potential scope of this research agenda substantially.
Second, I see the call for symmetric study of political phenomena in different contexts as critical
to, and often underemphasized in the study of Comparative Politics. The approach that I take toward
this mode of investigation relies on the combination of theory and empirics. Data collection or
collation is often quite costly, which understandably limits the number of cases in which we could
reasonably expect to measure a (micro-level) phenomenon. As such, the empirical results from a
single case, as in the Colombian audit experiment in Chapter 2, provide limited leverage on whether
we would expect similar effects in other contexts. In my reading, external validity proponents
ask whether similar effect sizes (and/or directional effects) obtain elsewhere. My argument for
symmetry, instead, seeks to explain similar or different outcomes of the same causal process in
different contexts.
To this end, the models that I forward present explanations for heterogeneity using models in-
tended to be commonly applied across contexts. In other words, I put minimal scope conditions on
the models.8 Variation in primitives that we expect to vary by context drive variation in outcomes.
Paper 2 generates predictions about the direction and magnitude of bureaucratic biases based in
service provision on the basis of citizen costs of complaint; politician tastes over constituents; and
bureaucratic tastes. Paper 3 generates predictions about the variation in both the adoption and con-
sequences of bureaucratic oversight from variation in bureaucratic quality (selection), bureaucratic
insulation, and a politician’s preferred constituency in the electorate. Paper 4 explains patterns of
political selection and politician malfeasance based on bureaucratic quality and the pool of candi-
dates.9
8For example, the model of electoral accountability pertains to democracies.
9The latter is largely left unexplored in the chapter but is ripe for further investigation.
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To my taste, the value of the “comparative” in Comparative Politics comes from the ability to
describe and understand both similarities and differences across and within countries. Too often,
however, we fixate on similarity given the empirical limitations inherent to the study of difference.
The approach that I put forth can be summarized in terms of how scope conditions are invoked.
Placing scope conditions on empirical findings (i.e., a directional result) seems unavoidable in many
cases. However, we too often use a similar logic to put scope conditions on arguments or theories
when they are not necessary. When this occurs, we unnecessarily avoid weighing into differences
across contexts. The combination of theory and empirics enables a more precise statement of scope
conditions on an empirical finding and also provides some guidance as to how different we could
expect outcomes of a common process to be. When we over-scope theory, we are risk being left
with a patchwork of arguments from different contexts that complicate the work of understanding
political phenomena.
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Chapter 2
Bureaucrats Driving Inequality in Access: Evidence from
Colombia
Inequalities in access to public goods and services have long challenged developing democracies,
inhibiting efforts to reduce socioeconomic inequality and promote economic development. Some
inequality is the deliberate result of politicians’ budget policies or targeting, but inequalities may
also emerge in the production of these goods and services. As “producers of public goods,” bureau-
crats map politicians’ budget allocations into outputs. I argue that bureaucrats are prone to exert
differential effort in providing service to different groups of citizens. Variation in bureaucratic ef-
fort in turn creates inequality in citizen access to public services. These disparities can emerge even
when budget allocations are equitable.
I focus on the setting of service provision, and specifically on interactions between street-level
bureaucrats and citizens.1 In delivering public services to citizens, bureaucrats’ actions have dis-
tributional consequences. Citizens engage the bureaucracy to gain access to state benefits, from
permits to subsidies. While the mode of interaction varies across jurisdictions and services, bu-
reaucrats’ role in providing service does not. Critically, bureaucrats distribute public goods and
1Following Lipsky (2010), I define street-level bureaucrats as those individuals that interface directly with citizens to
implement policies that they do not create.
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services because political principals – elected politicians – delegate program administration to bu-
reaucrats. With this delegation comes oversight. Politicians monitor the work of bureaucrats, doling
out punishments – from admonishments to termination – and rewards – including bonuses (in some
contexts) and promotion – upon observation of bureaucrats’ performance.
While politicians ultimately oversee bureaucrats, I consider the role of citizen complaints in
directing politicians’ oversight. Such complaints to political principals represent the primary form
of citizen control over bureaucrats. Complaints function as a means of control by incentivizing the
politician to target monitoring to specific decisions of the bureaucrat. Empirically, laws regarding
citizen complaints and responses are particularly common in developing democracies and enshrine
this form of citizen control over bureaucrats as a right. This paper focuses on differences in citizen
propensity to complain as a driver of unequal treatment by bureaucrats that generates inequality in
access to services.
This paper makes three innovations. First, I advance a theory that variation in citizen ability to
check the bureaucracy via complaint induces bias in bureaucratic effort. The theory emphasizes how
such biases map onto inequality in service provision across groups in society. Second, I develop
and implement a research design capable of measuring variation in bureaucratic effort behaviorally.
In so doing, I generate original measures of effort which allow me to understand how bureaucrats’
actions map into ultimate service provision. Finally, I leverage original administrative data to test
the bias mechanisms implied by the theory in order to identify the conditions under which bias
emerges.
A stylized formal model of service provision underpins my argument about how bias in bu-
reaucratic effort leads to inequality in access to public services. The model demonstrates three
mechanisms underpinning bias, which is defined as a difference in the average treatment of citizens
from different groups. Following Prendergast (2003, 2007), I argue that citizens’ direct mechanism
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of control over bureaucrats is the complaint to the bureaucrat’s principal, here an elected politician.
Departing from existing work, I posit that the costs of engaging the bureaucracy through complaints
can vary substantially across groups in the population. Where politicians exercise oversight on the
basis of such complaints, a rational bureaucrat should exert more effort to provide service to those
most likely to complain effectively, inducing statistical bias in effort (Becker, 1957; Phelps, 1972).
I refer to this form of bias as complaint-driven bias.2 The model incorporates this complaint-driven
bias alongside the bureaucrat’s and politician’s tastes for providing service to a citizen, the remain-
ing two sources of bias that generate alternate predictions about aggregate levels of bias. I identify
that two of three types of bias – the complaint-driven and politician’s taste-driven biases – occur
precisely because there is oversight of bureaucrats.
I measure bias in effort with novel measures of bureaucrats’ behavior in a preregistered national-
scale phone audit experiment in Colombia. I audited two national social welfare programs in con-
sultation with three national agencies overseeing the bureaucracy and these programs. The audited
programs, a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) and a means testing service, have stakes: the
CCT program alone confers benefits estimated at 13-17% of household consumption in the median
recipient household (Fiszbein et al., 2009). While both programs are funded and directed by the
national government, bureaucrats within each local government (alcaldía) assume some responsi-
bility for local administration of the programs.3 Figure 2.1 suggests dramatic variation in municipal
administration of the means-testing service (SISBÉN) across Colombia’s 1102 municipalities by
comparing rates of poverty to rates of program enrollment. Above the horizontal line, SISBÉN
has more enrollees than the ostensible municipal population (32.8%). Below the 45-degree line,
the program fails to cover the share of the municipal population in poverty – the minimal intended
2Specifically, this bias is induced by different probabilities of citizen complaint.
3For the rest of the paper, I use the Spanish word for local government, alcaldía, to refer to the government entities
that I study.
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Figure 2.1: The relationship between municipal poverty rates and SISBÉN (a means-testing service)
enrollment as a proportion of the population.
population of enrollees and targets of associated social programs (19.1%). Finally, between the two
lines, SISBÉN enrollment is plausibly aligned with intended administration (48.1%).
I seek to understand whether bias of street-level bureaucrats in alcaldías promulgates such dis-
parities in access. To do so, I direct petitions for information about each service to bureaucrats
in alcaldías across Colombia. The experiment employs a factorial design that varies both charac-
teristics of petitioners (socioeconomic class, regional accent, and internal migrant status) and the
difficulty of the petitions. The experimental design identifies bureaucratic bias in effort. The use
of a phone audit offers rich measurement of bureaucrats’ behavior, capturing access to officials
and provision of information (the service). I then leverage the national scale of the experiment to
study the conditions under which bias in bureaucratic effort emerges. This allows me to probe the
new mechanism that I propose – complaint-driven bias – and rule out two alternative explanations
for bias: taste-based bias and screening. I do this by investigating experimental variation in the
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difficulty of the petitions and non-experimental variation in welfare program characteristics to un-
derstand sensitivity of bias to oversight. I also draw upon an original dataset of all civil servants and
contractors in Colombia to measure bureaucrats’ incentives as well as demographic and program
data characterizing local markets for social welfare services.
I find robust evidence of bias in effort: lower class individuals and internal migrants received
substantially less information than their lower-middle class and resident counterparts, respectively.
In the context of the audit experiment, I identify these biases on outcomes measuring bureaucratic
effort (bureaucrats’ actions). I then show that bias in the provision of information in the experiment
occurs only in the municipalities where SISBÉN (the means testing program) is administratively
underprovided. This finding provides suggestive evidence linking these behavioral outcomes with
the ultimate service provision outcomes depicted in Figure 2.1.
Drawing upon the testable implications of the model, I provide clear evidence that the results
reflect complaint-driven bias. First, to separate bureaucratic tastes from oversight, I show that bias
is attenuated to zero as oversight by politicians becomes becomes less likely. This suggests bias is
unlikely to be driven by the bureaucrats’ tastes alone. Second, I separate complaint-based bias from
politician tastes by showing that anti-poor bias emerges only in poorer places where the ostensible
differences between experimental petitioners’ abilities to complain is greatest. Finally, I show that
the results are inconsistent with screening, an alternate explanation for differential treatment distinct
from “bias.” Some theories of misallocation of public services suggest that differences in treatment
could reflect efforts to screen intended from unintended potential program beneficiaries. However,
in contrast to these screening explanations, observed bias in effort cuts against the target population
for these programs.
Theoretically, this paper unites and extends two foundational approaches to the analysis of
agency problems in public service provision. First, it brings the moral hazard problem facing bu-
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reaucrats into a large literature on distributive politics focused on relationships between politicians
and citizens (voters) (Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). In so doing, I ar-
gue that the strategic behavior of intermediary bureaucrats distorts politicians’ desired distribution
of public services. My findings imply that even if politicians were to allocate funds equally across
citizens or constituencies, the lower probability that certain citizens would complain to politicians
induces bureaucrats to allocate services unequally.
Second, it brings citizens into models of politician’s oversight of bureaucrats (e.g., Banks, 1989;
Ting, 2017). In this regard, I endogenize the information that politicians receive to guide oversight
by emphasizing the role of citizen complaints to a principal (Prendergast, 2003, 2007). While
citizen complaints to a political principal increase service provision, they generate inequality when
some citizens are less able to engage politicians via complaint, inducing biased oversight by the
principal. I find that oversight can either increase or reduce bias in bureaucratic effort, countering
existing assumptions that oversight always deters bureaucratic bias (Hemker and Rink, 2017; White,
Nathan, and Faller, 2015).
The empirical findings generate new insights about the administration of social programs in
Latin America. In the past two decades, Latin American social policy has expanded to cover well
over 100 million former “outsiders,” generally low- and lower-middle income individuals (Garay,
2016; De la O, 2015; Huber and Stephens, 2012). These programs – from CCTs to health insurance
– are more administratively demanding to implement than past social policies in the region. I join
a literature that identifies substantial variation in access to social programs even among ostensible
target populations (Holland, 2015, 2017; Niedzwiecki, 2018). In contrast to existing electoral and
partisan explanations for this variation, I identify a complementary mechanism through which ev-
eryday service provision by bureaucrats generates disparities in access. I provide support for the
mechanism through the first experimental audit study of street-level bureaucrats in Latin America.
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Taken together, the theory and empirics suggest that socioeconomic inequalities generate po-
litical inequalities in citizens’ ability to extract oversight over bureaucrats responsible for service
provision. These inequalities in voice engender inequality in access to poverty reduction programs
intended to mitigate existing disparities. This analysis thus reveals a new mechanism for under-
standing how inequalities in political voice map onto inequalities in policy outcomes, rooted in
seemingly benign everyday interactions between citizens and bureaucrats. By showing that the ad-
ministration of social programs by bureaucrats can reinforce inequality traps in developing contexts,
I highlight the magnitude of the challenge in the design of large scale programs to effectively reduce




The model consists of three actors: a citizen (or client), a street-level bureaucrat, and a politician,
indexed by C, B, and P , respectively. Citizens are differentiated into two groups, g ∈ {x, y} on the
basis of observable ascriptive characteristics. Citizens vary in perceived costs to accessing the state.
These costs are some function of physical distance, familiarity with bureaucratic procedures, and
education.4 Costs, cC , are common knowledge and drawn from the distributionCg which is indexed
by group. Fg and fg denote the cdf and density of Cg, respectively, and Fg(0) = 0. Without loss of
generality, assume that Fy(cC) ≤ Fx(cC), or that Fy first order stochastically dominates Fx. Both
the bureaucrat and the politician, indexed by i, may have some bias toward providing the citizen
of group g with the service. These tastes are represented as γgi ∈ [0, 1], realizations of the random
variables Γgi . This bias is strictly taste-based (Becker, 1957). Alternatively, one could conceive of
4Rizzo (2018) argues that these barriers are largely psychological; this interpretation is also consistent with my argu-
ment.
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an altruistic bureaucrat and politician that internalize the benefits when the citizen receives service,
with weights proportional to γgi .
A bureaucrat responds to an exogenous citizen request for service by allocating effort, e ∈ [0, 1].
The service is provided with probability e. Effort is costly and is proportional to the difficulty of
the task, cB ≥ 1. The citizen observes whether she received the service. She subsequently decides
whether to complain to the politician, q ∈ {0, 1} at cost cC . Thus, the costs of complaining are
non-trivial and vary across the population as a function of access to the state.
In the subgame in which the service is not realized (provided), the politician receives or does not
receive a complaint from a citizen and subsequently chooses a level of effort to invest in auditing the
work of the bureaucrat, a ∈ [0, 1]. Politicians audit underprovision as opposed to misallocation of
services. This setting characterizes many service provision settings where all citizens have a right
to request service. In this sense, the model speaks clearly to the majority of tasks or programs in
which equal treatment is a mandate or objective.5
With probability a, the politician is able to deliver the service to the citizen. The politician
benefits reputationally and thus electorally from the increase in service provision when she detects
underprovision, parameterized as S > 0.6 A biased politician will also gain utility from providing
the service to a favored citizen. Failing to remedy a complaint induces a separate reputational cost of
q. Finally audits are costly, which constrains the intensity of auditing; the marginal cost of an audit
on a given task is cP . To avoid corner solutions, I assume that cP > S + 2. In addition, cP > cB
implying that it is costlier for politicians to recover the service than for bureaucrats to provide it in
the first place. This assumption is consistent with standard arguments about bureaucratic expertise.
5Even in the case of social programs with rigorously defined target populations, the first stages of enrollment are
generally open to all. If the initial application for, e.g. food stamps were inaccessible, it would be impossible to ensure
the program is reaching the entire target population.
6In the interpretation of this model with an altruistic politcian, one could consider S as the politician’s internalization
weight on the service provided to any citizen.
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The politician’s expected utility can thus be expressed as:
E[UP (a)] = a(S + γ
g





The citizen receives a utility of b > 0 if she receives the service. The citizen’s expected utility
conditional on not having received the service from the bureaucrat is a function of the probability
that the oversight process process will recover the service and her decision to complain (q), as
expressed in Equation 2.2.
E[UC(q)] = ba− qcC (2.2)
Finally, consider the bureaucrat’s utility.7 He gains utility proportional to γgB by (directly) providing
a favored citizen with service. If a decision is reversed during the course of an audit, bureaucrats
incur a penalty of r ∈ [0, 1]. In practice, these costs range from a reprimand, to transfer, or even
termination. The bureaucrat’s expected utility is thus:
E[UB(e)] = eγ
g






The game proceeds as follows:
1. The bureaucrat chooses an effort level e to provide the service to the citizen.
2. The citizen decides whether or not to lodge a complaint to the politician.
3. The politician chooses the intensity of audits, a. With probability a she overturns the bureau-
crat’s decision.
7One can assume that the bureaucrat receives a fixed wage that satisfies his participation constraint; importantly, in
this public sector setting, the wage does not depend on the effort exerted.
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4. Payoffs are realized.
I characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in pure strategies. The
bureaucrat’s allocation strategy sets e ∈ [0, 1]. The citizen’s complaint strategy maps the realization
of the service provided into a binary decision whether to complain to the politician q : {0, 1} →
{0, 1}. The politician’s audit strategy then maps receipt of a complaint into auditing intensity,
a : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → [0, 1].
2.1.2 Results
The main results characterize equilibrium effort, which allows for derivation of levels of bias. I
solve the model by backward induction, beginning with the politician’s decision whether or not to
audit the bureaucrat’s allocation. The politician’s objective is clearly concave in a; differentiating
Equation (1) with respect to a yields an interior optimal audit intensity of:
a∗ =
S + γgP + q
cP
(2.4)
Note that a∗ includes two types of oversight. S and γgP represent “police patrols” for underprovision
of the service while a complaint, q, represents a “fire alarm” (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
The optimal audit intensity allows for analysis of the citizen’s optimal complaint strategy. In the
subgame in which service is not provided, citizens will lodge a complaint if:






This yields an optimal complaint strategy of:
q∗ =

1 if cC < bcP
0 if cC ≥ bcP
(2.6)
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This implies that for higher cC , citizens are effectively “frozen out” of contesting the bureaucrat’s
service provision. The audit and complaint strategies map directly into the bureaucrat’s initial de-
cision on whether to exert effort. Substituting equations 2.4 and 2.6 into the bureaucrat’s objective


















where I is an indicator function.
Collectively e∗g, q
∗, and a∗ characterize the SPNE of the game. In Appendix A.1.3, I endoge-
nize the citizen request for service by assuming that citizens pay a cost proportional to cC to request
the service in the first place. Including this cost introduces two mechanisms through which service
provision changes from the baseline results. Clearly, if costs are sufficiently large relative to the
benefits of receiving the service, some citizens opt out, receiving no service. Less obviously, it
changes the composition of the portion of a group that requests service. This increase in the con-
ditional probability that a citizen that requests service will complain increases the expectation of
equilibrium effort across the population.
2.1.3 Defining and Measuring Bureaucratic Bias
There are two measures of bias implied by the model: bias in effort and inequality in outputs,
defined in Definition 2.1. Bias in effort corresponds to different equilibrium levels of effort across
groups. Inequality in outputs corresponds to different levels of ultimate service provision by group
(at the conclusion of the game). I derive these quantities formally in Appendix A.1.2. I assume
that the effort and service afforded to each citizen is independent of the effort and service afforded
to other citizens. In the context of service provision, if citizens request services at different times
or different days, this assumption is plausible. Even in environments in which bureaucrats face
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unmanageable caseloads such that more effort for one citizen implies less effort for another, so long
as citizens receive service on a first-come-first-served basis and the order of petitions is independent
of group membership, bias at the aggregate level can be captured by treating cases independently.
Definition 2.1. Bias in effort. Bias in effort refers to the difference in expectation of equilibrium
effort devoted to a citizen from each group, formally, ∆ = E[e∗x]− E[e∗y].
For the purposes of characterizing bias empirically or considering the distributional implications
of bias, it is useful to define bias between groups in the aggregate. I focus on the case in which effort
is interior, i.e. e∗g < 1 for all citizens. I characterize bias in terms of aggregate differences by group.
Define differences in the expectation of bureaucrat’s tastes as ηB = E[γxB] − E[γ
y
B]; differences in
the expectation of politician’s tastes as ηP = E[γxP ] − E[γ
y
P ]; and differences in the probability of
complaint as ηQ = Fx(cC)− Fy(cC).

























 = ηBcB + r(ηP + ηQ)cBcP
(2.8)
(Proof in appendix.)
Bias in effort between groups x and y can be decomposed into bias that enters through the
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Proposition 2.1 implies three mechanisms that drive the bias in effort and outcomes. The dif-
ferences ηP and ηB capture taste-driven biases of the politician and bureaucrat, respectively. The
model also implies the potential for complaint-driven bias, a form of statistical bias, parameterized
as ηQ. Note that, in contrast to standard models of statistical bias in which group membership is
observable and correlates with some latent trait, I show that this bias emerges even with complete
information. When one group is more able to complain, bureaucrats anticipate the increased prob-
ability of oversight by giving better service ex-ante. This is captured through a comparison of the
distribution of costs for each group. The stochastic dominance assumption serves as a sufficient
condition for complaint-driven bias to emerge on average (in the aggregate).
Of the three sources of bias, the complaint-based bias and the politician’s taste-based bias are
driven by oversight of the bureaucrat by the politician. In this sense, both forms of bias are strategic.
Oversight is biased if ηP + ηQ 6= 0. This implies that the politician exerts more effort in auditing
members of one group than another when service is not provided by the bureaucrat. In focusing on
bureaucratic behavior, I emphasize that the probability of audit conditions the bureaucrat’s level of
effort. Without loss of generality, assume that oversight is biased in favor of group x, e.g. ηP +ηQ >
0.
Proposition 2.2. Bias and the likelihood of oversight. Given ηP + ηQ > 0, a higher probability
of audits for citizens of group x citizens increases the magnitude of the bureaucrat’s bias in effort
if and only if r(ηP+ηQ)2cP > −ηB . The higher probability of audits for citizens of group x will only
reduce the magnitude of bias in effort if r(ηP+ηQ)2cP < −ηB . (Proof in appendix.)
Thus, oversight can increase or decrease the level of bias in effort exerted by bureaucrats. Crit-
ically, in order for oversight to decrease bias, if oversight-driven biases favor group x, the bureau-
crat’s tastes must favor y (ηB < 0) and be sufficiently large in magnitude. This result emerges
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because the politician optimizes service provision (possibly with some preference to one group),
not equality in access. I extend this analysis to investigate the relationship between oversight and
bias in outputs in Appendix A.1.4. Importantly, I find that if oversight is biased, bias in effort is a
sufficient condition to generate inequality in outputs.
2.1.4 Testable Implications
The model posits three types of bureaucratic bias in effort. These biases emerge in the bureaucrat’s
original decision to devote effort to provide service. The distributional consequences of bias in effort
for “who (ultimately) gets what” services depend on what is driving these biases. For this reason,
it is important to disentangle the mechanisms underlying any observed patterns of bias. While the
model implies no direct econometric test of the mechanism, Proposition 2.3 derives several testable
implications that I use to discriminate between types of bureaucratic bias.
Proposition 2.3. Tests of the mechanism. Decomposing oversight-driven and non-oversight-driven
bias:
1. Bias in effort varies in the politician’s cost of auditing if and only if oversight is biased:
∂∆
∂cP
6= 0, if and only if ∆O 6= 0. For sufficient increases in cP , bias in effort attenuates
toward zero.
2. The magnitude of bias in effort increases in the strength of bureaucratic incentives if and only
if oversight is biased: ∂∆∂r > 0 (< 0), if and only if ∆O > 0 (< 0).
Discriminating politician’s tastes from complaint-driven bias:
1. The magnitude of bias in effort increases in the between-group differences in ability to com-
plain: ∂∆∂ηQ > 0 (< 0) if ηQ > 0 (< 0).
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Classification Testable Implications










Complaint-driven: Citizens from group
x are more likely to complain than from
group y which draws a higher likelihood
of auditing by the politician. The bureau-
crat devotes more effort to x in anticipa-












Politician’s tastes: The politician
prefers to audit service to group x more
than to group y. The bureaucrat devotes
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Table 2.1: Summary of the bias mechanisms implied by the theory and the testable implications for
distinguishing the mechanisms. Bias is defined as a difference between two groups: when ∆ > 0
x is preferred to y and when ∆ < 0, y is preferred to x, so testable implications should be seen as
magnitudes. ∗Note that sufficient increases in cP attenuate bias toward zero.
2. The magnitude of bias in effort increases in the between-group differences in the politician’s
tastes: ∂∆∂ηP > 0 (< 0) if ηP > 0 (< 0).
Proposition 2.3 guides efforts to test the mechanisms described in the model and in Table 2.1. I
proceed in two steps. First, I test for evidence of oversight-driven bias. This distinguishes bias com-
ing from bureaucrats’ tastes (∆B) from the bias that comes from different probabilities of oversight
(∆O). As in Table 2.1, oversight-driven bias incorporates both politician tastes and complaint-driven
bias. To do this, I examine variation in bias with respect to the two parameters that should only drive
variation in the oversight mechanism, the politician’s cost of effort, cP , and the “bite” of possible
punishment, r. If bias varies in these two measures, there is evidence of oversight-driven bias.
Conditional on finding evidence of oversight-driven bias, I aim to distinguish between politician
tastes and citizen propensity to complain, the two components of oversight-driven bias. To do
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this, I examine variation in citizens’ cost of complaint (enters through ηQ). As the “distance”
between petitioner types’ costs of complaint, ηQ, increases, so too should the relative magnitude
of complaint-driven bias. In particular, if the magnitude of bias increases as ηQ increases, there
is evidence that bias comprises complaint-driven bias. This test is able to distinguish between
politician tastes and complaint-driven bias when Cov(ηP , ηQ) is small. I also consider a parallel
test with regard to politician incentives that may drive politician tastes, ηP with a parallel logic.
2.2 Case Context
I measure variation in bureaucratic discretion at national scale in Colombia. Writings on state capac-
ity in Colombia have long focused on a two-century history of civil wars as a cause or consequence
of state weakness (Centeno, 2003; González González, 2014). Nevertheless, studies of bureaucracy
typically characterize Colombia’s national bureaucracy as comparatively “Weberian” by regional
standards (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Mayka, 2016). Analyses of the World Bank’s Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators echo these findings (see Appendix A.2.2). Aside from measures of political
violence, the other governance indicators approximate the world median, rank in the highest tercile
in Latin America, and rank in the lowest decile of OECD countries.8 At the national level, bu-
reaucratic capacity in Colombia is believed to vary with the relative concentration of “technocrats”
and patronage employees (e.g., Schmidt, 1974; Dargent, 2016). Less is known about municipal
bureaucrats, the subjects of this investigation. However, dozens of semi-structured interviews with
national bureaucrats and participant observation in alcaldías evidence tremendous variance in pro-
fessionalism, competence, and outputs.
8Colombia joined the OECD in July 2018.
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2.2.1 Municipal Politics in Colombia
Since political decentralization in the late 1980s, Colombia’s 1102 municipalities have assumed
responsibility for most services, ranging from roads to education.9 Decentralization gave rise to
larger and relatively more professional municipal public administration (Fizbein, 1997). Important
for this project, some national programs are implemented “on the ground” within municipalities by
municipal bureaucrats.
Municipalities are governed by a mayor and local council (concejo) of seven to 45 councilors,
according to population.10 Mayors are elected every four years by plurality vote and are limited to
serving one consecutive term. In contrast, councilors are elected by optional open list PR without
term limits. In these elections, parties are weak and the role of ideology in elections is limited.
According to the Colombian party classification by Fergusson et al. (2018), 232 current mayors
represent parties classifiable as “left” or “right;” 543 mayors represent parties without an identifiable
ideology; and 325 mayors ran without a party (as their own party). In these contexts, the distribution
of public and private goods arguably constitutes the basis of political competition.
2.2.2 Bureaucratic Hiring
At the municipal level, bureaucrats are hired and overseen by local politicians. Politicians staff the
public sector via two hiring mechanisms: civil service (called empleados de planta) and contracting.
The degree to which mayors delegate staffing the alcaldía varies predictably with the size of the
municipality. In small municipalities, contracts are signed directly by the mayor (on behalf of the
alcaldía); in larger municipalities, high-level political appointees sign off.
On average, contractors are less expensive to employ than civil servants. From a purely practical
9There are 1122 territorial units, however 20 are corregimientos as opposed to municipalities. There were elections in
1100 municipalities 2015; it is from these municipalities that the sample of experimental municipalities was drawn.
10Bogotá has a local council of 45 councilors; the next largest councils have 21 members.
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standpoint, contractors have higher powered incentives than are typical in canonical public sector
settings (Dixit, 2002). Contracts are short term, on average less than five months, whereas civil
service employees empirically enjoy longer tenure and thus higher job security. The processes
of contracting are relatively lax and the share of contractors that could reasonably be considered
“patronage hires” is certainly higher than the share of of civil servants, though this is an admittedly
imperfect proxy.
Municipalities are legally constrained to a maximum budget share that they can devote to re-
muneration of civil servants. These constraints are a function of a municipal classification based
on revenues and population (Ley 617 de 2000). Municipal workforces are thus supplemented by
contractors. From the perspective of a politician, contracting provides a relatively flexible means
of delivering jobs. Yet, limited tenure provides few opportunities to develop expertise and, as prac-
ticed, contracting yields high fluctuation in actual staffing levels within the alcaldías throughout the
year, possibly reducing productivity of the bureaucracy.
2.2.3 Complaints and Oversight
I posit a fundamental role for citizen complaints as a means of seeking oversight over bureaucrats.
As in much of Latin America, Colombia provides substantial legal rights for making complaints.
The Colombian Constitution of 1991 mandates the right to access public information for all citizens
(Article 74) and statutory law allows Colombians to request “recognition of rights, intervention of a
government entity or official, legal resolution, service provision, information, copies of documents,
consultations, [various forms of] complaints, and claims” by written petition (translated from Ley
1755 de 2015, Article 14). In turn, the government has three weeks (fifteen business days) to
respond to the petition. Complaints also emerge through less formal channels; the distinction is not
relevant for the purposes of the theory so long as costs vary across the population.
Some complaints are ostensibly handled by other higher-level bureaucrats, while others rise to
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local mayors. While such instances are, in principle, hardly newsworthy, mayors do audit the local
administration of social programs. Yet even in this context, there are regular news reports of mayors
responding to complaints about the function of social programs, typically by auditing local rolls of
beneficiaries.11 For such action to influence bureaucrats’ behavior, threats of reprimand must be
perceived. An original survey of street-level bureaucrats in alcaldías in Bogotá and Cundinamarca
finds that 78% (57/73) of these bureaucrats perceive that a mistaken decision would be punished
(with varying severity) and decisions would be reversed (see Appendix A.3 for survey information).
While nationwide data on complaints to local entities is not collected, analysis of over 440,000
complaints filed in public entities in Bogotá from January 2017 through June 2018 and compiled by
the Veeduría Distrital provides two stylized facts of note. First, virtually all complaints relate to ser-
vice provision and approximately 125,000 complaints (28 percent) explicitly relate to bureaucrats’
actions in service provision. This represents the most common class of complaints. Second, lever-
aging Bogotá’s geographic segregation by class, analysis of complaints at the locality level suggests
that there are substantially more complaints per capita in richer localities. Figure A.4 shows a posi-
tive association between the the average class designation (estrato) of residential properties in each
locality and the per-capita rate of complaint submission to each local alcaldía. This pattern emerges
despite the fact that service provision is notably better in richer localities – those where complaints
are most frequent.12 (See Appendix A.4 for details.)
11Recent newsworthy investigations include investigation of how a councilor in Mosquera, Cundinamarca made it
onto a list of means-tested beneficiaries for social programs (SISBÉN); a scam to stuff the rolls for Adultos Mayor, a
subsidy for senior citizens, in Florencia, Caquetá; and a general audit of the SISBÉN rolls in Pitalito, Huila. The first two
investigations occurred in response to citizen complaints.
12The model implies that the group with higher barriers to complaint (the poor) could, in equilibrium, complain more
than the rich. If the rich receive better services such that they do not need to complain, the poor could complain at
higher rates. To the extent that the rich do complain more frequently despite receiving better service, the model provides
qualified evidence against taste-based bias of a high magnitude (see Appendix A.1.5).
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Figure 2.2: Rate of complaints filed by locality in Bogotá by average wealth of the locality.
2.2.4 Audited Social Welfare Services
I audit two nationwide social welfare programs that are administered, in part, by officials embed-
ded in every municipal government. Specifically, the national government agencies that oversee
these programs maintain agreements (convenios) with each municipality that mandates that local
alcaldías hire the local program officials. The programs, the System for the Identification of Bene-
ficiaries of Social Programs (SISBÉN) and Más Familias en Acción (MFA), provide coverage on a
nationwide geographic scale. These programs provide access to or transfers to low-income Colom-
bians. Colombia is among world’s most unequal countries with a very large low-income population,
indicating a large but not universal pool of potential beneficiaries for each program. Existing anal-
yses of the programs suggest very different levels of politicization between the two programs.
Created in 1995, SISBÉN is a household index of assets used for qualification for means-tested
social programs.13 SISBÉN is a prerequisite to access subsidized health insurance and most social
13SISBÉN is not a social program in the conventional sense; it does not confer a direct benefit on registrants. However,
this is the means by which Colombians access social benefits and is widely regarded as a central piece of the social policy
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programs, including Más Familias en Acción. The municipal service associated with SISBÉN is
the administration and readministration of household survey of assets. The survey is then sent to
the National Department of Planning (DNP), which generates a score on an index through a private
formula. At present, over 36 million Colombians are registered in the SISBÉN system, representing
approximately 70 percent of the population. SISBÉN is thought to be manipulated by citizens (i.e.
by hiding assets during the survey) or local bureaucrats. Past iterations of the formula have been
changed to reduce local discretion. I identify many municipalities with far more SISBÉN registra-
tions than the ostensible population, supporting longstanding views of politicization (Camacho and
Conover, 2011).
Created in 2002, MFA (formerly Familias en Acción), is Colombia’s national conditional cash
transfer program that provides subsidies to (mostly) mothers on the basis of compliance with their
children’s health and educational requisites. Each municipality has one MFA official (enlace),
though the program is overseen by a much larger office in larger municipalities. These individuals
provide information to recipients and monitor compliance with community participation aspects of
the program. MFA enrolls between 15-20 percent of Colombian households, providing subsidies es-
timated at approximately 15 percent of median household consumption among recipients (Fiszbein
et al., 2009). In contrast to SISBÉN, MFA is designed and implemented as per transparent and
uniform programmatic guidelines, at least relative to other conditional cash transfer programs in the
region (De la O, 2015).
2.3 Research Design
To test the implications of my theory of bureaucratic biases, the research design must be able to
(a) elicit bias and (b) measure bureaucratic effort, the outcome of interest. I utilize phone audits to
facilitate direct behavioral measurement of bureaucrats’ response to requests for service (informa-
landscape.
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tion). I implement these audits at national scale in Colombia. In order to elicit bias, I randomly
assign petitioner characteristics. The random assignment permits direct identification of bias, ∆. I
also randomize the several characteristics of the petition itself to test theoretical claims about the
sensitivity of bias to the cost of effort and to reduce detection of the audits.
2.3.1 Audit Experiment
The unit of random assignment is the petition: a call with a request for a service. I utilize a facto-
rial experiment to randomly assign characteristics of petitions. The treatments provide exogenous
manipulations in the bureaucrat’s and politician’s marginal cost of effort, cB and cP , as well as in
observable attributes of the petitioner, g. Several aspects of petitions are constant across calls. Given
the composition of MFA recipients – mostly mothers – all petitioners are female. While all calls
were made from Bogotá, the outgoing phone numbers appeared as standard cell phone numbers. In
Colombia, cell phone numbers do not convey geographic information.
2.3.1.1 Treatments
In order to induce experimental variation in bias, I manipulate identity-based characteristics of the
petitioners. These characteristics are rooted in the Colombian social and political context, and
serve as the analogue to the groups in the theoretical model. First, I assign the socioeconomic
class (estrato) of the caller. Since independence (and before), class has represented an organizing
feature of Colombian society and political life (Martz, 1997; Sanders, 2004). Given the focus of
the social programs audited, I differentiate between low- and lower middle-class callers.14 Focus
groups with Colombians of different socioeconomic classes and observation of calls in a government
call center suggest several avenues in which the class of a caller can be immediately distinguished
by phone. Specifically, callers in the two groups vary in their vocabulary, salutations for figures
14For readers familiar with Colombia’s class categorization system, lower class refers to estratos 1 and 2. Middle
class refers to estrato 3. Politically-defined class categories (estratos) range from 1 to 6. Appendix A.5.2 reflects the
distribution of individuals by class in the population as of 2005.
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of authority (bureaucrats), and the framing of questions. While class communicates a variety of
features, I assume that on average lower middle-class individuals have relatively greater ability to
engage (access) the bureaucracy than lower-class individuals.
A second identity-based manipulation relies on regionalism in Colombia. Due to colonial settle-
ment patterns, a rugged topography, and limited central government penetration, social and political
life flourished within regions in the 19th century (González González, 2014; Uribe de Hincapié
and Álvarez Gaviria, 1998). Two centuries later, regional accents remain quite distinct and regions
maintain relatively distinct cultures and political organization (Ocampo, 2014). I randomly assign
Bogotano, Paisa, and Costeño regional accents. These accents represent the most widely-spoken
accents in Colombia and are collectively spoken by ≈60 percent of the Colombian population. Ap-
pendix A.5.1 includes maps of the geographical coverage of these accents.
The accents probe concepts of embededness of petitioners. Recent arguments have emphasized
the embeddedness of bureaucrats within state or local governments, using bureaucrat region (resp.
state) of origin to measure “embeddedness” (Pepinsky, Pierskalla, and Sacks, 2017; Bhavnani and
Lee, 2018). Extending this logic, in a context where the vast majority of local bureaucrats are drawn
from local communities, regional accent should provide a signal of embeddedness or lack thereof.
There is not an obvious ranking of costs of access within the accents, though long-held stereotypes
and data on outcomes hold that service is substantially better in the highlands (home of the Bogotano
and Paisa accents) than on the Caribbean coast (home of the Costeño accent).
The third identity-based treatment focuses on migrant status. This treatment is communicated
during the petition through a statement that the individual in need of the service is a recent (internal)
migrant. The “resident” condition does not provide this information. Rates of internal migration
have long stood among the highest in Latin America and encompass both ordinary and conflict-
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induced migration (Martine, 1975; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008).15 See Appendix A.5.3 for estimates
of rates of internal migration in Colombia. The migrant condition signals two potentially relevant
features. First, migrants are apt to have less familiarity with a municipality, suggesting higher
costs of access. Second, following Gaikwad and Nellis (2017), migrant status indicates a much
lower likelihood of voting, as there is no absentee voting and re-registering in a new municipality is
cumbersome and occurs during relatively short temporal windows prior to elections.
The final manipulation varies the technical specificity of the petition.16 For both programs,
the “easy” version of the question simply asks how a non-enrolled/registered citizen could enter
SISBÉN or MFA, respectively. The “technical” version of the questions poses a question about a
situation with specific technical program requirement. This manipulation allows me to test sensitiv-
ity of bias to costs to the bureaucrat which aids in discriminating between bias mechanisms.
Collectively, all four factors are fully crossed, yielding a 2×3×2×2 factorial design summarized
in Table 2.2. This yields 24 distinct treatments for each of two programs, though I analyze along the
margins (by attribute). Note that the twelve confederates were actresses. All confederates voiced
both low- and middle-class petitions. To maximize authenticity, actresses voiced only their own
regional accent and calls were divided between four actresses per region of origin. Calls were
randomly assigned to each confederate.
All calls were recorded. I hired Colombian coders to listen to all of the recordings to double
code call characteristics and responses. Given that the coders were blinded to treatment assignment,
this yields one measure of compliance with treatment assignment. I define compliance as a measure
of whether coders reported hearing the assigned factors (i.e. if they heard a Costeña petitioner on a
15For example, 7.4 million Colombians are internally displaced, representing approximately 15% of the Colombian
population.
16Under the assumptions of the model, that cP > cB this may or may not also increase the politician’s cost of effort
cP commensurately.
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Factor Levels Mode of Administration Compliance Rate
EFFORT (COSTS)
Difficulty of Request • Easy
• Difficult
Technical specificity of request to petition, as




Regional Accent • Bogotá
• Paisa
• Costeño





Socioeconomic Class • Low
• Lower Middle




Stated Migrant Status • Migrant
• Resident
One statement in delivery of petition (mi-




Table 2.2: Factors and levels employed in the factorial design. Compliance rates are calculated as the
proportion of calls correctly classified by double coders out of the number of calls assigned to each
level for which the factor was revealed (see Section 4.3 for details on the rollout and estimation).
∗Note that while the framing of the interaction varied across class but the statement of the question
itself was stated identically for both classes.
call assigned to a Costeño accent). The rates of compliance are reported in the final column of Table
2.2. A more detailed analysis of compliance is reported in Appendix A.11.1. While I cannot know
what bureaucrats intuited, rates of compliance in the double coding exercise are quite high across
all factors and levels, alleviating major concerns.
2.3.1.2 Sampling, Assignment
The sample of alcaldías was selected with two opposing objectives. First, by maximizing the num-
ber of petitions made to the same alcaldía, I increase statistical efficiency and allow the estimation of
within-alcaldía treatment effects. Second, I seek to minimize the probability of detection. In order
to achieve both objectives, I stratify municipalities into three groups by estimated 2018 population.
Note that Bogotá provides services at the level of 20 localities. The entities are thus municipal
alcaldías outside of Bogotá and local alcaldías in Bogotá. The number of petitions varies by stra-
tum. In the large stratum, six petitions were assigned, three each for SISBEN and MFA. In the
medium stratum, four petitions were assigned, two per program. In the small stratum, one petition
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n Petitions per Entity
Stratum Stratum Size Population threshold Sample SISBÉN MFA Total Total Petitions
Large 80 > 100,000 All 3 3 6 480
Medium 140 [35,000, 100,000) All 2 2 4 560
Small 898 < 35,000 398 1 1 2 796
Total 1118 618 1836
Table 2.3: Sample of municipalities (or localities) and number of petitions. Note that in the small
stratum, localities are selected proportionally to population size. All population data from 2018
estimates from DANE.
was assigned per program. The distribution and number of petitions is depicted in Table 2.3.
Blocking by alcaldía was used in order to ensure maximal within variation and avoid detection.
The blocking procedures are detailed in Appendix A.9.1. The blocking ensures that each alcaldía
received equal numbers of low- and middle-class petitioners; equal numbers of easy and difficult
questions; and received half the petitions from migrants. To minimize the likelihood of detection,
the more specific technical questions were never repeated within an alcaldía. This implies that the
ratio of easy to technical questions in the large stratum was 2:1. The estimation strategy accounts
for these differential probabilities of assignment. Further, no alcaldía received more than one call
from the same class/accent combination or was asked the same question more than once.
The order of calls was randomly assigned to space out calls to the same alcaldía over approxi-
mately four weeks. The assignment process for this rollout procedure is documented in Appendix
A.9.3. In general, first attempts of each call were consistent with the assigned ordering (within
morning or afternoon), but repeated attempts complicate this mapping. Finally, the time of day –
morning or afternoon– within each alcaldía’s hours of service was randomly assigned. Each al-
caldía received equal numbers of calls at each time. Ultimately, just 6 calls were detected. Analysis
of the detected calls yields no systematic patterns, minimizing concerns in this regard (see Appendix
A11.2).
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2.3.1.3 Outcomes
The audits measure a rich set of behavioral outcomes relating to service provision through the course
of the call. Appendix A.6 clarifies the sequencing of calls and outcome measurement. To measure
service provision, all enumerators filled out an instrument to document the trajectory, outcomes, and
information conveyed in each call. Further, all calls were recorded. Two trained research assistants
listened to every recording and double entered all data, including additional measures of compliance
and qualitative observations of each call.
I focus on three classes of outcomes. For the alcaldías reached by phone, I provide a mapping
of the call through the alcaldía. Since dispatchers who answer are not generally program officers,
I measure whether a petitioner was provided access to a program officer in order to make the pe-
tition. I map the mode of transmission through the bureaucracy to measure the accessibility and
navigability of service providers within local bureaucracies. In particular, I measure four outcomes
dichotomously: (1) whether the dispatcher identified himself/herself; (2) whether the petitioner was
able to make (state) the petition; (3) whether the petitioner was connected to at least a second offi-
cial; and (4) whether a program officer for SISBÉN or MFA from an ex-ante pre-treatment list was
identified.
Most important, I measure agents’ responses to the petition. I focus on the amount and verac-
ity of information provided relative to the benchmark (correct) answers specified by the national
government agencies that oversee each program. Outcomes at this stage also include a measure
of red tape: whether an official asked for extra requirements not specified by program guidelines
and whether petitioners were asked to come “in person” without further guidance. I measure five
pre-registered outcomes of interest: (1) whether the correct, complete answer was provided; (2)
whether partial information was provided; (3) whether any actionable information was provided (a
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sum of #1 and #2); (4) whether the petitioner was asked to come to the alcaldía in person without
further instruction; and (5) whether red tape was solicited. The “come to the alcaldía” response
merits some clarification. All services require an eventual trip to the alcaldía. Arriving without
the requisite documents imposes additional costs on the petitioner, regardless of the bureaucrat’s
intent.17
Finally, I use confederate ratings of service as a benchmark to the behavioral measures of ser-
vice provision. Here I examine whether the perceptions of the petitioner align with experiences of
service. A z-score index includes assessments of competence, knowledge, respect, trustworthiness,
and satisfaction.
2.3.1.4 Ethical Considerations
Government audit experiments generally raise three ethical concerns: the use of deception, the pro-
tection of subjects, and the waste of time and public resources. I address the concern of deception
through a novel model of collaboration with national government agencies. The collaboration in-
cluded consultation throughout the research design process with the agency overseeing the Colom-
bian bureaucracy at the national level (the Administrative Department of Public Administration) as
well as the agencies overseeing SISBÉN (National Department of Planning) and MFA (Department
of Social Prosperity). These agencies provided guidance on the programs to be audited, the con-
tent of the audits, the correct answers to the audits, and some administrative data. In exchange, I
conducted the experiment independently with external funding and produced and presented a policy
report to each agency in June 2018.
Notably, these agencies conduct their own “mystery shopper” (cliente incógnito) audits of em-
17Two plausible interpretations of the “come to the alcaldía” response include: (a) political capture is more likely to
occur in person than on the phone; or (b) the bureaucrat believes that the petitioner will only understand in person. I
remain agnostic between these interpretations but maintain that failure to provide information imposes an additional cost
to petitioners.
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ployees and contractors periodically, though my collaborators do not recall randomizing any compo-
nents. By conducting the audits independently, I provide additional privacy protections to subjects
(audited bureaucrats) in a manner that cannot be guaranteed in government audits.
In terms of wasting of time and resources, the costs to public entities in Colombia should be
weighed against the benefits of this original data and report. The upper bound on the costs to these
entities can be quantified quite simply. The answered calls (i.e. those that occupied the time of
public employees) total under 200 hours. At the maximum monthly salary for the maximum rank
of employee (“Profesional”) that would have spoken with a caller, the upper bound on the cost of
these calls totals $2, 644 USD.18 This totals less than 10 months for one employee at the official
minimum wage, a common local benchmark.
2.3.2 Administrative Data
In order to understand the relationship between bureaucratic organization and behavioral measures
of service provision by street-level bureaucrats, I leverage several original administrative datasets
on public sector personnel in Colombia. The first datasets contains individual public employees
working as civil servants in Colombia with self-entered name, position, work experience, and ed-
ucation. Outside of Bogotá, I use the data from the Sistema de Información y Gestión del Empleo
Público (SIGEP) and inside Bogotá I use the city-level equivalent (SIDEAP). This provides data on
public employees hired under the law for public employment.19
Second, I generate a list of contractors working for municipal governments using data from
Colombia Compra Eficiente, the national government entity that oversees public procurement. This
source contains data on public sector contractors working in all government entities. While con-
18Calculated from Decreto No. 309 de 2018. Maximum public sector salaries are benchmarked by municipal “cate-
gory,” a measure of population and local development. This calculation uses the highest salary in the “special” category
of municipality (highest paying) and is thus a strict upper bound.
19Ley 80 de 2003.
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tracting is generally cheaper than hiring civil servants, it concurrently serves as a means to preserve
patronage in the face of civil service laws. As such, not all contractors are patronage employees,
but my measurement relies on the assumption that contractors are more likely than civil servants to
be patronage employees and that aggregate patterns of contracting by alcaldía measure the use of
contracts for patronage.
Both datasets are entered and maintained by officials within each alcaldía. In full, 82 percent of
the employees reached in the experiment and program officers appear in this combined list. In the
cases in which I am unable to identify the employee, 4.7 percent come from municipalities that do
not use one or both datasets.
I also leverage additional demographic and electoral data. Demographic data on the charac-
teristics of municipalities allow me to contextualize the identities portrayed in the calls to local
constituencies. In terms of the theoretical model, such data provides some information about the
shape of the distribution of costs, fg, within a given population of citizens.
With the electoral data compiled at Universidad de los Andes, I seek to measure political com-
petition, a feature which should increase the politician’s incentives to provide public goods, S, and
may covary with the tastes of elected politicians, γgP . Standard measures of political competition
are complicated by features of municipal politics in the Colombian context. First, at the municipal
level, party labels do not signal ideology and high rates of party switching suggest that analyses at
the party level contain little meaningful information. Further, measures based on raw electoral data
such as mayoral margin of victory (distance between the winner and runner up) exhibit very little
serial correlation.20 Thus, observing a close election at time t provides essentially no information
about competitiveness at t + 1. As a result, I develop other measures of political competition. In
20The quality of electoral data is generally high. As such, lack of serial correlation is ostensibly driven by characteristics
of electoral competition, not data limitations.
CHAPTER 2. BUREAUCRATS DRIVING INEQUALITY IN ACCESS: EVIDENCE FROM
COLOMBIA 47
particular, I look at the frequency with which individuals are re-elected and which family names con-
centrate among local council members (concejales) over a twenty year panel (six electoral cycles).
These measures build upon those used by Acemoglu et al. (2008) to measure political inequality in
the department of Cundinamarca, Colombia in the nineteenth century.
2.3.3 Estimation
The estimation of causal quantities in the experiment accounts for the process of selection and the
delivery of treatment during the course of the interactions with local government officials. Post-
treatment selection represents a threat to inference in existing audit experiments (Coppock, 2018).
In the present experiment, if a Costeña petitioner was more likely to be able to state the petition,
conditioning the sample on having made a petition may induce bias in estimates of the effect of
accent on informational responses.
To overcome this limitation, the attributes (factors) in the factorial design were revealed at three
distinct points in the call, as depicted in Table 2.4. This defines three relevant samples: all attempted
calls, all answered calls, and all calls in which the petition was delivered. Factors not yet revealed
in a given sample are referred to as placebos; factors revealed within the sample are referred to
as treatments; and factors revealed prior to revelation of the a sample are regarded as pre-treatment
covariates. Point estimates on the treatment variables (in the relevant sample) are causally identified.
Taking advantage of the rollout of factors during the course of the call increases statistical efficiency
and while avoiding the threat of bias induced by post-treatment sample selection.
I seek to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) of the randomly-assigned
treatments. This effect is the marginal effect of each factor, averaged over the joint distribution
over other factors. I account for the differential probabilities of assignment to easy and technical
questions across the strata of municipalities with two estimators. I estimate the sample AMCE
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using inverse probability weighting (IPW) or alcaldía fixed effects.21 The latter strategy examines
differential treatment of petitioners leveraging variation only from within the same alcaldía.
I estimate the AMCE with either estimator with regressions of the form of Equation 2.11 using
OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Note that these standard errors correspond to
the level of treatment assignment: the petition. The set of indicators in the regression model cor-
responds to the factor levels in the design, here Z = {Afternooni, Technicali,Lower Middle Classi,
Bogotá accenti,Costeño accenti, and Residenti}. In Equation 2.11,ψm indicates municipality fixed
effects; IPW specifications do not include this term.22 κp indicates a vector of program (SISBÉN or






i + κp +ψm + εipm (2.11)
In order to estimate the conditional AMCE with respect to institutional, demographic, or polit-
ical covariates, I estimate Equation 2.12 using OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
In this equation, moderators and covariates are represented by the variable Xi (resp. Xm). The
conditional AMCEs estimated in are causally identified under the conditions specified above for
the AMCE. The conditional AMCEs are estimated by βj and βj + γj , where j indexes the treat-












iXi + κp +
∑
p∈P
αpXi + εipm (2.12)
21The implied AMCE estimand coming from the two estimators is subtly different. For the IPW estimator, the sample
AMCE (for a factor Z) is E[Yipm(Zi = 1,Z) − Yipm(Zi = 0,Z)], where Zi is the factor of interest, Z is a vector of
all other attributes. For the FE estimator, the AMCE is given by
∑
m∈M wmE[Yipm(Zi = 1,Z) − Yipm(Zi = 0,Z)],
where wm is a weight proportional to the inverse of the variance within the block.
22Fixed effects are highly prognostic of outcomes. Regressions of the main outcomes on a vector of municipality fixed
effects yield R2’s of 0.37 to 0.55.
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Call Made −→ Call Answered −→ Petition Made
1836 Calls 1194 Calls 911 Calls
618 Municipalities 466 Municipalities 424 Municipalities
(Time of Day) X (Time of Day) Not point identified (Time of Day) Not point identified
Accent Not revealed Accent X Accent Not point identified
Class Not revealed Class X Class Not point identified
Difficulty Not revealed Difficulty Not revealed Difficulty X
Migrant Status Not revealed Migrant Status Not revealed Migrant Status X
Table 2.4: Timing of treatment delivery during the process of a call. Attributes that are “not yet re-
vealed” serve as placebos in the outcomes prior to their revelation. The timing of treatment delivery
defines the relevant sample upon which effects are estimated. In endogenous samples where treat-
ment effects are “not point identified,” the attributes are included as covariates but (point) estimates
are not causally identified.
With multiple outcomes, high dimensional treatments, and covariates, the design gives rise to
some concerns of limited power, particularly for interaction terms, and of multiple comparisons
problems. To alleviate these concerns and make inferences on more theoretically-relevant concepts,
I seek to aggregate “up” from the basic AMCE estimates presented here. To test for bias, I make
inferences on the basis of F -tests (or the equivalent) on the joint significance of relevant coeffi-
cients. To estimate these models, I specify the subset of relevant estimators (β’s in Equation 2.12)
and implement an F -test to test the null hypothesis that all β’s in the subset are equal to zero. I
refrain from the use of high-dimensional interactions which are underpowered in the present de-
sign. Importantly, note that the inclusion of interactions between identity-based characteristics does
not improve the predictive power of the models. Joint tests of interactions between the identity
treatments reported in Appendix A.11.3 provide no evidence that identity characteristics serve as
complements or substitutes in terms in bureaucrats’ responses to petitioners.
2.3.4 On Identification
Section 2.4 shows that bias in effort, ∆, is identifiable by manipulation (random assignment) of
petitioner type. The model further implies that there is no direct test of the sources of bias through
the manipulated attributes in the factorial design. As such, I test the broader theory about the
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sources of bureaucratic bias through examination of the testable implications of the model. With
one exception, the tests of these implications rely upon treatment-by-covariate interactions with
institutional and societal features that I cannot manipulate. While I use a flexible, non-parametric,
and interactive covariate adjustment strategy to probe the robustness of these inferences, tests of the
comparative statics that use administrative data remain observational.23
2.4 Identifying Bias in Bureaucratic Effort
I begin by estimating the magnitude of bureaucratic bias by socioeconomic class, migrant status, and
regional accent. Bias in effort, ∆, is identified by differences across petitioner treatment conditions.
Where this difference is zero, there is no evidence of bias. In addition, baseline levels of service
provision are also relevant for interpreting these differences.
This analysis focuses on how observed effort varies with randomly assigned petitioner identity
characteristics. Given that the regional accent and socioeconomic class (ideally) were revealed as
soon as the call was answered, I consider outcomes of process and access as well as the information
provision outcomes. I analyze these outcomes on the full sample of answered calls (n = 1, 194).
Logically, the “unrevealed” factors (class, accent, migrant status, and petition difficulty) should
be orthogonal to whether or not a call was answered or not. Reassuringly, F -tests of the joint
significance of these factors provide no evidence of selection (imbalance) across unrevealed factors
on the probability that a call was answered in Appendix A.15.
2.4.1 Bias in Access to the Alcaldía
First, I investigate whether petitioner characteristics influence process of the petition through the
alcaldías in Table 2.5. Column 1 examines whether the dispatcher (original official) identified
themselves; if they did not identify themselves ex-ante, callers asked for a name. Levels of iden-
23Note that the conditional AMCEs by subgroup are identified. The difference in conditional AMCES – the tests
implied by the comparative statics from the model – are not causally identified without imposing additional assumptions.
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tification were high (≈ 0.85) and there are no apparent differences across callers per the randomly
assigned petitioner characteristics.
Column 2 examines whether the caller was able to ask the question. In general, confederates
were unable to make petitions when the dispatcher passed the call or referred the caller to a second
official and the second official did not answer within two attempts. The lack of (robust) differences
across across identity characteristics is therefore not surprising. Further, it provides no evidence
that the dispatcher’s handling of calls varied by class or regional accent of the callers.
Column 3 measures whether the petitioner was successful in speaking to (at least) a second
official, a measure of access. The mean of this outcome is lower than with the petitions because
some petitions were made to the dispatcher directly at the dispatcher’s request. There is no bias on
the basis of class or accent on this measure of access.
Column 4 examines whether any official identified herself as one of the officials on the pre-
treatment administrative lists of MFA and SISBÉN officials collected from government partners.
The results indicate somewhat higher levels of access to these program administrators for the
middle-class petitioners relative to lower class petitioners, a difference of approximately 4.9 per-
centage points. Taken with Column 3, this finding likely emerges from higher levels of identifi-
cation (by a second official) to middle-class petitioners. The joint test of coefficients on class and
accent, however, is only marginally significant. Collectively, these analyses suggest limited, if any,
bias in navigating the alcaldías within an initial interaction on account of class or accent.
The lack of evidence of bias by dispatchers is important for several reasons. First, high rates of
identification, petition making, and access to a second official indicate statistical power to identify
even modest amounts of bias. The power of the tests combined with the null findings suggest that
for this class of tasks, there is no evidence of bias within the present research design. Second, the
lack of differences in Columns 1-3 (outcomes measuring dispatcher behavior) provide no evidence
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that bureaucrats were “differentially confused” by some petitioner or script characteristics.24
2.4.2 Bias in Information Provided
Columns 5-10 examine bias in the responses to the petitions. Note that these responses are not con-
ditional on making a petition; thus failing to receive information comprises both wrong responses
and no response. Column 5 provides no evidence of bias in the probability that a petitioner receives
a complete, correct response on the basis of the identity attributes. Note, however that baseline
levels of correct responses are quite low. To the extent that bias represents the withholding of effort
or information, there is limited scope to move this outcome. In this context, note that the (small)
treatment effects on on lower-middle class and resident represent effect sizes of around 20% of this
baseline.
There is notable bias in the likelihood of receiving a partial response or any information (Column
6). Lower middle-class petitioners are substantially more likely to receive a partial response or
any information relative to lower class petitioners. In Column 7, the point estimate on receipt of
any information is 8.1 percentage points and represents a 16 percent increase in the probability of
receiving any information relative to the baseline (lower class). There is noisy evidence of a penalty
against migrants.
Columns 8 and 9 track two outcomes in which information was not provided. Column 8, “no
information” includes any response that did not provide individuals information or invite them to
come to the alcaldía.25 These responses included hang-ups, “don’t know”-type responses, and situ-
ations in which the bureaucrat stated that they did not want to provide information. It is a relatively
rare outcome and disproportionately impacts lower-income callers, though the point estimates and
24One concern is that because the lower class petitioner scripts were less direct, they may have confused the bureaucrats
that answered the phones. There is no evidence that this was the case.
25This outcome was not prespecified.
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F -tests are not significant at conventional thresholds.
Column 9 measures whether or not individuals were simply told to “come to the alcaldía”
without further information. While all services require the person to come to the alcaldía with
documents, failure to specify these requirements by phone passes the cost onto the citizen. The
estimates suggest that lower-middle class individuals are 37.5 percent less likely to receive this
response than lower class individuals, while residents are half as likely as migrants to receive the
response.
The results in Column 10 indicate disproportionate use of red tape – a request for extra require-
ments – against Paisas relative to both Bogotanas and Costeñas, with sizable point estimates of
0.071 and 0.098, respectively. These differences are not driven by individual enumerators or pairs
of enumerators across the groups (Appendix A.16.2). It is unclear why differences emerge on this
outcome specifically.
The observed biases in information provision on the basis of petitioner class merit some ad-
ditional discussion. It does seem that the class treatment was recognizable; independent coders
identified the assigned coding in 77.5% of calls, as reported in Table 2.2.26 While class is neces-
sarily a compound treatment in the Colombian context, analysis of the magnitude of the “complier”
AMCE relative to the intent-to-treat AMCE in Appendix A.16.1 suggests that bias enters through
what blinded coders perceive to indicate social class within the calls.27
There are several explanations for the generally null effects of regional accent. First, it could be
that bureaucrats did not hear regional accents. This seems highly unlikely as blinded coders listening
to recordings of the calls correctly identified over 99% of calls (Appendix A.11.1). Second, it could
26The blinded coders were given an “I don’t know” option in addition to the two class categories; another 13.5% of
calls fell into this category. Only 9% of calls were incorrectly classified.
27The estimates of the complier AMCE can be seen as an informal test of the excludability assumption as applied to
the social class treatment.
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be that a Bogotá accent means something different in Bogotá than in other parts of the country. To
this end, I report the results of a prespecified analysis on the subsample of calls from the regions in
which these accents are local in Appendix A.16.3. Here the treatment is defined as an “in-region”
accent. In the full subsample, estimates are near-zero and confidence intervals bound zero for all
outcomes. This masks some heterogeneity between the three regions, however. While I cannot
reject the null hypothesis that any of the conditional AMCEs is zero, there is suggestive evidence
that Costeñas are punished in their home region relative to outsiders, while there is mild evidence
of an in-region bonus for both Bogotanas and Paisas in their respective home regions.
Collectively the differences in treatment of lower-middle class versus lower class petitioners
track those of residents versus migrants, though the class effects are substantively stronger. How-
ever, as indicated in Table 2.4, migrant status was not revealed until the petition was made. Ap-
pendix A.16.4 reveals that these estimates are conservative and less efficient than estimates of mi-
grant status on the sample of petitions alone. To the extent that these groups are relatively marginal-
ized at least within the experimental comparisons, these comparisons provide some evidence about
the dynamics of bias that I explore in the next section.
Beyond the behavioral measures, confederates evaluated their interactions with bureaucrats after
each call. These results, reported in Appendix A.16.5, suggest that perceptions largely aligned
with the behavioral outcomes. Within enumerator and alcaldía, enumerators perceived slightly
worse treatment when calling as low-income petitioners. The alignment between the behavioral
measurements and perceptions of the calls increases confidence in the behavioral measures.
2.4.3 Does Information Provision Reflect Costly Effort?
I seek to validate that information provision does indeed reflect exertion of costly effort. I consider
the total amount of time spent on the call (mean: 4.83, standard deviation: 6.32 minutes). Because
the scripts for the petitions varied in length of delivery across the identity characteristics, I lack
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the ability to identify differences across petitioner identities on this outcome.28 This represents an
excludability violation: observation of a longer call could mean the bureaucrat spent more time
answering the question or that the petition took longer to make. By the same token, where script
length and information provision counterbalance each other, an inference of no difference in time
does not provide a clear measure of differential effort.
Instead, I show that the length of calls is increasing in the amount of information provided
(correct, partial, or no information).29 I first aim to purge differences in the length of calls due
to variation in the experimental scripts. To do so, I fit a regression of ln(Minutes on call) on the
experimental factors, a program indicator, and enumerator fixed effects with IPW.30 I then examine
the distribution of residuals from this regression across the three types of outcomes.
Figure 2.3 depicts the distribution of residualized (logged) call length by the amount of in-
formation provided as empirical CDFs (ECDFs). The graph indicates that the cumulative length of
contact for petitions providing no information was substantially shorter than the length of those pro-
viding some information. On average, petitions receiving no information were 1.17 minutes shorter
(p < 0.01) than calls providing partial information and 1.21 minutes (p < 0.01) shorter than calls
providing complete answers. These differences represent effects of approximately 25 percent of the
mean for calls with no information (4.63 minutes). Further, the crossing of the ECDFs for partial
and complete information provide some evidence to adjudicate the competence vs. effort distinction
between the two types of answers. It suggests that the difference between the two answers is not
simply differential competence and that, in the upper median of the distribution, bureaucrats spent
more time to provide a more complete answer. This is consistent with qualitative observations of
28For example, the migrant petitions included an extra sentence that was not included in the resident petition.
29Incorrect includes the alcaldía only response from Table 2.5.
30There was some heterogeneity in the pacing of calls between enumerators.
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Figure 2.3: The distribution of residualized call lengths by the amount of information contained in
the response. Calls that provided no information were uniformly shorter than calls with partial or
complete responses. In the upper quantiles of the distribution, calls providing correct answers were
longer than those providing partial information.
confederates.
2.5 Examining the Mechanism
The evidence of bias in information provision against lower class petitioners and, to a lesser extent,
internal migrants motivates analysis of what drives these biases. I seek to distinguish between the
three mechanisms suggested by the model: bureaucrats’ tastes, politicians’ tastes, and complaint-
driven bias. The experiment measures bureaucrats’ effort, meaning I do not measure oversight or
biases in oversight directly. Indeed, the question is not whether biased oversight leads to biased
service outcomes, but how the likelihood of oversight conditions bureaucrats’ initial behavior. I use
the model to identify the conditions under which oversight-driven bias should be magnified.
To conduct this analysis, I proceed in two steps, following Proposition 3. To begin, I endeavor
to separate bureaucrats’ taste-based bias from oversight-based bias (composed of politicians’ taste-
based and complaint-driven bias) on class. Then, I seek to tease apart complaint-driven bias and the
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politician’s taste-based bias. These tests follow directly from the comparative statics presented in
Table 2.1. I then distinguish the results from an alternate account from existing models of differen-
tial treatment in the form of screening clients for services.
2.5.1 Political Oversight Drives Bias
In order to disentangle bureaucratic taste-based bias from oversight-driven, bias, I consider two
parameters of the model: the politician’s marginal cost of effort, cP , and bureaucratic incentives,
r. Do the costs of a task reduce the level of bias in effort? As effort becomes more costly to the
bureaucrat and audits become more costly for the politician, effort should decline. Increases in these
costs should also attenuate bias.
Analysis of bias as a function of petition difficulty provides an experimental test of this logic. I
find that class-based bias emerges on easy questions but not on technical questions, where the cost
of effort is highest for the bureaucrat. The left panel of Figure 2.4 visualizes estimates from an inter-
active specification where the technical petition indicator is interacted across all other experimental
factors (petitioner characteristics and program) in the design. Consistent with the theory, substan-
tially less information is provided in response to the technical petition. Further, there is no evidence
of bias, given that the solid and dotted blue lines are do not substantially diverge for any response.
Bias is driven by the easy (registration) petition, as is evident from the divergence of the green lines.
Bias is most strongly apparent in easy petitions for the provision of any information (p < 0.002).
Indeed, the difference in the estimated bias against poor petitioners for easy and technical questions
in the provision of any information is substantively large at 10.1 percentage points and statistically
significant at the α = .1 level in a two-tailed test (p = 0.079).
This finding is consistent with the prediction with any of the bias mechanisms. However, con-
sider that technical petition may also induce a shock to the politician’s cost of effort, cP . Per
Proposition 3, if bias varies in the politician’s cost of effort, there is evidence of oversight-driven
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Figure 2.4: Sensitivity of bias in information provision to the cost of effort (difficulty of the pe-
tition) (left) and program (SISBÉN or MFA) (right). The area of the polygon corresponds to the
level of bias for each subgroup and for each level of information provision. Given that the lower-
middle class consistently received more information, the lower curve of all polygons represents the
lower-middle class and the upper curve represents the lower middle class. All estimates come from
interactive models estimated with IPW.
bias ( ∂∆∂cP 6= 0 if and only if ∆O 6= 0). If the task is harder for the bureaucrat, it should also be
harder for the less expert politician. This (simultaneous) increase in the cost of the politician’s effort
should increase the relative contribution of the bureaucrat’s taste-based bias to the estimated bias in
effort. Stated another way, if the oversight-driven biases were entirely absent, the reduction of bias
observed in the data corresponds to a very large shock to cB . Importantly, service provision is not
commensurately driven to zero. There is scope to observe taste-based bias, but I do not detect any.
This test provides no evidence against oversight-driven bias.
As a further test of whether bias varies in costs to the politician (cP ), consider variation between
the two audited programs as a more direct test of the oversight channel. By all accounts, one
fundamental distinction between the operation of SISBÉN and MFA at the municipal level is the
degree of politicization. One plausible operationalization of politicization is a lower cP for SISBÉN
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and a higher cP for MFA since it is less costly for a politician to intervene in SISBÉN. Examining
variation in information provision by program thus provides one test of how bias changes when the
politician is more apt to intervene.
For sufficient increases in the politician’s cost of effort, she is less willing to monitor the bureau-
crat. This implies a higher propensity to monitor the more politicized program (SISBÉN) than the
less politicized program (MFA). Less monitoring reduces the bureaucrat’s incentives to work and
reduces the contribution of oversight-driven bias to total bias. Thus, if bias attenuates substantially
for MFA relative to SISBÉN, there is evidence that bias enters through oversight. The results in the
right panel of Figure 2.4 mirror this expectation quite precisely. More information was provided
for SISBÉN than MFA. There is clear class-based bias in the the provision of any information for
SISBÉN (p = 0.013) but no evidence of bias in the administration of MFA (p = 0.421). The
difference-in-difference estimate on the interaction between class and program is sizable at 6.7 per-
centage points, but is not statistically significant at conventional thresholds (p = 0.24). Regression
tables supporting these analyses are reported in Appendix A.17.1.
A final analysis seeking to disentangle bureaucratic taste-based from oversight-driven bias turns
to variation in bureaucrats to understand bias. Per Proposition 3, an increase in the “bite” of pun-
ishment, r, should increase oversight-driven bias. The central characteristic of bureaucratic em-
ployment that I measure is contract type, comparing contractors to civil servants. I argue that con-
tractors, all else equal, face higher powered incentives to exert effort given the prospect of contract
non-renewal.31 In terms of the model, I argue that r is higher for contractors than for civil servants.
As such, we would expect higher levels of effort and a magnification of any oversight-induced bias.
In this analysis, I study the program officers administering the program in each municipality.
31Interviews suggest contractors – patronage or not – work hard, sometimes to “compensate” for shirking civil servant
colleagues.
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Because Table 2.5 indicated that identifiability of program officers was related to the class of the
petitioner, I must restrict analysis to the dispatcher sample or the program officers (from admin-
istrative data) to avoid conditioning on a post-treatment variable. Program offices were likelier to
take the petition than dispatchers so I focus on the ex-ante list of program officers. Table 2.6 ex-
amines the conditional effects by program officer contract. It provides no evidence of differences,
on average, in bias between contractors and civil servants. Specifically, there are few differences
in information provision in the aggregate.32 Moreover, rates of bias against lower class individuals
cannot be distinguished between contractors and civil servants.
The null findings of this analysis are mixed with respect to the model. However, two caveats
in the present analysis are in order. As documented in Appendix A.12, I am unable to identify
individuals in the poorest municipalities. As subsequent analyses demonstrate, these are precisely
the locations where class-based bias is most pronounced. Further, the majority of calls did not reach
the individual identified as a program officer in the data. In larger municipalities, they often spoke
to subordinates; in smaller municipalities, they spoke to other individuals from the alcaldía with or
without knowledge of the program. In that sense, this result is very much an “intent-to-treat” effect
and attenuate differences between contractors and civil servants to zero.
Second, and more importantly, politicians’ choice of hiring mechanism is, to some extent, strate-
gic. While I lack data on the tenure of all SISBÉN program officers, approximately half of all MFA
officers (whether contractors or civil servants) have been appointed in the last two years, and fewer
than 19% have served more than five years. This suggests substantial scope for mayors’ appoint-
ment of individuals to the position, whether or not they had previously served in the alcaldía. To
this extent, the distribution of contract types varies across the two programs. Among the identified
32There is evidence that contractors provide more information in response to technical petitions. The estimates in the
table refer to an easy petition given the interactions in the estimator.
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY EMPLOYEE TYPE; IPW ESTIMATES
Lower-Middle Class −0.002 0.077∗ 0.076∗ −0.044∗ −0.032
(0.026) (0.042) (0.041) (0.025) (0.035)
Contractor: Lower-Middle Class 0.043 −0.040 0.003 −0.003 0.062
(0.042) (0.067) (0.067) (0.039) (0.057)
Conditional Effect, Contractor 0.042 0.037 0.079 -0.047 0.030
(0.034) (0.053) (0.054) (0.030) (0.045)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY EMPLOYEE TYPE; STRATUM + ENUMERATOR FE
Lower-Middle Class −0.002 0.084∗∗ 0.082∗∗ −0.045∗ −0.027
(0.026) (0.041) (0.040) (0.024) (0.035)
Contractor: Lower-Middle Class 0.042 −0.054 −0.012 0.0002 0.053
(0.041) (0.067) (0.066) (0.037) (0.057)
Conditional Effect, Contractor 0.040 0.030 0.070 -0.045 0.026
(0.032) (0.053) (0.053) (0.029) (0.044)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Mean, Lower Class and Contractor 0.077 0.438 0.515 0.112 0.207
Mean, Lower Class and Civil Servant 0.125 0.407 0.532 0.115 0.276
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.6: Bias and type of program officer type (civil servant or contractor). Conditional AMCEs
of a lower-middle class petitioner by program officer type. The base category is civil servant. In the
sample of petitions, there are n = 611 petitions to civil servants; n = 354 petitions to contractors;
n = 103 petitions to a vacant program officer; and n = 126 petitions to an official whose contract
type is unidentifiable. The program indicator is interacted with all factors in the experimental design
and a program indicator. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
MFA officials 50% are contractors; just 25% of SISBÉN officials are contractors.33 Because the
effort gains of contractors relative to civil servants are driven by the ratio of r to cP , the imbalance
in contractors should theoretically attenuate differences in the strength of oversight-driven bias in
the full sample.
Collectively, these analyses provide evidence that the observed bias is driven, at least in part,
by oversight of political principal, e.g. ∆O 6= 0. The degree to which bias is attenuated by tech-
nical questions or less politicization, there is evidence that taste-driven bias by bureaucrats is quite
33The fact that there were any civil servants running these programs in the municipalities surprised officials that oversee
the program at the national level.
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limited, e.g. ∆B ≈ 0. This conclusion is supported by several other facts beyond the scope of the
model. First, while confederates perceived worse service on average after lower-class calls, they
perceived precisely no difference in respect (see Appendix A.16.5). Respect is the only measure of
affect in the battery, an indicator of bureaucratic bias in existing audit studies (Einstein and Glick,
2016). Second, the lack of bias in the access outcomes in Table 2.5 provides additional evidence that
outcomes that are less easily audited (since complaints are typically received and ratified through
the dispatcher) do not exhibit class-based bias.
2.5.2 Bias Occurs where Differences in Access to Complaints is Greatest
In the model, bias between groups is driven by the differentiation of citizens. The differentiation
of citizens could come from three sources: differences in the distribution of costs of complaint
across groups (ηQ), differences in tastes of the bureaucrat (ηB), differences in tastes of the politician
(ηP ).34 Bias should be greatest in magnitude in places where these distances are larger. To examine
whether observed biases vary with the distribution of citizen costs of complaint, I leverage the fact
that markets for social services vary substantially across Colombia.
I argue that the differences in the distribution of costs of complaint are relative. Measures of
physical distance and familiarity with the bureaucracy vary with context. In particular, the relative
status of the individual analogues to the experimental profiles – lower and lower-middle class pe-
titioners – varies substantially across Colombia. The intuition is straightforward: a lower-middle
class profile connotes a higher status, with more access to complain, in a place where the entire
population is poor than a place with many lower-middle class (and higher) individuals.
For concreteness, consider the role of the lower and lower-middle class petitioner profiles in
two hypothetical municipalities. In one municipality, the vast majority of the population is poor
(lower class). In another, a plurality of the population is lower-middle class. The experimental
34To the extent that the previous section focused on separating ∆B from ∆O , it implicitly addresses ηB .
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profiles relate quite differently to the underlying population distribution. If the cost of complaint is
a function of relative status, the status differential between experimental profiles is far larger in the
first (poorer) municipality than in the second.
Thus, to understand where class-based bias emerges, I examine how class differences in treat-
ment vary with the class composition of municipalities. I assume that differences in cost of access
to complain are greatest where the lower middle-class is most empowered relative to poor individ-
uals. This occurs in places with more poor citizens, or higher poverty rates. Thus I use poverty
rates to operationalize ηQ. Per Proposition 3, the magnitude of bias should increase in municipal
poverty if complaint-driven bias is operative. Accordingly, this analysis should be interpreted as
heterogeneous treatment effects with municipal poverty rate as the moderator.
Figure 2.5 examines bias in information provision as a function of a the portion of residents
in poverty as per the multidimensional index of poverty, calculated from the 2005 census.35 The
figure shows that anti-poor bias emerges against poor petitioners only in poorer places. The bias
is restricted to the inscriptions question (left column) and reception of partial information or the
alcaldía only response, as described above.
To subject these graphical intuitions to a more rigorous test, I run a series of regression analyses
in Appendix A.17.2. I bin the poverty index into terciles to reduce functional form assumptions
on the moderator. Because poverty and population are strongly negatively correlated (ρ = −.61
in the sample), I include an interactive binned population control with deciles of the estimated
2018 population in a second estimator. Both the moderator, municipal poverty, and the (demeaned)
population decile bin controls are interacted across the whole design (all factors and the program
indicator).
35This index is compiled by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas (DANE) at the level of rural
and urban populations within each municipality. I take the weighted average where weights correspond to the share of
urban and rural residents in the population.
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Figure 2.5: Heterogeneity in level of class-based bias by the level of municipal poverty. Column
1 examines average marginal effects on “easy” (enrollment) questions while Column 2 examines
average marginal effects on technical questions. Lines are estimated by Loess regression with a
span of 0.75. The shaded regions are 95% confidence intervals. Graphs exclude observations from
Bogotá given the vastly disproportionate number of observations, though substantive results on bias
are robust to including all observations in the analysis.
This analysis suggests that bias against lower-class individuals (the baseline) is worse in poorer
places. There is no evidence of bias in the lowest tercile (the municipalities with the lowest poverty
rates) for any outcome. Class bias against the poor is increasing in the middle-poverty and high-
poverty terciles. I find clear, statistically significant evidence of bias in the high-poverty tercile for
the receipt of partial information. Further there is suggestive evidence that differential application
of the “alcaldía only” outcome against poor individuals is driven by poorer municipalities. These
findings are robust to other operationalizations of poverty including rates of secondary education
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(2005).
Combined with the analysis of in-region accents, these findings provide suggestive evidence
that differentiation of citizens correlates with bias in service provision. Attributing such patterns to
tastes requires a theory of bureaucratic selection or politician incentives that yield divergent tastes.
While I cannot eliminate this possibility, several findings are useful to consider. First, there is no
evidence that service favors the median voter in each municipality – neither the class or regional
accent analysis supports this interpretation. If service were to favor the median voter, the poor
should do the best in the highest poverty places; these are the places that they do the worst. From an
elected politician’s perspective, providing worse service to poorer individuals in poor places works
against the median voter and those most likely to turn out in Colombia (Kasara and Suryanarayan,
2015).
Other explanations of bias in terms of politician tastes do not account for these geographic pat-
terns of bias. While there may be a disproportionate incentive to politicize social programs (outside
the scope of the model) to claim credit or buy votes in poorer places, it is not clear why such op-
portunities to claim credit would yield unequal information provision, as opposed to simply less
information provision. Following accounts of clientelistic usurpation of social services in Weitz-
Shapiro (2012), we would expect clientelism to correlate with lower levels of service. Importantly,
as is evident in Figure 2.5, there is no evidence that less information is provided to the middle class
in poor municipalities. Further, as I document in A17.2, clientelism practices are highly regional
in Colombia; this pattern persists within region and department. Finally, I leverage the municipal
classification of electoral risk including clientelism, corruption, and electoral violence by Colom-
bia’s Mission of Electoral Observers (MOE) to show that these patterns persist when interactively
controlling for these features (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2018).
Unless politician tastes vary systematically in unmeasured ways with the degree of poverty in
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a municipality, there is little evidence supportive of politicians’ taste-based bias in driving the bias
results. I find no evidence that political competition drives bias. If competition drives politician in-
centives to provide public goods, S is the relevant parameter of the model. Note that the expression
for bias in effort (Equation 2.8) does not include S, implying S does not drive bias. However, relax-
ing the assumption of interior effort, bias is eliminated when S drives universal service provision.
Empirically, the low rates of information provision suggest that this is not the case for the relevant
services. To the extent that competition drives the selection of different “types” of politicians, there
is no evidence that this manifests in politicians with different tastes.
One final explanation concerns the selection of bureaucrats themselves. In rural areas, in par-
ticular, bureaucrats are hired from a less skilled local labor market. This could drive anti-poor bias
via lower competence, perhaps accompanied by tighter oversight, or different tastes, potentially as
a function of status. To this extent, a theory of bureaucratic selection consistent with these results
cannot distinguish between oversight and taste explanations. Further, recall that the estimates in
Appendix A.17.2 suggest that the association between poverty and bias is not driven by differences
in population.
I therefore argue that the most plausible interpretation of the finding is that where differentials in
relative ability to complain between the treatment conditions are theoretically the strongest, levels
of bias against the less able group are strongest. Structurally, this analysis suggests that ηQ > 0.
In particular, lower-middle class individuals are relatively more empowered in places where a plu-
rality of the population is poor. Suggestive patterns of an in-region penalty against Costeñas in the
Coast (Caribe) are consistent with this interpretation. If Costeños are perceived as less demanding
and therefore less likely to complain within the region, the observed penalty is consistent with the
complaint-driven bias explanation of findings.
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2.5.3 Alternative Explanation of Bias: Screening
The theoretical model described here is a model of underprovsion rather than misallocation of ser-
vices. Some theories of misallocation suggest that the “bias” that we observe could simply be
efforts to screen citizens that the program is intended to serve from unintended potential recipients
(Banerjee, 1997; Ting, 2017). The intended population of beneficiaries/registrants for SISBÉN and
MFA are poor individuals and households. However, I find no evidence that differences in levels of
service provision are consistent with the theoretical predictions of a screening account.
Informational outcomes cut against lower class individuals and internal migrants, the target
populations for these programs.36 One outcome of interest for testing the screening logic is the use
of red tape. Red tape is hypothesized to serve as a mechanism that induces individuals to truthfully
reveal their “type” – whether or not they comprise the intended target population of the program.
Table 2.5 indicates high levels of red tape generally, but no differences in its application by class or
migrant status.
While a story of screening is inconsistent with the observed data, it may still be the case that
red tape is employed to deter unintended recipients from requesting services in the first place. Yet,
qualitatively, the forms of red tape requested appear to disparately impact intended recipients (the
poor). The most common extra requirements were a receipt for utilities (usually electricity), a formal
letter of application for the service, or extra government documents (other services). Thus, within
the experimental data, there is no evidence of differential treatment due to screening. Speculatively,
in a setting with endogenous requests, the type of red tape may exacerbate inequality in service
provision, but in a direction opposite to that predicted by existing screening theories.
36To the extent that migrants requesting services are associated with internally displaced persons (IDPs), a special
category for both programs, these programs should also favor the migrant condition.
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2.6 Discussion: Bias in Effort and Inequality in Outputs
To what extent does bias in information provision map onto inequality in public service outputs?
Bureaucratic bias in effort is important because of its link to inequality in citizen access to public
services. Recall that the theory suggests that in the presence of oversight-driven bias, bias in effort
is a sufficient condition for ultimate inequality in outcomes.
While the experiment allows for measurement of bureaucratic effort in information provision,
confederates did not try to obtain the service. Yet, using pretreatment data on SISBÉN registra-
tion from across Colombia’s municipalities reported in Figure 2.1, I examine the correspondence
between rates of enrollment (outputs) and the experimental measures of bias.37 Recall that two
pathologies of SISBÉN enrollment exist in the administrative data: over enrollment and under en-
rollment of the relevant population. Some municipalities maintain rolls that could not possibly cover
the estimated poor population; other municipalities maintain rolls far larger than the population as
a whole. The focus of this experiment is on the former category. To that end, I investigate whether
there exists differential levels of bias in municipalities where the service is under-provided from
places in which it is plausibly administered according to program guidelines.
Table 2.7 suggests that bias is present precisely in the places in which under enrollment of
plausible beneficiaries is the strongest concern.38 There is strong evidence of bias in information
provision in the base category (under-enrolled) municipalities. This bias is substantively, and for
some outcomes, significantly attenuated in municipalities with ostensibly “intended” enrollment.
These results are robust to redefinition of the “plausible enrollment” category (see Appendix A.17).
While it is evident that under-enrollment occurs in poorer places, the results are robust to controlling
37MFA data by municipality is not publicly available. However, aside from IDPs and indigenous Colombians, SISBÉN
is used to qualify for MFA. As such, under-enrollment of SISBÉN should predict under-enrollment of MFA.
38To the extent that over-enrollment represents politicization, empirically bias also emerges in these places.
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Complete Incomplete Any Information Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE ON CLASS BIAS BY ENROLLMENT TYPE
Lower-Middle Class 0.072 0.091 0.163∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.010
(0.045) (0.064) (0.061) (0.049) (0.055)
Plausible Enrollment: Lower-Middle Class −0.056 −0.072 −0.129∗ −0.005 0.006
(0.050) (0.074) (0.071) (0.054) (0.064)
Conditional Effect, Plausible Enrollment 0.015 0.019 0.034 -0.044∗∗ -0.005
(0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.022) (0.033)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE ON CLASS BIAS BY ENROLLMENT TYPE WITH COVARIATES
Lower-Middle Class 0.108 0.082 0.190∗∗ 0.008 0.076
(0.051) (0.092) (0.089) (0.058) (0.082)
Plausible Enrollment: Lower-Middle Class −0.094 −0.084 −0.179∗ −0.062 −0.112
(0.059) (0.108) (0.105) (0.069) (0.097)
Conditional Effect, Plausible Enrollment 0.013 -0.002 0.011 -0.053∗∗ -0.036
(0.027) (0.042) (0.040) (0.024) (0.036)
Interactive Poverty Decile Bins X X X X X
Interactive Poverty Decile Bins X X X X X
Mean, Lower Class and Plausible Enrollment 0.107 0.449 0.556 0.107 0.251
Mean, Lower Class and Under Enrollment 0.084 0.379 0.463 0.126 0.242
Observations 903 903 903 903 903
All Factors X X X X X
Program X X X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.7: Relationship between bias in information provision and underprovision of SISBÉN.
OLS estimates of the conditional AMCE of class by municipal SISBÉN enrollment type. The
sample includes places that are under enrolled or plausibly enrolled as intended. Standard errors are
clustered by municipality (n = 366) because the conditioning variable is measured at the municipal
level.
flexibly interactively for municipal poverty and population (Panel B). This finding is consistent
with the logic that bias in bureaucratic effort yields inequality in service provision. It bolsters
confidence that the bias in effort measured in the experiment correlates with public service outputs.
These results are also consistent with the theoretical extension of endogenous requests for service.
In places with where prospects for service are lowest, lower-income Colombians may opt out of
seeking SISBÉN registration altogether.
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2.7 Conclusion
Observers of Latin American social policy regularly identify variation in the implementation of pro-
grams intended to reduce inequality. While existing literature has emphasized electoral motives of
politicians in program implementation or non-implementation (Holland, 2015; Niedzwiecki, 2018),
I argue that disparities in administration emerge in the course of everyday processes of service
provision even without such political directives. By characterizing service provision as a strategic
relationship between a politician, a bureaucrat, and a citizen, I identify a new mechanism through
which political inequality in ability to draw oversight from a politician leads to inequality in access
to social programs. Empirically, I show that bias against lower-class petitioners in the provision
of information is substantial but occurs only where oversight is most likely and in municipalities
where inequalities in voice are apt to be strongest.
The model of service provision posited in this paper is broadly applicable beyond the reaches of
social services in Latin America. The three sources of bureaucratic bias that I identify should emerge
differentially across contexts. The model helps to guide our understanding of the institutional and
social conditions under which we observe the complaint-driven biases present in Colombia. In
particular, as bureaucrats become more insulated, such bias attenuates. Further, where disparities in
voice are lower, the scope for complaint-driven bias decreases.
One implication of this argument is that inequalities in political voice reduce the efficacy of
the state programs to combat inequality. I posit that mundane processes of service provision may
contribute to inequality traps in highly unequal societies. This mechanism complements literature
linking economic inequality to political inequality through more explicit conflict between the inter-
ests of elites and non-elites (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).
The argument presented here suggests some policy implications for reducing inequality in ac-
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cess to services. One argument revolves around the selection of politicians and bureaucrats. My
model implies that selection of politicians or bureaucrats whose tastes favor the poor can offset
complaint-driven bias while improving service provision. On the bureaucrat side, this counters
normative ideals of neutral bureaucrats. In contrast to selection-based remedies, strategies to com-
bat biased oversight by politicians have fewer prospects for success. While insulating bureaucrats
reduces complaint-driven inequalities, it also reduces effort leading to lower aggregate levels of ser-
vice provision. Further, inducing the politician to monitor service provision to populations unable
to complain at higher rates will not eliminate inequality in access if citizens must pay a cost to re-
quest service in the first place. In general, citizen-focused interventions to reduce costs of engaging
the bureaucracy hold the most promise for improving service provision and reducing inequality,
despite difficulties in implementation. Simply providing information on government services does
not remove cultural, economic, and psychological barriers to demanding equal service.
The implications of the theory proposed in this paper provide ideas prime for further exploration.
To the distributive politics literature, it suggests that we must consider the production of public
goods – not simply budgets – to understand variation in “who gets what.” To the bureaucratic
politics literature, I argue that citizens can combat the moral hazard of bureaucrats, but that increased
bureaucratic effort on the basis of citizen complaints translates to unequal gains in terms of service
provision. Collectively, these points suggest that the strategic relationship identified in this paper
between politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens has the potential to illuminate big questions about
accountability, inequality, and redistribution.
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Chapter 3
Oversight, Capacity, and Inequality
Citizen complaint systems represent one of the most regular forms of citizen engagement with
governments in democratic and autocratic regimes alike. These systems, broadly defined, provide a
means for citizens to convey information to the government in response to a (perceived) failing of
a bureaucrat or bureaucratic agency. Across contexts, citizens communicate information about the
location of potholes, missing social benefits, corruption by state agents, and violations of social or
human rights, among many others.
Despite their ubiquity, the design of citizen complaint systems as a bureaucratic oversight insti-
tution varies across contexts and policy areas. These systems differ in how principals (politicians
or higher- level bureaucrats) respond to complaints, both in terms of granting redress an in punish-
ing the offending agents. In turn, the anticipation of these responses is thought to shape citizens’
complaint-making behavior and bureaucrats’ effort in providing services. In this paper, I ask how
the design of oversight institutions influences “who gets what” from the state.
A growing literature uses citizen complaints to study government responsiveness (Chen, Pan,
and Xu, 2015; Christensen and Ejdemyr, 2020; Sjoberg, Mellon, and Peixoto, 2017; Dipoppa and
Grossman, 2020; Hamel and Holliday, 2019) and the organization of autocratic regimes (Pan and
Chen, 2018; Dimitrov, 2013). This paper complements and builds upon this literature by consider-
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ing when and how politicians (principals) design complaint systems and how these institutions shape
the population that complains. In turn, this characterization of selection into complaint-making gen-
erates new implications for understanding the distributional consequences of oversight.
Consider a politician’s choice to use (or ignore) information generated by citizen complaints as
part of a bureaucratic oversight strategy. In terms of classic oversight parlance, when do politicians
commit to monitor bureaucrats via “fire alarms” versus “police patrols”? How the does choice of
such monitoring propensities constrain the politician’s ability to incentivize bureaucratic effort? I
contend that the answer to this puzzle lies in who complains. The model emphasizes that citizens
in a population vary in their ability to complain or “pull” a fire alarm. The observation that costs of
complaint are often non-trivial and can vary substantially across a population echoes early warnings
of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984).
I answer these questions by developing a model of service provision built upon a framework
developed by Prendergast (2003). In the model, a bureaucrat chooses whether or not to exert effort to
determine a citizen’s state (i.e., eligible or ineligible). The bureaucrat then makes a binary allocation
of the service to the citizen. The citizen, who knows her state, observes the allocation, and decides
whether or not to complain to the politician. Importantly, the cost of complaint varies across the
population of citizens, such that citizens vary in their willingness to provide information about
their personal state. The politician monitors the bureaucrat’s action based on the allocation and the
presence of a complaint. If such auditing reveals misallocation (i.e., a service denial to an eligible
citizen), the citizen recovers the service and the bureaucrat is punished.
The politician designs oversight by committing to a contract ex-ante that specifies effort incen-
tives for bureaucrats (the magnitude of punishment for errors) and monitoring rates as a function of
observed allocation by the bureaucrat and the presence of a citizen complaint. I characterize four
qualitatively distinct contracts that emerge in equilibrium depending on: (i) the politician’s targeting
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of services and (ii) the level of bureaucratic insulation, conceived as a limit on the allowable mag-
nitude of effort incentives. The contracts vary in their provision of effort incentives and whether
the politician’s monitoring responds to information provided by citizens in the form of complaints.
These monitoring propensities, in turn, determine which citizens have an incentive to complain.
I use these oversight contracts to derive implications for the state’s capacity to implement poli-
cies as well as for inequality in access to services. The measure of implementation capacity devel-
oped in this paper arguably formalizes Mann’s (1984) concept of state capacity as “infrustructural
power,” or the “ability to . . . penetrate civil society, and to implement political decisions throughout
the realm” (189).1 By focusing on an informational problem underlying service provision, namely
the need for a government to learn about its citizens, this paper draw parallels to discussion of the
“legibility” of citizens to a government as a determinant of implementation capacity (Scott, 1998;
Lee and Zhang, 2016).
I find that contracts that condition monitoring on information provided by citizens have an am-
biguous effect on a state’s capacity to match policies to intended recipients. This type of monitoring
improves the accuracy of targeting among “legible” citizens – those that choose to provide informa-
tion when wrongly denied. However, it also promotes a form of capture by simultaneously reducing
the state’s accuracy in providing service to “illegible” citizens who never complain. Which effect
dominates depends on the share of legible citizens in a population.
In contrast to its ambiguous effect on state capacity, conditioning monitoring on citizen informa-
tion transmission always increases inequality in the delivery of state services when citizens vary in
their propensity to complain. When monitoring relies on citizen complaints, citizens who complain
receive more accurate – and simply more – services, both from bureaucrats’ initial allocations and
1There are many definitions of state capacity in the literature. I refer to “implementation capacity” to refer to the
concept used in this paper.
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through redress of their complaints. Further, the capture mechanism implies that those who cannot
complain are worse off (in absolute terms) than they are in the absence of information transmission.
The magnitude of this increase in inequality depends on the distribution of costs of complaint in the
population.
The use of citizen information in bureaucratic oversight thus suggests a possible tradeoff be-
tween expanding the state’s capacity to accurately serve its citizens and entrenching inequality in
access to state resources. The tradeoff emerges when oversight institutions induce a sufficient share
of the population to provide information to the state. Characterization of this tradeoff helps to rec-
oncile divergent arguments about the welfare effects of increased state capacity (i.e. Scott, 1998;
Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2015; Johnson and Koyama, 2017). It also forwards a
need to examine the distributional consequences of efforts to expand capacity.
This paper analyzes a comparatively neglected tool used by politicians to influence the state’s
capacity to implement policies: the use of information from citizens in bureaucratic oversight
(Berwick and Christia, 2018). Existing work linking bureaucratic institutions to state outputs has
focused on the adoption of civil service reforms (Geddes, 1991, 1994; Grindle, 2012; Huber and
Ting, 2020). The present model captures public sector personnel systems with two exogenous pa-
rameters: bureaucratic quality and insulation. In so doing, it allows for consideration of how these
oft-studied features of public sector personnel systems affect the oversight schemes adopted by
politicians and their consequences. Whereas civil service reforms are often viewed as major, costly
reforms across large portions of the bureaucracy (Rauch, 1995; Folke, Hirano, and Snyder, 2011;
Ujhelyi, 2014), oversight practices can, in principle, be deployed or manipulated more flexibly by
politicians. Variation in oversight practices across policies or jurisdictions therefore may provide
more explanatory power for variation in apparent implementation capacity across space, time, and
policy design, in line with a growing literature on sub-national variation in capacity (Weber, 1976;
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Enriquez and Centeno, 2012; Soifer, 2015).
The model in this paper builds upon an emerging theoretical literature on state capacity (Besley
and Persson, 2010; Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and Robinson, 2015; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015;
Snowberg and Ting, 2019). As in the empirical literature, there is no apparent consensus on what
state capacity means. I focus on one manifestation of state capacity distinct from the aforementioned
literature: the congruence between policies and their realization. I refer to this as implementation
capacity. Further, this paper clarifies and formalizes the distinction between bureaucratic capacity
and state implementation capacity, by emphasizing the incorporation of bureaucrats into the state as
an organization consisting of a government and citizens.
This primary contribution of this paper is its suggestion of a link between organization of bu-
reaucratic oversight and the study of distributive politics. The study of “who gets what” from the
state generally focuses on the allocation and policy decisions made by politicians by examining
which individuals or groups are targeted as beneficiaries (Golden and Min, 2013). One interpreta-
tion of existing arguments of capacity and economic growth is that capacity scales the “size of the
pie” that politicians have to distribute. My theory, instead, contends that building the capacity to im-
plement policies redistributes the pie across different segments of a population. Such distributional
consequences of implementation can occur independently from the content of the policy. To the
extent that politicians design influence bureaucratic oversight institutions, I identify a novel strategy
via which politicians influence “who gets what” beyond the policymaking process, complementing
an emerging literature on policy implementation (Williams, 2017).
Many recent and ongoing studies on state capacity are motivated by an impulse to learn “how
to strengthen [state capacity]” (Berwick and Christia, 2018: p. 71). The bureaucratic oversight
institutions I study provide a new framework through which to answer the “how.” However, the
main findings on capacity and distribution suggest that viewing capacity as an aggregate concept or
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measure can disguise stark distributional outcomes of efforts to strengthen states’ implementation
capacity. In so doing, I provide one possible reconciliation of a much longer-standing disagreement
about the welfare effects of state capacity (e.g., Scott, 1998; Johnson and Koyama, 2017).
3.1 Empirical Motivation
3.1.1 Describing Observed Complaints
The most frequently documented citizen complaints come from 311-type hotlines or online plat-
forms that allow for reporting about a variety of service provision issues (Chen, Pan, and Xu, 2015;
Pan and Chen, 2018; Sjoberg, Mellon, and Peixoto, 2017; Christensen and Ejdemyr, 2020; Dipoppa
and Grossman, 2020; Hamel and Holliday, 2019). In Figure 3.1, I examine per-capita utilization of
complaint hotlines in New York City, United States and Bogotá, Colombia. Similar to many other
cities and countries with 311-type systems, both cities release anonymized complaint-level records.
The left panel of Figure 3.1 suggests a consistent stream of complaints in both cities between Jan-
uary 2017 and June 2018. Rates of complaint are substantially higher in New York, averaging 616
per million residents per day versus 15 in Bogotá.2 Variation in the services covered by complaint
systems, modes of complaint, and potentially responsiveness render the comparison of complaints
in both cities a challenging endeavor. Nevertheless, the non-trivial rates of complaint in both cities
suggest that responding to and remedying complaints occupies one source of oversight effort.
The right panel of Figure 3.1 examines rates of complaint across smaller geographic units. The
data is shared at different levels of spatial aggregation. In Bogotá, I examine the city’s 20 localities;
in New York, I examine 2164 census tracts. In both cities, there is substantial variation in the per-
capita use of complaints across these areas. The variation across geographic units is substantial:
in Bogotá, moving from the first to the third quartile locality represents a 232% increase in the
2I exclude non-emergency complaints to the police, fire department, and Taxi and Limousine Commission in New
York given to increase comparability. Non-emergency police calls are directed elsewhere in Colombia.
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per-capita rate of complaint; in New York, the analogous shift represents a 47% increase in the per-
capita rate of complaint. Existing studies that seek to identify differential responses to complaints
as a function of election timing (Dipoppa and Grossman, 2020), politician re-election incentives
(Christensen and Ejdemyr, 2020), or neighborhood characteristics (Hamel and Holliday, 2019) find
measurable differences in the speed with which complaints are remedied, but effect sizes are quite
small, ranging from a few hours to 2 days. Combined, substantial differences in the rate of complaint
and small (if precise) differences in response to complaints suggest that selection into complaining



































































































































Figure 3.1: Description of anonymized 311 complaint data in Bogotá and New York. The left panel
depicts the number of daily complaints per million over an 18-month period. The large differences
in daily complaint rates in both cities generally map to weekdays vs. weekends/holidays. As such,
the line represents a 7-day moving average. The right panel shows the distribution of per-capita
complaints over the 18-month period by locality (Bogotá) and census tract (New York).
Certainly, rates of complaint may differ across a population for multiple reasons. If different
subpopulations rely more or less on specific public services, their need for recourse via complaint
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may vary. With high levels of residential segregation, these differences may manifest across juris-
dictions. Further, even among widely-used services, if the quality or level of service provision is
uneven across jurisdictions, worse service provision may yield more complaints. On the other hand,
if some citizens may face fewer costs or barriers to complaint they may be more likely to commu-
nicate grievances that do occur (Ba, 2018; Rizzo, 2019). In the model, as in Chapter 2, I consider
a population that is differentially willing (or able) to engage the state via complaint. In light of
the complaint data, I provide suggestive evidence in favor of the plausibility of this argument in
Appendix B.2.
3.1.2 The Design of Oversight
The design of oversight practices varies substantially across contexts and policy areas. One source
of variation evident even across 311 complaints is how costly complaints are to the bureaucrat
subject to the complaint. Across national contexts, complaints about a pothole may help to redress
the issue but are unlikely to result in a substantial penalty to a bureaucrat with responsibility for
roads. However, bureaucrats’ efforts to hide corruption complaints in China suggest a widespread
perception that these complaints are detrimental to the career advancement of implicated officials
(Pan and Chen, 2018). The design of oversight systems includes the determination of sanctions
for implicated bureaucrats. Of course, politicians (principals) operate within the constraints of
personnel laws in determining bureaucratic sanctions. Where the use of sanctions is permitted,
setting these sanctions can be consequential for understanding bureaucratic behavior.
A second important feature of oversight systems concerns how politicians opt to collect and use
the information generated by complaints. Relative to other complaint systems, 311 systems impose
comparatively low barriers to register a complaint. However, variation in perceived levels of redress
appears to condition citizens’ decisions to complain (Sjoberg, Mellon, and Peixoto, 2017; Dipoppa
and Grossman, 2020). Importantly, oversight systems specify how politicians monitor bureaucrats
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in the presence and absence of complaints. While I am unaware of systematic classifications of
complaint mechanisms and monitoring practices, several anecdotes are instructive.
In Colombia, for example, the 1991 Constitution specifies a process for complaint and appeal
of most services beyond the scope of 311 hotlines. Citizens submit written petitions (peticiones)
for information or recourse to authorities overseeing the relevant entity.3 Petitions impose costs
because they must be formal letters delivered to relevant entities. When responses are not received
within the specified timeframe or need to be appealed, complainants can pursue an acción de tutela,
a legal petition directed to courts for adjudication. These mechanisms are widely, if unevenly, used:
607,499 tutela claims were filed with the courts in 2018, or 1.2 cases per 100 citizens (Defensoría
del Pueblo de Colombia, 2019; Taylor, 2018). In the public health system where tutelas are used
most widely, these complaint processes are particularly important drivers of who accesses health
services. In this case, the Colombian Constitution guided the adoption of new mechanisms for
complaints and specifies protocols for a response.
Other oversight systems develop endogenously without similar “paper” (or constitutional) pro-
visions. For example, Slough and Fariss (2020) examine illegal pretrial detention in the Haitian
criminal justice system. They consider a population of unrepresented and illegally detained citizens
who lack access to any complaint mechanisms. One implication of the argument is that a lack of ac-
cess to complaint substantially reduces the rate at which the justice system processes cases relative
to represent cases. The oversight institutions in practice vary substantially from the “paper” laws
specified by the Haitian Constitution, yet still reflect the choices of a government overseeing the
courts. These anecdotes suggest a plausibly broad range of modes via which oversight institutions
are adopted and posit some challenges for the empirical measurement of these decisions. Neverthe-
3Most entities are public sector agencies, others are public-private entities that oversee service delivery, most com-
monly in health insurers.
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less, they also point to how consequential these decisions can be in terms of access to high-stakes
services/outcomes they govern.
3.2 Model
The model examines the choice of bureaucratic oversight institutions in a service provision set-
ting. The model of service provision builds upon Prendergast (2003), with two central departures
discussed at length in the model exposition.
I consider three actors: a citizen (C), a bureaucrat (B), and a politician (P ). Define a state,
ω ∈ {0, 1}, where ω = 1 with probability 12 . The state can be thought of as a characteristic of a
citizen, specific to a single interaction, as opposed to a fixed characteristic of the citizen (e.g., type).
In various service provision settings, the state could refer to sick or healthy; guilty or innocent; or
eligible or ineligible. The state is private information to the citizen.
In this model, implementation capacity refers to the congruence between the ultimate service
outcome, a† ∈ {0, 1} and a citizen’s state. I denote this congruence C in Equation 3.1. In existing
work including Prendergast (2003), congruence is often assumed to generate a social surplus. I ab-
stract from the assumption that accurate targeting of a service (higher congruence) leads to “better”
outcomes. Like the motivating examples, accurate targeting of a service could well promote the rule
of law or public health. On the other hand, the targeting of state repression is also a manifestation of
capacity, but is not typically assumed to generate a social surplus. The framework developed here
allows for the comparative study of capacity across society under weaker normative assumptions
about the outcomes of state services.
C =

1 if ω = a†
0 else
(3.1)
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The bureaucrat is tasked with providing a citizen with some service, allocating a. He determines
whether to exert effort, e ∈ {0, 1}, to try to ascertain ω. Exerting effort (e = 1) incurs cost
d > 0. The bureaucrat correctly ascertains the state with probability q + pe where q ∈ [12 , 1] and
p ∈ [0, 1−q]. The parameter q should be interpreted as a measure of bureaucratic quality and q+pe
can be interpreted as the measure of bureaucratic capacity that incorporates both quality and effort.
Upon observation of their allocation, the citizen determines whether to complain (c = 1) or not
(c = 0) to the politician about their allocation, at cost θ, where θ is a random variable distributed
according to the pdf f(·), with cdf F (·), where F (0) = 0. θ represents the legal, expertise, time,
and/or psychological costs of contesting the bureaucrat’s allocation. θ can be thought of as an
individual citizen’s type and is common knowledge. The invocation of a continuum of costs of
complaints represents the first substantial departure from Prendergast (2003). Prendergast (2003)
assumes that complaints are costless. A direct implication of this assumption is that, conditional
on the state and allocation received, there is no variation in citizens’ equilibrium complaint-making
behavior. This implication stands at odds with recent work measuring citizen participation in service
provision (Bussell, 2019; Kruks-Wisner, 2018). Further, consistent with descriptions of legibility
before the state, the continuum of costs of complaint suggests that citizens are not equal in their
ability (or propensity) to generate information. Importantly, the properties of the distribution of θ
serve as a way to consider societies in comparative perspective.
The politician observes the bureaucrat’s allocation and the citizen’s complaint (resp. non-
complaint) and audits the bureaucrat’s decision according to a pre-specified contract that stipulates
the rate of auditing as a function of a and c. Denote this rate ρ(a, c) ∈ [0, 1]. If audited, the politician
pays a cost, ρ(a,c)
2
2 , to learn ω. If the politician audits and observes that a = ω, she will not change
the allocation. If ω 6= a, the citizen’s ultimate allocation is 1 − a. Thus, the ultimate allocation of
the service, a† is given by:
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a† =

1− a if politician monitors and ω 6= a
a else
(3.2)
When the politician reverses a bureaucrat’s allocation, the bureaucrat is sanctioned with a penalty









p(1− q − p)
(3.3)
The assumption of a discrete ∆ eliminates corner solutions. Note, however, that admission of
a continuous ∆ does not change the qualitative findings of the model. ∆ can be interpreted as
a measure of bureaucratic non-insulation. Lower values of ∆ constrain the punishment that the
penalty the politician can impose, indicating a more insulated bureaucrat.
The citizen’s decision about whether to complain depends on her valuation of the bureaucrat’s
allocation, and what can be recovered through the politician’s auditing. I assume that citizens value
receiving the service, regardless of state, i.e., citizens prefer to receive benefits, even when they are
not “qualified.” Citizens gain utility normalized to 1 if they ultimately receive the service and 0
otherwise. The citizen’s utility function is given by Equation 3.4:
UC(c; θ) =

a− θc if a = ω
ρ(a, c)(1− a) + (1− ρ(a, c))a− θc if a 6= ω
(3.4)
The bureaucrat exerts effort in order to deter the penalty ∆. His utility is given by Equation 3.5,
where r is an indicator taking the value of 1 if the politician audits and reverses the bureaucrat’s
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allocation. w > 0 represents a wage that satisfies the bureaucrat’s participation constraint.
UB = w −∆r (3.5)
The politician contracts the bureaucrat, specifying the probabilities of audit, ρ(a, c), and sanc-
tion for errors, ∆. The politician seeks to optimize the accuracy of services provided to to serve to
someone “like her,” net the costs of investigation. Formally, I assume that politicians, like citizens,
are indexed by type, denoted θP , and politicians maximize accuracy (congruence) to serve a citizen
for whom θ = θP .
This specification of the politician’s preferences represents the second major departure from
Prendergast (2003). In a population in which citizens are differentiated, an additional assumption
is needed to justify which citizens a politician seeks to serve. Consistent with a large literature on
targeted distribution by politicians, the assumption here is simply politicians value the state’s capac-
ity to serve a specific type of citizen, not the population as a whole. The extension in Section 3.6
considers a politician that seeks to maximize the accuracy of service provision for serve all citizens.
This assumption is closer in spirit to the welfare-maximizing principal in Prendergast (2003), but
maintains the heterogeneity in citizen type. Given the present assumption that politicians maximize
accuracy for their own type, the monitoring rates ρ(a, c)’s depend on whether a citizen of the politi-
cian’s type will complain conditional on an allocation and state. Equation 3.6 gives the politician’s
expected utility. Each line of the equation corresponds to one state (ω). The politician’s type, θP
enters this calculation through anticipation of an identical citizen’s complaint-making behavior.
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(q + pe)(1− ρ(1, c)
2
2









(q + pe)(1− ρ(0, c)
2
2






3.2.1 Sequence, Equilibrium Concept
1. The politician chooses a contract specifying ρ(a, c) and ∆.
2. The state, ω is realized and revealed to only the citizen.
3. The bureaucrat chooses effort level, e, allocating the service to the citizen, a.
4. The citizen observes a and decides whether or not to complain, c.
5. The politician monitors according to the contract. When she monitors, any bureaucratic errors
are reversed and the bureaucrat is punished.
6. Utilities are realized.
I characterize a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The politician’s contract is given by ∆ ∈ [0,∆]
and ρ(a, c) ∈ [0, 1] for a ∈ {0, 1} and c ∈ {0, 1}. The bureaucrat’s effort is given by e : [0,∆] ×
[0, 1]4 → {0, 1}, and his allocation is given by a : [0,∆]× [0, 1]4 × {0, 1} → {0, 1}. The citizen’s
complaint strategy is given by the mapping: c : [0,∆]× [0, 1]4 × {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1}.
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Given that the politician pre-commits to the auditing strategy, consider first the citizen’s decision to
complain. First note that, if a politician audits, she will observe the state. As such, if the state were
ω = 0, no citizen would complain. Even if the citizen were allocated a = 0, they would not recover
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the service via an audit. As such, they will not complain. In contrast, when the state is ω = 1, a
citizen will complain if an increased probability of recovering the service exceeds the citizen’s cost
of complaint, θ:
ρ(0, 1)− ρ(0, 0) ≥ θ (3.7)
This implies that there exists some threshold, θ̃ ≡ ρ(0, 1) − ρ(0, 0), above which citizens do
not provide information to the politician via complaints. I refer to citizens for whom θ < θ̃ as
“legible” to the state. Building off of Scott (1998) and Lee and Zhang (2016), “legible” here refers
to a citizen that could be induced to share private information about their state via a complaint to the
politician. The informativeness of a complaint to the politician depends on both the citizen’s type
and the allocation. The the ability to complain provides information only if the citizen is legible and
the bureaucrat allocates a = 0. If a = 1, the citizen has no incentive to complain in either state.
Lemma 3.1. Informational value of citizen (non-)complaints:
(i) If θ > θ̃, the citizen never complains (c = 0). Upon observing no complaint, the politician’s
posterior belief about the probability of non-congruence is: Pr(a 6= ω) = 1− q − pe for any a.
(ii) If θ ≤ θ̃, the citizen complains if and only if ω = 1 and a = 0. As such, the politician’s
posterior belief about the probability of non-congruence between ω and a is:
Pr(a 6= ω) =

1 if a = 0, c = 1
0 if a = 0, c = 0
1− q − pe if a = 1
Now, consider the bureaucrat’s decision to allocate effort to an illegible citizen (of type θ > θ̃).
In this case, the bureaucrat’s decision to allocate effort depends on the accuracy gains from effort
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(i.e. p) and the anticipated monitoring rate under either allocation, ρ(1, 0) and ρ(0, 0), respectively.
It is incentive compatible to exert effort, e = 1, if:
w − 1− q − p
2
[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 0)]∆− d ≥ w − 1− q
2
[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 0)]∆ (3.8)
∆ ≥ 2d
p[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 0)]
(3.9)
In contrast, the bureaucrat exerts effort to more serve a legible citizen (of type θ ≤ θ̃) if:
w − 1− q − p
2
[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 1)]∆− d ≥ w − 1− q
2
[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 1)]∆ (3.10)
∆ ≥ 2d
p[ρ(1, 0) + ρ(0, 1)]
(3.11)
Comparing the expressions in Equations 3.9 and 3.11, it is clear that if ρ(0, 1) ≥ ρ(0, 0), the
bureaucrat can be induced to exert effort at a higher marginal cost, d, on behalf of a citizen is
expected to complain when wrongly denied the allocation. In considering the bureaucrat’s behavior,
one further consideration is warranted. Namely, is it always incentive compatible for the bureaucrat
to follow his investigation?
Given that the effort incentive, ∆, is symmetric for an error of either type, any incentive to allo-
cate the service contrary to the findings of a bureaucrat’s investigation must be driven by different
monitoring rates. Suppose first that the bureaucrat’s research suggests ω = 0. If he distributes
a = 0 but is wrong (with probability 1 − q − ep), he draws a monitoring rate of ρ(0, c) where
c depends on citizen type (θ). The bureaucrat’s expected utility from allocating a in line with his
investigation is shown on the left-hand side of the following inequality. In contrast, if the bureaucrat
goes against his research allocating a = 1, he is more likely to be wrong (with probability q + ep),
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but the monitoring rate, ρ(1, c), may be lower as shown on the right hand side of the inequality.
w − (1− q − ep)ρ(0, c)∆ ≥ w − (q + ep)ρ(1, c)∆ (3.12)
ρ(1, c)
ρ(0, c)
≥ 1− q − ep
q + ep
(3.13)
Given the parametric assumptions, the right hand side of Equation 3.13 is bounded between 0
and 1. Therefore, if ρ(1, c) ≥ ρ(0, c), this condition is always satisfied and the bureaucrat will
always follow his investigation. If this inequality does not hold, the bureaucrat will give a = 1
even when his research suggests that ω = 0 to reduce the likelihood of an investigation. Consider
now the case in which the bureaucrat’s research suggests that ω = 1. In order for the bureaucrat to
allocate a = 1, the following inequality must hold:
w − (1− q − ep)ρ(1, c)∆ ≥ w − (q + ep)ρ(0, c)∆ (3.14)
ρ(0, c)
ρ(1, c)
≥ 1− q − ep
q + ep
(3.15)
Comparing Equations 3.13 and 3.15, it is clear that if all relevant monitoring rates are equivalent,
the bureaucrat will always follow his investigation. One final observation is warranted: if ∆ = 0,
the bureaucrat indifferent between ignoring and following his signal in all cases. I assume that
bureaucrat’s indifference is broken by following his investigation.
Finally, consider the politician’s determination of the bureaucrat’s contract. Recall that the
politician is trying to maximize the probability that a citizen of type θ = θP receives the “correct”
service relative to their state, given costs of monitoring. The determination of the marginal legible
citizen depends on the monitoring rates specified in the contract.
Consider first a politician that represents citizens that cannot be incentivized to complain regard-
less of the bureaucrat’s allocation, θP > 1. Because a citizen of the type θ = θP will never com-
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plain, the politician never learns such a citizen’s state. Substituting ρ(0, 0) and ρ(1, 0) into the politi-
cian’s objective and maximizing, ρ(0, 0)∗ = (1−q−ep), ρ(0, 1)∗ = 0, and ρ(1, 0)∗ = (1−q−ep).
Further, the politician always prefers that the bureaucrat exert effort to improve the accuracy of his
allocation. To incentivize effort, the politician must set ∆ ≥ dp(1−p−q) . However, this is only
possible when ∆ = ∆H . When ∆ ∈ {∆L,∆M}, the politician cannot offer effort incentives.
In either case, because ρ∗(1, 0) = ρ∗(0, 0), the bureaucrat will always allocate a in line with her
investigation.
Second, consider the case of a politician whose type can be induced to complain if wrongly
denied the service, e.g., θP ≤ 1. Such a citizen will complain if a = 0 and ω = 1, but not if a = 0
and ω = 0. Substituting ρ(1, 0), ρ(0, 1), and ρ(0, 0) into the politician’s objective and optimizing
yields ρ(0, 0)∗ = 0, ρ(0, 1)∗ = 1, and ρ(1, 0)∗ = (1− q − pe).
However, if the politician sets these monitoring rates, any bureaucrat for whom q < 1 would
always accede to a citizen of type θ ≤ 1, by allocating a = 1 regardless of her investigation
because 1 − q − pe < 1−q−epq+ep , the incentive compatibility constraint in Equation 3.13. This is a
manifestation of the “truth-telling” problem identified by Prendergast (2003). However, the problem
also manifests in a second form with a heterogeneous population of citizens. For a citizen of type
θ > 1, a bureaucrat will only face the prospect of monitoring when she allocates a = 1, since
ρ∗(0, 0) = 0. As such, for any ∆ > 0, the bureaucrat is better off allocating a = 0 to a citizen
that would never complain. Because the politician’s objective is to maximize service provision
for someone “like her,” the capacity loss from the former problem (acquiescence to a prospective
complainant) is of concern, but the latter is not.
The politician can do strictly better than allowing the bureaucrat to accede to every prospective
complainant. She can employ one of two strategies. First, she can eliminate incentives, setting
∆ = 0 and monitoring at these optimal rates. If the bureaucrat does not fear punishment, he will not
CHAPTER 3. OVERSIGHT, CAPACITY, AND INEQUALITY 91
accede to a citizen that would complain. Moreover, the bureaucrat then has no reason to uniformly
deny a citizen that would not complain. However, when ∆ = 0, the bureaucrat cannot be induced
to exert effort, reducing the accuracy of the allocation.
Alternatively, Equation 3.13 gives the highest highest ratio of monitoring rates under which a
bureaucrat will not accede to a potential complainant. Maximizing subject to this incentive com-
patibility constraint ρ(1,0)ρ(0,1) =
1−q−ep
q+ep reduces monitoring rates when a subject is denied the ser-
vice to ρ(0, 1)∗ = q+p
q+p+(1−q−p)2 , and increases monitoring rates when the service is granted to
ρ(1, 0)∗ = 1−q−p
q+p+(1−q−p)2 . However, this second strategy is only available when a politician can
offer effort incentives, if ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H}. The politician faces a trade-off between less efficient
monitoring and incentivizing bureaucratic effort. If the return to bureaucratic effort, p, is sufficiently
high, providing incentives is preferred. Denote p̂(q) as the solution to:
E[UP (ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) = 1, ρ(1, 0) = 1− q,∆ = 0)] =
E[UP (ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) =
q + p
q + p+ (1− q − p)2 , ρ(1, 0) =
1− q − p
q + p+ (1− q − p)2 ,∆ ≥ ∆M )],
expressed as a function of q. When p ≥ p̂(q) the politician prefers the contract with effort incentives
even though she must monitor at a higher intensity. When p < p̂(q), the politician prefers the
incentive-free contract.
Inspection of the optimal ρ(0, 1)∗ with and without incentives reveals that the composition of
prospective complainants changes when incentives are used, as q+p
q+p+(1−q−p)2 ≤ 1. This means
that a politician of type θP ∈ ( q+pq+p+(1−q−p)2 , 1] can only incentivize complaints and bureaucratic
effort by monitoring cases of complaints at a higher rate. To avoid forcing the bureaucrat to acede
to a possible complainant, the politician must also increment the rate of monitoring when a = 1
(ρ(1, 0)). The additional monitoring is costly to the politician and can only be sustained when re-
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turns to monitoring are sufficiently high. I denote the threshold at which the politician is indifferent
to providing effort incentives as p(q), as in the previous case. When p ≥ p(q), the politician opts
for incentives; when p < p(q), the politician adopts the contract with information but no incentives
(∆ = 0). Note that because inducing effort costs more for a politician of this type, p(q) ≥ p̂(q)∀q.
The equilibrium contracts are formalized in Proposition 3.1. In describing contracts throughout
this paper, the subscripts indicate two qualitative features of the contracts – whether information
transmission is incentivized (I) and whether bureaucratic effort incentives are provided (E).
Proposition 3.1. A politician of type θP > 1 implements the contract:
(i) %∅ = {ρ(0, 0) = ρ(1, 0) = 1− q, ρ(0, 1) = 0, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ ≤ ∆} if ∆ ∈ {∆L,∆M}
(ii) %E = {ρ(0, 0) = ρ(1, 0) = 1− p− q, ρ(0, 1) = 0, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ ∈ [ dp(1−p−q) ,∆]} if ∆ =
∆H .
A politician of type θP ∈ ( p+qq+p+(1−q−p)2 , 1] implements the contract:
(i) %IE = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) = θP , ρ(1, 0) =
θP (1−p−q)




if ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H} and p > p(q)
(ii) %I = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) = 1, ρ(1, 0) = (1− q)2, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ = 0} else.
A politician of type θP ≤ p+qq+p+(1−q−p)2 implements the contract:
(i) %IE = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) =
p+q
p+q+(1−p−q)2 , ρ(1, 0) =
1−p−q




if ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H} and p > p̂(q)
(ii) %I = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) = 1, ρ(1, 0) = (1− q)2, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ = 0} else.
(All proofs in appendix.)
Figure 3.2 depicts the qualitative features of the contracts in Proposition 3.1 graphically across
the parameter space. The x-axis in all plots gives politician type, θP . The y-axis depicts the level of










θP : Politician type
Information transmission Effort incentives
Figure 3.2: Visualization of the qualitative features of equilibrium contracts in Proposition 3.1
across the parameter space. The blue pattern shows that any politician for whom θP ≤ 1 will
always incentivize information transmission from some citizens by setting ρ(0, 1) ≥ ρ(0, 0). The
purple shading shows the regions of the parameter space where effort incentives are implemented,
i.e. where ∆ is large enough to sustain bureaucratic effort.
bureaucratic (non-)insulation, ∆ ∈ {∆L,∆M ,∆H}. The horizontal panels depict different levels of
p, the accuracy gains attributable to bureaucratic effort. Three findings are of note. First, politicians
of a low-cost type (θP ≤ 1) will always elicit information transmission from citizens. Second, the
use of citizen information can support bureaucratic effort incentives at a lower ∆. Note that effort
incentives are only possible at ∆ = ∆M in the presence of information transmission. Finally, effort
is not uniformly preferred in the presence of information transmission. This is a consequence of the
trade-off between incentivizing bureaucratic effort and monitoring at optimal rates.
In the remainder of this paper, I use the contracts characterized here to develop implications for
state capacity and inequality in societies of different compositions. The parameter determining the
composition of a society is the density of θ and its cdf F (·).
3.4 Oversight and Implementation Capacity
I proceed by formalizing the definition of implementation capacity posited in the introduction.
Specifically, implementation capacity is a measure of the state’s ultimate ability to match service
outputs to an unknown state associated with each citizen in a population. Given the definition of C
as an indicator for the match between an allocation and the service provided, capacity is given by
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E[C], where the expectation is evaluated over both a citizen’s state ω, and their type θ. As noted
above, capacity need not be limited to the allocation of private goods (services) to individual citi-
zens. The logic can productively be extended to the distribution of club or local public goods across
communities as a function of communities’ mobilization capacity.4
Definition 3.1. State Implementation Capacity: State implementation capacity is the rate at which
the ultimate service provided is matched to each citizen’s state across the population, formallyE[C].
As is clear from Definition 3.1, implementation capacity is not explicitly defined in terms of
the amount of services given to a population or their distribution across the population, only the
match between the allocation and a citizen’s state. Because capacity is defined in terms of the
ultimate service provided, the measure combines both the bureaucrat’s equilbrium allocation and
the politician’s equilibrium monitoring strategy. As such, capacity incorporates bureaucratic effort,
the bureaucrat’s determination of whether to follow his investigation, and the rate at which the
politician recovers the correct allocation via monitoring.
The contracts characterized in Proposition 3.1 also provide implications for the distribution of
state services across the population. To this end, it is useful to examine E[a†], the expectation of
the ultimate allocation received by a citizen, as a measure of distributional outcomes.
Table 3.1 enumerates conditional expectations measuring capacity and distribution for different
types of citizens. By conditioning on citizen type, this table clarifies several insights. The mapping
between institutions (contracts) and the outcomes of interest – capacity and distribution – depends
critically on societal composition. In particular, contracts that incentivize citizens to provide infor-
mation (Contracts %I , %IE , and %IE) lead to different levels of capacity and allocation across the
population, as a function of θ.
4This extension admits a reduced-form interpretation of θ as a community’s mobilization capacity.
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One implication of Table 3.1 is that implementation capacity can only be achieved when bu-
reaucrats can perfectly allocate the service, with or without effort.
Remark 3.1. Bureaucratic quality and implementation capacity: Perfect bureaucratic quality,
q = 1, is a sufficient condition to achieve complete implementation capacity, E[C] = 1. Com-
plete implementation capacity cannot be achieved under any contract if bureaucratic capacity is
incomplete, q + p < 1.
When bureaucratic quality is perfect, q = 1, it is impossible (and unnecessary) to provide
the bureaucrat with effort incentives. Either contract without effort incentives (%∅ or %I ) can be
implemented in equilibrium. In this case, both yield observationally equivalent behavior since the
bureaucrat never wrongly denies the benefit and the citizen never complains. It is possible to achieve
complete capacity if q + p = 1 and the whole population was induced to complain under contracts
%IE or %IE . The remainder of the paper considers the remaining cases – arguably those consistent
with empirical observation – in which bureaucratic capacity is limited (q + p < 1).
Consider the relationship between oversight institutions and implementation capacity. Figure
3.3 provides a visualization of state capacity under the contracts characterized in Proposition 3.1.
The y-axis, E[C|θ] measures the likelihood that the ultimate (post-monitoring) allocation matches
the citizen’s state under each contract. Two findings are of note. In the absence of information,
effort incentives weakly increase capacity. In contrast, the use of information from citizens increases
capacity among those that can complain, while decreasing capacity among those that cannot.
As is evident from Figure 3.3, state capacity is calculated as the weighted average of E[C|θ]
over the population type and state space. One immediate implication is that increases in capacity for
legible populations generated by monitoring on the basis of complaints reduce the state’s capacity
to accurately serve the population that cannot complain. As such, using information transmitted


















%E (vs. %∅) %I (vs. %∅) %IE (vs. %∅)
θ θ θ
Figure 3.3: Graphical representation of state implementation capacity, conditional on citizen type, θ.
The black dashed horizontal line measures capacity under contract %∅, and serves as a benchmark.
This benchmark is compared to the contract with effort incentives alone (%E) in the left panel; the
contract with information transmission alone (%I ) in the middle panel; and the contract with both
features (%IE) in the right panel. Note that contract %IE is substantively similar to the right panel.
by citizens in the form of complaints has an ambiguous effect on capacity depending on the pro-
portion of citizens that can complain. As shown in Proposition 3.2, using information volunteered
by citizens can only increase capacity when a sufficient share of the population can be induced to
complain when wrongly denied the service.
Proposition 3.2. Information transmission and capacity: Monitoring the basis of citizen com-
plaints can increase or decrease state implementation capacity. Specifically, there exists a thresh-
old, λ ∈ [0, 1], for which F (θ̃) ≥ λ implies that monitoring on the basis of citizen complaints
weakly increases state capacity. If F (θ̃) < λ, monitoring on the basis of complaints decreases state
capacity.
Capture of the state by individuals or groups has been forwarded as corrosive to state capacity
in different domains (Bardhan, 2002; Suryanarayan, 2020). Figure 3.3 suggests a novel mechanism
underlying state capture. In contracts %I , %IE , and %IE , politicians commit to using information
from citizens to monitor service providers. Such contracts, however, yield weakly less capacity to
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serve illegible citizens. The result resembles capture: by incentivizing some citizens to provide
information to the state, legible citizens procure better service at the expense of the accuracy of
services rendered to their illegible counterparts. The tradeoff between capture and the informational
benefits of citizen complaints generates the ambiguous result in Proposition 3.2.
How do incentives to induce bureaucratic effort influence capacity? From Figure 3.3, it is clear
that in the absence of information transmission, effort incentives increase capacity by increasing bu-
reaucratic effort and accuracy. Specifically, moving from Contracts %∅ to %E yields weakly higher
capacity for all citizens, and thus the population as a whole. However, the effect of incentives is am-
biguous in the presence of information transmission. Considering the difference between contracts
%IE to %I , there are two counterveiling effects, as evidenced in Equation 3.16. Most obviously,
effort incentives can increase the accuracy of targeting for at least citizens that complain. Less obvi-
ously, adding effort incentives reduces the share of legible citizens from F (1) to F ( q+p
p+q+(1−p−q)2 ).
Thus, while capacity is higher with incentives for a citizen of type θ < q+p
p+q+(1−p−q)2 in the parame-
ter space in which %IE is adopted, these gains come at a cost of creating more illegible citizens and
reducing capacity among these types. The comparison of %IE to %I yields a qualitatively similar
finding.
E[C|%IE − E[C|%I ] =F
(
p+ q
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Note that in order for effort incentives to increase capacity when a principal employs monitoring





is large and p is sufficiently
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high. In such cases, the composition of legible citizens is not substantially changed under the two
contracts. Where differences in the set of citizens that complain under the two contracts are sub-
stantial, effort incentives lead to concentration of capacity among a smaller subset of the population
at the expense of others, reducing overall capacity.
Politicians incentivize information transmission from citizens and effort incentives to increase
the state’s capacity to accurately serve a specific client. However, Proposition 3.2 establishes that the
direction of the effect of these oversight tools on implementation capacity depends fundamentally
on the underlying composition of the population as a whole. In particular, the use of information im-
proves the state’s capacity to serve legible citizens at the expense of other citizens. These dynamics
are magnified in the presence of information incentives.
Collectively, the analysis of implementation capacity provides insights about the role of infor-
mation transmission for bureaucratic oversight in comparative perspective. In particular, the effect
of incentivizing citizens to volunteer information depends critically on the underlying legibility of
the population. Where this distribution implies that an insufficient proportion can be made legible,
relying on information from the legible population can harm outcomes for illegible citizens. The
use of effort incentives alongside information transmission can compound these harms and can be
particularly detrimental to state capacity in settings where few citizens are legible. This observation
hints at the distributional consequences of oversight that are developed in Section 3.5.
3.5 Inequality
While oversight institutions have implications for capacity, they also influence the distribution of the
service across a population. To this end, I proceed by considering the relationship between the types
in a population – in terms of costs of complaint – and the distribution of state services. The service
in question, a, is given to half the population if capacity were complete because Pr(ω = 1) = 12 .
5
5It is straightforward to see that the Gini coefficient on the capacity-maximizing allocation is equal to 1
2
.
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However, because ω ⊥ θ, when the service is “perfectly” allocated, there are no differences in
likelihood of receiving the service as a function of θ. The focus here is how inequality can emerge as
a function of citizen type (cost of complaint), θ, under under the contracts enumerated in Proposition
3.1. As such, I develop a metric of inequality that abstracts from inequality generated by the state
variable, ω.
The metric of inequality used to measure inequality as a function of θ is depicted geometrically
in Figure 3.4. Specifically, I examine the share of total services devoted to each type of citizen. Note
that under each of the contracts, there are at most two levels of service provision E[a†|θ], defined
in terms of a (possible) cut-point, θ̃, which corresponds to the marginal legible citizen. Further,
note that under any contract, moving from a citizen with θ = θ′ to a citizen of type θ = θ′′ where
θ′ < θ′′ implies that citizen of type θ = θ′ will, in expectation, be weakly more likely to receive
the service. On the graph, the x-axis is the CDF of θ, F (·) and the y-axis is the cumulative share of
service (a) received by citizens with lower θ’s. The area of the shaded triangles thus visualizes the
proposed metric of inequality, type-attributable inequality (TAI), defined formally in Definition 3.2.
The maximum area of the triangle is theoretically 12 , so I normalize inequality to a more familiar
[0, 1] domain by doubling the area.
Definition 3.2. Type-attributable inequality (TAI) measures inequality in the expectation of ser-
vices provided as a function of citizen cost of complaint, θ. It is given by the formula:
TAI(%) = 2µ2
(
(0, 0), (F (θ̃),
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[a†|θ > θ̃]
), (1, 1)
)
where µ2(·) represents the area of the triangle defined by the three coordinates. TAI ∈ [0, 1], and
higher values of TAI indicate higher levels of inequality.
Proposition 3.3 describes the consequences of conditioning oversight on citizen complaints






















F (θ): CDF of citizen type
Contracts %∅,%E Contract %I Contracts %IE
Figure 3.4: Geometric representation of inequality measure under each contract. The inequality
measure, type-attributable quality (TAI), is equivalent to twice the area of the shaded region. Note
that contract %IE is substantively similar to the right panel.
for inequality in access to services. As is evident from Table 3.1, when a contract precludes re-
sponsiveness to complaints, low-θ citizens respond by pooling with high-θ citizens by not lodging
complaints, regardless of the service they receive. All citizens then receive the same allocation in
expectation, resulting in no type-attributable inequality. In contrast, when politicians adopt moni-
toring systems that respond to citizen complaints, inequality in the expectation of service allocation
emerges. Comparing the information-only contract (%I ) to either of the contracts with information
and effort incentives (%IE and %IE), the combination of effort incentives and information generates
weakly higher levels of inequality than information transmission alone.
Proposition 3.3. Oversight and inequality. For any q + p < 1 and F (1) ∈ (0, 1), conditioning
oversight on citizen complaints introduces inequality in the allocation of a across the population,
implying TAI > 0. TAI is weakly greater under contract %IE or %IE than under contract %I .
Combining the discussion of capacity and inequality provides several insights about the impli-
cations of bureaucratic oversight. In societies in which some citizens can be induced to complain
and others cannot, there exists a tradeoff between employing oversight institutions that maximize
a state’s capacity to define and serve legible citizens and equity in outputs. When examining ca-
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pacity and equity across the whole population, using citizen information in oversight can either: (i)
increase capacity at the cost of increased inequality in outputs; or (ii) decrease capacity while in-
creasing inequality. The latter is more likely when relatively few citizens can be induced to complain
(lower F (1)).
The canonical outcomes of civil service systems, captured here by higher bureaucratic quality
(higher q) and higher bureaucratic insulation (lower ∆), reduce the magnitude of the inequalities
that are generated by reliance on citizen complaints. However, this presents a paradox. States
where bureaucratic quality is low or insulation is absent are low are precisely those places where
use of citizen information in oversight can deliver the largest gains in capacity to (endogenously)
legible citizens. As such, the distributional considerations highlighted here may be most salient in
states with canonically weaker bureaucracies.
This model abstracts from considerations of political selection, or how θP is chosen. Given
the importance of societal composition in determining the distributional consequences of oversight,
some discussion of the the mapping between the distribution of politicians (the density of θP ) and
the population as a whole (θ) may shed light on the extent to which these dynamics are realized
empirically. It seems plausible that potential politicians are disproportionately of a low θP relative
to the population as a whole, whether in an autocracy or democracy.6 If this is the case, we may
expect a bias toward reliance on information transmission in oversight, relative to what might be
generated by randomly drawing a politician from the population or an oversight strategy designed
to appeal to the median voter.
6Arguments in support of the idea that politicians are drawn from a population with lower costs of complaint include:
findings of positive electoral selection in democracies (e.g., Dal Bó et al., 2017; Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011); ac-
counts of dynastic politics and familial persistence in political office (e.g., Querubin, 2016; Smith, 2018); and studies of
the importance of political connections for promotion in autocracies (e.g., Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim, 2015).
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3.6 Politician’s Objective and Implications for Policy Design
To this point, I have considered a setting in which a politician maximizes the state’s accuracy to
serve a citizen “like her,” net the costs of monitoring. The analysis thus considers the consequences
of oversight policies based on an instance of an interaction between a single politician, a single
bureaucrat, and a single citizen. The oversight strategy tailored to one citizen type is thus uniformly
applied across to the population of citizens; in this case, the politician does not internalize the
consequences of its application to other citizens. In this section, I consider different approaches to
modeling a politician’s design of oversight that considers the population of citizens.
I focus, therefore, on the oversight strategies adopted by a politician that maximize capacity
across the population. In so doing, I depart from the assumption that monitoring rates are fixed
across the population. In the previous analysis, I have assumed that the oversight contract is uni-
form across citizen types. Indeed, a politician catering to a particular type of citizen would set the
monitoring rate at 0 for all other citizen types if she were allowed to do so. Bureaucrats would
respond by not exerting effort for any citizen of type θ 6= θP , regardless of effort incentives, and
the likelihood of receiving the correct allocation (ultimately) would fall to E[C] = q across the
population for any continuous distribution of θ.
Instead, consider a politician that seeks to maximize capacity (net of costs) for every citizen and
can implement a contract as a function of citizen type. This approach aggregates across a population
of citizens by simply considering infinite number of politician-bureaucrat-citizen interactions across
the continuum of citizens, for which θP = θ in each interaction. I assume that the bureaucratic
quality and capacity are fixed across all interactions. This benchmark analysis thus abstracts from
changes in the composition of who complains.
Following Proposition 3.1, thus, it is clear that for any F (1) ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1, different mon-
CHAPTER 3. OVERSIGHT, CAPACITY, AND INEQUALITY 104
itoring rates will be adopted for different citizens. This can be visualized by examining Figure 3.2
for a fixed ∆ and p. Given that F (0) = 0 (by assumption), the politician adopts different contracts
– here different monitoring rates – for different citizen types in the population. Importantly, every
contract incentivizes information transmission from some citizens by setting ρ(0, 1) > ρ(0, 0), as
is the case in Contracts %I , %IE , and %IE .
One implication of these capacity-maximizing contracts is that when there is variation in the
legibility of a population, these contracts necessarily generate inequality in the allocation of the
service across the population. This is evident from the variation in the levels of E[a†|θ], reported
in Table 3.1. Thus, while information transmission from some citizens is necessary to maximize
capacity across the population, when not all citizens can be induced to communicate, capacity is
necessarily uneven.
Proposition 3.4. Any capacity maximizing contract incentivizes information transmission from
some citizen types. For any such contract, there exists inequality in expected allocations across
the population (TAI > 0). However, relative to a uniform application of the most unequal “con-
stituent” contract, conditioning the contract on citizen type reduces inequality (TAI).
Proposition 3.4 further finds that the levels of inequality generated by the capacity-maximizing
contract are lower than those generated by any of the constituent contracts with information when
applied uniformly. This occurs because the use of type-specific monitoring rates effectively breaks
the capture mechanism. The service provided to illegible citizens is no longer compromised due
to oversight optimized for legible citizens. This implies that contracts that mandate unequal treat-
ment of citizens by bureaucrats or their principals can reduce inequality in outputs. This finding
has implications for a burgeoning literature on bureaucratic bias or discrimination. Studies that
measure such biases often assert perverse implications (immediate or downstream) of differential
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treatment of citizens by bureaucrats ranging from disenfranchisement to inability to access state
benefits (White, Nathan, and Faller, 2015; Hemker and Rink, 2017; ?). The present result suggests
that with a heterogeneous population of citizens, differential responses by bureaucrats to citizens of
different types can actually reduce inequality in outcomes.
The finding that contracts that condition oversight on citizen type can reduce inequality in out-
puts raises several important considerations. First, benefits in terms of capacity or reductions in
inequality that can be realized by conditioning oversight in this way rely on the assumptions about
the politician’s objective. If a politician is not motivated to, for example, maximize capacity for
each citizen, the ability to monitor service provision differentially by citizen type can be corrosive
to efforts to build capacity. This points to the importance of characterizing the agency problem
between politicians and bureaucrats for the interpretation of empirical measures of bureaucratic be-
havior, particularly with respect to empirical documentation of bias or discrimination. Second, such
conditioning may not be legal or feasible in certain contexts. Equal rights guarantees may preclude
this form of conditioning state processes (here forms of oversight) on citizen type in program or
institutional design.
This section extends the analysis to explore the tradeoffs between capacity and inequality when
a politician seeks to maximize the accuracy of service provision across the population of citizens.
One of the two central findings from the baseline model that monitoring bureaucrats on the basis
of information transmitted by citizen complaints leads to inequality in service provision remains
unchanged. However, in contrast to some cases in Proposition 3.2, using citizen information in
monitoring cannot reduce overall implementation capacity across the population. Indeed, the politi-
cian is effectively maximizing implementation capacity when they opt to incentivize information
transfer. Under this assumption about the politician’s objective, therefore, there necessarily exists
a tradeoff between state capacity (across the population) and equity that is not always present with
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a particularistic politician. The features of “capture” are eliminated by a politician that values ac-
curate service provision across the population and can tailor oversight policies to the client. As
such, the main results of this paper are robust to several specifications of the politician’s objective.
Nevertheless, accurate characterization of this objective can refine the predictions in terms of the
effects of oversight.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper posits a new connection between oversight institutions and their implications for state
implementation capacity and the distribution of state services across a population. Specifically, I
examine how a politician’s adoption of these institutions conditions the state’s ability to accurately
match service outcomes to an unknown citizen state. In particular, I study when oversight con-
tracts provide citizens with incentives to complain about services rendered by bureaucrats. Citizen
communication of private information helps the government match service to the citizen’s state.
However, when the state cannot incentivize all citizens to complain, a commitment to use infor-
mation in monitoring improves capacity among legible citizens that can complain and can reduce
implementation capacity among citizens that cannot. These dynamics generate inequality in the
distribution of services across the population.
This theory speaks to many potential empirical applications. Most crucially, it emphasizes a
broader role for the study of implementation in distributive politics. In the model, the policy is not
targeted to any citizen type. It is directed on the basis of a citizen’s state, which is assumed to be
independent of observable characteristics (type). Yet, the politician’s choice of contract generates
substantial variation in “who gets what.” In a large body of work that measures targeting of state
resources in terms budgetary appropriations, the account of distribution developed in this paper
would generally be undetectable in the data. As such, measuring only targeting in appropriations
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stage can yield inferences that do not reflect distributional outcomes.
Moving from theory to application suggests a need for new measures of the use of informa-
tion transmission in bureaucratic oversight. First, more systematic data is needed to characterize
variation in the role of citizen information provision cross-nationally and across policy areas sub-
nationally. National regulation of procedures for complaint and information transfer appear to vary
substantially in stylized cases. Moreover, measures of citizen willingness to provide information
represent important variables in behavioral research that can develop our understanding of costs
of complaint or legibility (as conceptualized in this article). Both sets of measures are critical to
better formulating the relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens in the study of
distributive politics.
This article views implementation capacity as the outcome of an interaction between a gov-
ernment and its subjects. By considering heterogeneity among citizens in terms of willingness to
provide information, I provide a novel institutional foundation for observed unevenness in imple-
mentation capacity across the population or territory (e.g., Scott, 1998; Soifer, 2015). The model
proceeds to link this unevenness to the co-occurrence of inequality in the distribution of state ser-
vices. In so doing, it suggests new limits on states’ ability to develop greater capacity for policy
implementation without generating disparities in the distribution public goods and services.
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Chapter 4
Bureaucratic Capacity and the Observability of Electoral
Accountability
Electoral accountability is a normative goal of democracy (Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, 1999).
Yet, recent empirical assessments of the health or existence of these relationships between voters
and politicians present grounds for pessimism. In developing democracies, widespread malfea-
sance by politicians, underprovision of public goods and services, and low levels of citizen political
knowledge motivate questions about whether and when voters can hold these apparently poorly per-
forming politicians to account. Furthermore, efforts to inform citizens in settings where account-
ability is thought to be limited provide little systematic evidence that citizens respond by sanctioning
underperforming or rewarding high-performing politicians (Dunning et al., 2019).
In this paper, I present an alternative explanation for these empirical patterns that focuses instead
on bureaucratic quality as a constraint on politicians’ incentives to provide public goods, even when
voters are sufficiently informed and rational. The theory suggests that empirical manifestations of
accountability across democracies vary with bureaucratic quality. Specifically, I identify conditions
under which the presence and absence of electoral accountability are observationally equivalent
with respect to corruption by politicians, underprovision of public goods, and voter beliefs and
behavior. These findings provide implications for how we interpret empirical evidence and design
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comparative research on accountability.
To see the distinction between my argument and existing alternatives, consider a standard ac-
count of accountability failures. In such models, citizens are uncertain about a politician’s type and
lack some informational signal upon which they can update their beliefs about the politician. This
model is consistent with the implied equilibrium absent information in Ferraz and Finan (2008),
Humphreys and Weinstein (2012), and Dunning et al. (2019), among others. Alternatively, citizens
may receive information but fail to rationally update their beliefs (Achen and Bartels, 2016; Healy,
Malhotra, and Mo, 2010).1 In either case, failure to access or update on performance-relevant in-
formation breaks the link between a politician’s actions and her subsequent electoral fortunes, so
politicians maximize their own utility, regardless of whether their actions are congruent with voters’
preferences.
In contrast, I argue that low bureaucratic quality generates the same empirical patterns even
with voters that hold politicians to account. Across democracies, politicians rely on bureaucrats to
co-produce public goods. Yet, politicians in different settings face bureaucrats of varying quality. I
define quality as a function of human capital levels of bureaucrats and potentially their allocation
across a politician’s jurisdiction. Variation in bureaucratic quality influences the efficiency of public
goods investments, altering politicians’ incentives to appropriate funds to public goods. Citizens
attempt to learn about the politician’s type on the basis of observed public goods outputs, but the
scope for learning varies with bureaucratic quality.
To understand the implications of these two accounts, I develop a simple two-period model of
electoral accountability with a bureaucrat. As in standard models of accountability, voters evaluate
politicians on the basis of the quality of observed policy outcomes, here levels of public goods pro-
1But see Fowler and Montagnes (2015); Fowler and Hall (2018); Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Fridenberg
(2018).
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vision (Ashworth, 2012). This model departs from standard practice by considering co-production
of public goods by politicians and unelected bureaucrats. The politician allocates funds between
public goods and private rents (corruption). In turn, bureaucrats produce public goods with the
allocated funds. Bureaucratic quality influences the efficiency with which these public goods are
produced. Politicians differ in their competence at “getting things done,” which translates into better
monitoring of bureaucrats. Voters prefer competent types and update their belief about a politician’s
type on the basis of public goods outputs. The voter then decides whether or not to retain the in-
cumbent for a second period or to elect a challenger. I examine the manifestations of variation in
accountability by allowing the probability that the voter observes the signal (public goods output)
to vary.
I characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the model. At low levels of bureaucratic quality,
public goods provision is inefficient for both types of politicians, and a pooling equilibrium emerges
in which neither type of politician invests in public goods. As a result, voter observation of outputs
is uninformative, and even an voter that observes the signal cannot differentially retain competent
types. At moderate levels of bureaucratic capacity, public goods provision is efficient for competent
types but inefficient for incompetent types. In this case, voters observation of public goods allows
for updating on politician type which yields higher retention of competent types and can induce
incompetent type to make costly investments in public goods in their first term. Finally, at high
levels of bureaucratic quality, a pooling equilibrium emerges in which both types make efficient
investments in public goods. Again, in this equilibrium, voter observation of public goods outputs
allows for updating which facilitates more frequent retention of competent politicians.
I illustrate the plausibility of the model by revisiting empirical evidence on the accountability
of mayors in Brazil. Specifically, I develop and validate a measure of bureaucratic quality across
Brazilian municipal bureaucracies. I use this measure to extend seminal studies of corruption by
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politicians (Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018); voter updating on politician per-
formance (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2016a; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2016); and voter sanc-
tioning of incumbent politicians on the basis of information disclosure (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). I
find that a separating equilibrium where competent invest in public goods and incompetent politi-
cians invest in rents emerges only in municipalities with comparatively low measures of bureaucratic
quality (relative to the random sample of Brazilian municipalities). In municipalities with higher
quality bureaucracies, a pooling equilibrium emerges in which all politicians invest in public goods
(in both periods). The evidence presented allows for rejection of cases of the model characteristic
of existing empirical literature in which (i) voters are (completely) uninformed or unable to update;
or (ii) bureaucratic co-production of public goods is not a feature of citizen-politician accountability
relations.
This paper contributes to theoretical and empirical literatures. First, the model considers a
strategic relationship between a citizen, a politician, and a bureaucrat. It connects to accountability
models focused on a voter and politician(s) (Fearon, 1999; Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and
Fridenberg, 2017) and to models of moral hazard in bureaucracies. Joining Yazaki (2018); Li,
Sasso, and Turner (2019), the model posits distinct but complementary roles of politicians and
bureaucrats in the production of public goods as central to our understanding of accountability.
This represents a departure from spatial models of delegation such as Fox and Jordan (2011) and
analyses of optimal institutional design (e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 2004; Alesina and Tabellini, 2007)
in which bureaucrats and politicians (ultimately) use the same instrument to affect policy. These
departures from standard accountability models allow for novel results characterizing why patterns
of accountability manifest differently in some democracies than others.
The results engage large empirical literature on information and accountability in developing
democracies (Dunning et al., 2019; Chong et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2011; Bhandari, Larreguy,
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and Marshall, 2019; Cruz, Keefer, and Labonne, 2018). The findings of these studies are mixed with
respect to the (average) effects or non-effects of information on voter beliefs and election outcomes
(Enríquez et al., 2019). This study helps to rationalize mixed results in this literature and provides
guidance for research design. Joining an important recent contribution by Martin and Raffler (2019),
I argue the co-production of public goods by bureaucrats and politicians conditions voters learning
about politicians and their behavior. In contrast to this work, however, I find that the argument
that bureaucratic co-production of public goods hinders voter learning is not general across the
parameter space; when bureaucratic quality is high, reliance on bureaucrats to produce public goods
can actually improve voter information and thus political selection. Empirically, I provide evidence
that this equilibrium presents in substantial number of Brazilian municipalities.
In both academic and policy research, much recent emphasis on improving accountability em-
phasizes interventions targeting voters. The most salient (or at least numerous) interventions exam-
ine how creating a better-informed citizenry can facilitate better selection of politicians or improve
politician behavior in office. The theory in this article finds that such voter-focused interventions are
only capable of improving accountability when bureaucratic at moderate levels of bureaucratic qual-
ity when voter information is limited. In contrast, interventions focused on improving governance
from the inside – by building capacity – hold promise in a larger subset of cases.
4.1 Theory
Consider three actors: an incumbent politician, P , a bureaucrat, B, and a voter V . I study the
production of public goods over two periods (terms). In each period, the politician and bureaucrat
jointly produce public goods that are observed (or unobserved) by the voter. After the first term,
there is an election in which the politician contests office against a challenger.
Politicians are of an incompetent or competent type, θ ∈ {θ, θ}, respectively. The politician’s
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type is private information to the politician and the bureaucrat. The voter holds a prior belief that the
politician is a competent type with probability Pr(θ = θ̄) = π ∈ (0, 1). I conceive of competence
as ability to manage the bureaucracy or “get things done” via oversight.2 Specifically, a compe-
tent politician monitors the bureaucrat at intensity θ while an incompetent politician monitors the
bureaucrat at intensity θ, where 0 < θ < θ < 1.
Public goods are produced as a function of the funding allocated by the politician in period t
and the quality and effort of the bureaucracy. Specifically, politicians allocate a budget, normal-
ized to 1 in each period, between public goods (at) and private rents (1 − at). I assume a binary
allocation decision, i.e. at ∈ {0, 1}.3 I treat the quality of the bureaucracy, q > 1 as exogenous.
While bureaucratic quality may be an outcome of policies pursued by a politician, the model simply
assumes that quality is slow-moving and requires sustained investment to realize changes (Rauch,
1995; Huber and Ting, 2020).4
I assume that bureaucrat the bureaucrat exerts effort, e in response to some intensity of oversight,
given by θ ∈ {θ, θ}. As such, the utility of the bureaucrat, in period t, net of a wage satisfying his
participation constraint, can be written:




Note that θ is given by the politician’s type. The bureaucrat is myopic. Because the bureaucrat does
2There may be statutory regulations that constrain or empower the politician to take action. I abstract from these
considerations at the moment, but they could be modeled as the product of θ and some variable capturing the statutory
environment.
3Given that the politician’s utility is linear in at, if at ∈ [0, 1], the results are identical because the optimal allocation
decision is always at a corner. However, additional out of equilibrium beliefs are necessary if the strategy space for at is
continuous.
4There is less systematic empirical evidence on reforms designed to improve bureaucratic quality. Notably, however
studied programs that are intended to improve bureaucratic quality via hiring (selection) are are initiated by higher levels
of government from outside the localities they serve, not by local politicians who may be judged on the quality of their
services (Dal Bó, Finan, and Rossi, 2013; Ashraf et al., 2020).
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not internalize public goods outcomes, their utility is independent of their quality.
Given the allocation of funds by the politician and the effort exerted by a bureaucrat, the public
good, gt(at, et) is produced according to the production function in Equation 4.2. The production
function assumes that allocation to public goods and bureaucratic quality are complements.
gt(at, et) =

atq with probability et
0 with probability 1− et
(4.2)
Equation 4.2 indicates that if the politician invests in public goods (at = 1), then the expected quan-
tity of public goods outputs is increasing in bureaucratic quality (q) and effort (e1). In contrast, if
the politician starves public goods funding (at = 0), they are not produced. Equation 4.2 further
clarifies the relationship between bureaucratic quality, q, and broader notions of bureaucratic capac-
ity. As is discussed in existing work, bureaucratic capacity consists of both the skill of bureaucrats
(Geddes, 1994), their allocation of bureaucrats across a jurisdiction (Acemoglu, García-Jimeno, and
Robinson, 2015), and the effort exerted by bureaucrats. I capture the first two features in quality (q)
and the third in bureaucratic effort (et). Thus, in the present framework both bureaucratic quality
and effort increase the efficiency with which a politician’s funding allocation is converted to a public
goods output.
The politician trades off private rents for public goods when allocating the budget. Both types
of politicians value the provision of public goods.5 However, variation in the two types’ efficacy in
inducing bureaucrats to work is captured in the realization of gt.
uPt (at; θ) = 1− at + gt (4.3)
5One can generate qualitatively similar results if politicians were distinguished by their objectives, i.e., a venal type
that does not value public goods and an altruistic type that does. Since the emphasis here is on settings where public
goods are not produced, I opt for a setting in which politicians do not vary in their preference for producing public goods.
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The politician receives uPt (at; θ) for each period she is in office, and utility normalized to 0 if
she is not in office. This normalization creates a re-election incentive for the politician. As such,
the politician’s utility over two periods is given by:
uP (a; θ) =

2− a1 − a2 + g1 + g2 if re-elected
1− a1 + g1 if not re-elected
(4.4)
The voter observes the realization of first-term public goods provision, g1, and forms a poste-
rior belief about the politician’s type, µ(g1).6 To understand the role of voter information – here,
whether or not a voter observes the public goods – in generating results, I assume that the voter
observes this signal of first-term public goods with probability p ∈ [0, 1]. While it is natural to think
that incumbents, challengers, or civil society would publicize performance signals, the information
and accountability literature generally assumes some some barrier to diffusion of this information,
for instance, a lack of local media (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr.,
2020). The assumption of exogenous revelation solely maintains that these diffusion technologies
are not manipulated by politicians in the short-run. Further, treating p as exogenous is consistent
with the theoretical treatment of information revelation in experiments on information and account-
ability (Izzo, Dewan, and Wolton, 2019). In this paper, setting p = 0 allows for characterization of
equilibria “without accountability,” which I interpret as broadly consistent with assertions that vot-
ers are uninformed about politician performance or public goods outputs (see anecdotes throughout
Dunning et al., 2019). As such, varying p allows for examination of the effect of increasing voter
information, and ostensibly accountability pressures.
The voter values consumption of the public good, whether or not they observe it. This implies
6In this baseline model, the voter does not observe the politician’s allocation or the bureaucrat’s effort (a1 or e1,
respectively).
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that the voter cares about a politician’s competence to the extent that competent politicians produce
more public goods (in expectation). The voter’s utility is thus given by expected public goods pro-
vision in the second period and a valence shock for the incumbent, parameterized as φ ∼ U [−b, b],
where b > q. The voter votes, v ∈ {i, c}, to re-elect the incumbent (i) or elect the challenger (c). If
elected, a challenger acts as a first-period incumbent. For that reason, I index second-period actions
by i and c, respectively. The voter’s second period expected utility from the a vote for incumbent or
a vote for a challenger (c), can be expressed:
E[uV2 (i)] = E[g
i
2|µ] + φ (4.5)
E[uV2 (c)] = E[g
c
2|π] (4.6)
I assume that if the challenger wins, she acts as a first-term incumbent. Thus, in evaluating E[gi2|µ]
and E[gc2|π], the voter considers differences in expected politician competence and differences in
allocation behavior that depend on a politician’s term.
4.1.1 Sequence and Equilibrium Concept
The game proceeds according to the sequence:
1. Nature determines θ, the incumbent’s competence. Only the incumbent and bureaucrat ob-
serve θ.
2. The incumbent allocates a1 to the public good.
3. The bureaucrat exerts effort e1 to produce the first-term public good, g1.
4. With probability p, the voter observes g1 and forms a posterior belief about the politician’s
type, µ. The valence shock φ is revealed, and the voter chooses whether to re-elect the
incumbent or elect the challenger.
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5. If the incumbent was re-elected, she allocates ai2 to the public good. Otherwise, the challenger
allocates ac2 to the public good.
6. If the incumbent was re-elected, the bureaucrat exerts effort ei2 to produce the public good g
i
2.
Otherwise, the bureaucrat exerts effort ec2 to produce the public good g
c
2.
I characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the game. The incumbent’s allocation
decision is the choice a1 ∈ {0, 1}. The bureaucrat’s effort allocation is e1 ∈ R+. Public goods
production, g1 : {0, 1} × R+ → {0, q}, maps the budget allocation and bureaucratic effort into a
public goods output observed by all players. Voters update beliefs on the observation of public goods
µ : {0, q} → [0, 1] and the voter’s voting strategy is a mapping v : {0, q} × [0, 1] → {i, c}. The
second period incumbent’s allocation strategy is a mapping ai2 : {0, q} × [0, 1] × {i, c} → {0, 1}.
Finally, second period bureaucratic effort and public goods production represents the mapping:
ei2 : {0, q} × [0, 1] × {i, c} × {0, 1} → R+ and public goods provision represents the mapping
gi2 : {0, q}×[0, 1]×{i, c}×{0, 1}×R+ → {0, q}. As in many signaling games, there exist multiple
equilibria in some regions of the parameter space. I invoke the intuitive criterion refinement (Cho
and Kreps, 1987). Under this refinement, the equilibrium characterized here is unique.
4.2 Equilibrium Analysis
First, consider the bureaucrat’s equilibrium level of effort. By straightforward inspection of the
bureaucrat’s objective, it is clear that optimal effort, e∗t = θ. Clearly, the bureaucrat’s effort depends
only on the politician’s type in either period. When combined with Equation 4.2, this optimal effort
indicates that politician competence and bureaucratic effort are complements with respect to the
production of public goods. The assumption contrasts with the idea that politician type (quality)
and bureaucratic quality are substitutes, which is typically motivated by the observation that high-
quality bureaucracies tend to insulate outputs from the follies of bad politicians. Instead, the model
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develops an alternate mechanism for this observed insulation focused on how bureaucratic quality
shapes a politician’s allocation.
Turning to the incumbent’s second-term allocation strategy, the politician considers the expec-
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1 if q ≥ 1θ
0 else
(4.7)
Intuitively, if the bureaucracy is of sufficiently low capacity (low q), even the competent type
has no incentive to fund public goods when it is inefficient to do so. This implies that even a
competent politician that values public goods outputs will “take the money and run” when the state
is incapable of efficiently producing public goods. On the other hand, when q is sufficiently high,
both types will fund public goods. The efficiency gains in the provision of public goods from a high-
quality bureaucracy thus induce both types of politician to fund public goods, insulating outputs (to
some extent) from incompetent politicians.
Consider the voter’s voting decision. The voter votes for the incumbent ifE[uV2 (i)] > E[u
V
1 (c)].
























2|θ = θ)] + (1− π)E[gc2(ac2, ec2|θ = θ)]
2b
(4.9)
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Turning to the voter’s beliefs and voting decision, recall that the voter observes g1 with probabil-
ity p. With probability 1−p, the voter does not observe g1. Consider the latter case first. Consistent
with descriptive accounts, it may be the case that voters do not observe g1 due to lack of attention to
or access to media. In this case, µ = π, which follows (trivially) from Bayes’ rule. If voters do not
update, a politician’s re-election fate is independent of her first-period allocation decision. As such,
the politician maximizes her utility by adopting the same allocation strategy in both periods, always
adopting the optimal allocation strategy given by Equation 4.7. Thus, following Equation 4.9, the
probability of re-election is τ(π, a) = 12 .
In the case that voters do observe g1, they are able to update their beliefs on the basis of observed
outputs. However, at different levels of bureaucratic quality, the signal offered by the realization of
public goods differs in its informativeness. Politicians choose their first period allocation behavior
on the basis of the efficiency with which a public good could be produced combined with their
anticipated prospects for re-election.
Proposition 4.1. Equilibrium In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
(i) If q < 1
θ
, both types of politicians allocate a1 = a2 = 0 to public goods.







, a competent-type politician allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a
incompetent-type politician allocates a1 = a2 = 0 to public goods.









, a competent-type politician allocates a1 = a2 =
1 while an incompetent-type politician allocates a1 = 1 and a2 = 0 to public goods.
(iv) If q ≥ 1θ , both types of politicians allocate a1 = a2 = 1 to public goods.
Consider the four cases in Proposition 4.1. In the first case, q < 1
θ
, bureaucratic quality is
sufficiently low that investing in the provision of public goods is inefficient for either type. As a
result, no public goods are produced in the first period. If p = 1, the citizen observes no public
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goods and updates, but it must be the case that µ = π, as an observation that g1 = 0 provides no
additional information about the type of politician. As such, the probability of re-election – even
with informed voters – is 12 . Optimal allocation strategies, posterior beliefs, and re-election rates
are therefore identical regardless of whether the voter observes public goods. This equilibrium is
supported by a voter’s off-path beliefs that, upon observation of a non-zero public goods output, the
voter believes the politician to be of the competent type with certainty.7 Note that the competent
type of politician has no incentive to deviate by allocating funds to public goods in the first period
because the voter has no additional incentive to retain a competent politician that will not allocate the
budget to public goods in the second period. This rules out any equilibrium in which the competent
type invests in public goods in only the first period.







. In this interval, the competent type of politi-
cian can provide public goods efficiently while the incompetent type cannot, as E[g1|θ = θ] > 1
and E[g1|θ = θ] < 1. Consider the voter’s beliefs and voting strategy. When the voter observes
g1, they learn from its realization. If they observe g1 = q, the voter knows that the politician is a
competent type, µ = 1. In contrast, upon observing g1 = 0, the voter’s posterior is µ = π−πθ1−πθ ,
which implies µ < π. Combined with Equation 4.9, when a voter observes public goods outputs,
competent type politicians are re-elected at a probability strictly greater than the incompetent type.
In this interval, thus, accountability improves (from the perspective of voter welfare) the selection
of politicians. Importantly, this parameter region can be empty. Many empirical studies start from
an assumption of the existence of a separating equilibrium; the theoretical analysis suggests that
this assumption may not obtain.









, the incompetent type politician
7Note that these off-path beliefs eliminate equilibria in which neither politician contributes to the public good in the
first period in other regions of the parameter space.
CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND THE OBSERVABILITY OF ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 121
pools with the competent type politician in the first period, allocating her budget to the public good,
but shirks in the second period by allocating no funds to public goods. Note that this equilibrium
exists only when the voter (sometimes) observes public goods outputs. If the voter were never
to observe outputs (p = 0), it is easy to verify that this interval would be empty. When p > 0,
accountability pressures induce an incompetent incumbent to allocate funds to public goods in the
first period when she would not otherwise do so in this interval. If the voter observes that the public
good has materialized, they update their belief to µ = πθ
πθ+(1−π)θ > π; if the public good does not
materialize, the voter updates their belief to µ = π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) < π. Note that in this case,
a voter prefers any competent politician to a first-period incompetent politician to a second-period
incompetent politician. This generates two implications. First, competent-type politicians are re-
elected at higher rates than incompetent-type politicians whenever p > 0. However, because of fears
that a second-period incompetent-type will shirk, this case generates an incumbency disadvantage
(Klas̆nja and Titunik, 2017).
In the final case, q ≥ 1θ , both types of politicians allocate the entire budget to public goods
in both periods, regardless of how observant the voter is (the value of p). However, it is more
likely that a competent politician induces the bureaucracy to produce the public good given her
investment. If the voter observes the public good, their posterior beliefs (under each realization of
g1) are identical to the previous case (with information). Consequently, the voter retains competent
type politicians at a higher rate than incompetent type politicians. As a result, the likelihood that
the second-period office holder is a competent type is higher than in the baseline case. Unlike the
previous case in which a voter is concerned about second-period shirking by the politician, in this
case she is indifferent between a first- and second-period politician, conditional on type.
As is standard in political accountability models, the inclusion of a voter that learns from ob-
servation of first-period public goods introduces two mechanism through which the equilibrium
CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND THE OBSERVABILITY OF ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 122
changes relative to model where the voters is uninformed (Fearon, 1999). First, the voter updates
on politician type and their resultant voting strategy re-elects competent politicians at weakly higher
rates than incompetent politicians. Second, these changes in the likelihood of re-election change a
incompetent-type politician’s first-period allocation strategy to fund public goods when they would
not otherwise do so in some intervals of the parameter space. However, these manifestations of
accountability do not manifest in every case of the equilibrium.
4.2.1 Observational Equivalence
The discussion of Proposition 4.1 suggests that the consequences of a more informed electorate vary
across the equilibria identified. To examine this more systematically, I examine the conditions under
which variation p – the likelihood that voters observe public goods outputs – manifests in observa-
tionally distinct equilibrium actions and beliefs. Proposition 4.2 identifies several observational
equivalencies.
Proposition 4.2. In the PBE characterized in Proposition 4.1:
(i) If q < 1
θ
, the voter’s posterior belief and therefore the probability of re-election of the
incumbent are observationally equivalent for any p ∈ [0, 1].









, the optimal allocation strategy for an incumbent
of either type is observationally equivalent for any p ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4.2 posits that accountability only manifests in distinct voter beliefs, voter actions,
and politician actions when bureaucratic quality is sufficiently high. In a large body on literature on
information and accountability, a politician accrues rents from office at the expense of public goods
because voters are not watching. Proposition 4.2 suggests that politicians that value public goods
may accrue rents from office while voters watch because low bureaucratic quality makes investments
in public goods inefficient. Voters cannot update on the basis of observing a lack of public goods
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outputs and are consequently indifferent between re-electing the incumbent or electing a challenger
from the same pool of candidates.
In contrast, when bureaucratic quality and politician competence are high enough to render
investment in public goods (by at least one type of politician) efficient, voters can update their
beliefs by observing public goods outputs. This updating leads to a higher likelihood of retention of
competent versus incompetent types. For some parts of the parameter space, re-election concerns
induce incompetent-type politicians to make costly first-period allocations to the public good that
does would not occur in equilibrium absent accountability pressures.
Collectively, this observational equivalence suggests that the empirical diagnostics used to as-
sert an absence of electoral accountability in developing countries – corruption by politicians, un-
derprovision of public goods, coexisting with “uninformed” voters – may not imply a lack of ac-
countability. Moreover, by choosing different diagnostics of electoral accountability failures on the
basis of equilibrium outcomes (e.g. corruption), we have less leverage to distinguish between these
accounts.
4.2.2 Observable Politician Behavior
The model also provides implications about when the co-production of public goods by politicians
and bureaucrats may hinder or facilitate selection or moral hazard of politicians (Martin and Raffler,
2019). To isolate the role of co-production, I compare a model in which the voter observes politician
first-period allocation behavior (a1) to the main model in which the voter observes public goods
outputs (g1). This model in which voters observe politician allocation behavior instead of public
goods outcomes removes a source of randomness – whether or not public goods are executed by the
bureaucrat.8 As such, in a separating equilibrium, the politician’s type is fully revealed to the voter.
8This is consistent with the characterization of corruption revelation treatments in Izzo, Dewan, and Wolton (2019).
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Proposition 4.3. In the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium:
(i) If q < 1
θ
, both types of politicians allocate a1 = a2 = 0 to public goods.







, a competent-type politician allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a incompetent-
type politician allocates a1 = a2 = 0 to public goods.








, a competent-type politician allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while an
incompetent-type politician allocates a1 = 1 and a2 = 0 to public goods.
(iv) If q ≥ 1θ , both types of politicians allocate a1 = a2 = 1 to public goods.
The equilibria characterized in Proposition 4.3 are substantively similar to the equilibria char-
acterized in 4.1. However, differences between the two results suggest that both the direction and
magnitude of bureaucratic co-production of public goods on politician selection depend on bureau-
cratic quality. First, consider the effect of co-production on the moral hazard of the politician. Note
that in the baseline model, the moral hazard of the politician can be overcome by accountability
pressures at intermediate levels of bureaucratic quality, where public goods production efficient for
only the competent type. Comparison of Propositions 4.1 and 4.3 demonstrates that the parameter
space in which the incompetent type can be induced to pool with the competent type in the first
period weakly expands when voters observe allocation behavior instead of outputs. In the baseline
model in which voters may observe g1, the bureaucrat’s effort adds noise to the production of the
public good. As such, the politician’s type is not fully revealed to the voter in the instance that
public goods are not realized. In contrast, in the present model in which voters may directly observe
a politician’s allocation, the voter learns the politician’s type with certainty. This increase in voter
learning creates stronger incentives for this first-period pooling.
Comparison of the models in which voters observe allocations as opposed to outcomes suggests
that bureaucratic co-production of public goods can weaken or enhance the voters’ ability to select
competent politicians. Consistent with Martin and Raffler (2019), in a separating equilibrium in
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which competent and incompetent types make different allocations in the first period, the noise in
the mapping from a politician’s allocation to the public goods produced by bureaucrats reduces
a voter’s ability to select competent types upon observation of outputs as opposed to allocations.
However, in contrast to the argument in Martin and Raffler (2019), in any equilibrium in which both
types of politicians allocate funds to public goods in the first period, complementarities between
politician competence and bureaucratic effort imply that voters can select better politicians when
they observe outputs.
Relative to Proposition 4.1, Proposition 4.3 also reveals a broader set of observational equiva-
lencies, as summarized in Proposition 4.4.
Proposition 4.4. In the PBE characterized in Proposition 4.3:
(i) For any q < 1
θ




}, the voter’s posterior belief and therefore the
incumbent’s probability of re-election are observationally equivalent for any p ∈ [0, 1].








, the optimal allocation strategy for an incumbent of either
type is observationally equivalent for any p ∈ [0, 1].
In this model, the observational equivalence at low levels of bureaucratic quality is maintained.
However, additional equivalencies emerge in the other pooling equilibrium when voters can observe
politician behavior directly. The idea that voters’ information comes from scouring municipal bud-
gets to observe allocations seems less plausible than voter observation of public-facing public goods
outputs. However, most partial-equilibrium empirical assessments of accountability focus on reve-
lation of politician allocation or behavior (i.e. corruption) as opposed to public goods performance.
For this reason, observational equivalence in both models is important for interpretation of evidence
on accountability.
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4.3 Revisiting Studies of Accountability in Brazil
I present empirical evidence in support of this theory of accountability relations between voters
and politicians using empirical evidence from municipal governance in Brazil. To contextualize
these findings, I extend the findings of a number of recent studies on information provision, voter
updating, and mayoral corruption. The choice of Brazil allows me to leverage a new measure of
bureaucratic quality to complement a rich existing literature. These practical and epistemological
justifications should not undermine the importance of the study of accountability in one of world’s
largest democracies.
The parameter emphasized throughout the paper, bureaucratic quality, occupies a similarly
salient role in the analysis. I provide original measurement of bureaucratic quality at the munic-
ipal level. However I do not manipulate bureaucratic quality, nor do I identify a research design
which generates plausibly exogenous variation in this variable. Indeed, historical evidence and
existing theories of bureaucratic reform emphasize the rarity of such moments in addition to the
strategic and dynamic nature of reform (generally described in terms of civil service adoption)
(Geddes, 1994; Ting et al., 2012; Huber and Ting, 2020). As such, I rely on observational variation
in bureaucratic quality in a series of analyses intended to test several implications of the theory.
4.3.1 Measuring Bureaucratic Quality
As the theory clarifies, bureaucratic quality (q) is distinct from bureaucratic effort (e) and public
goods outputs (g). As such, a measure of bureaucratic quality must abstract from these features.
I thus operationalize quality as a measure of human capital of individuals employed in municipal
administration. I rely on Brazil’s Basic Municipal Information Survey (MUNIC) to measure char-
acteristics of employment in (direct) municipal administration. This survey, implemented by the
Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Estadística, requires muncipalities to report counts of public em-
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ployees working in direct municipal administration, disaggregated according to several categories
including education and contract type. Given that the raw data consists of counts of public employ-
ees, the level of cross-sectional aggregation is the municipality.
I operationalize bureaucratic quality as the average education level of bureaucrats working in
municipal administration. The measure of bureaucratic quality capture features of a representative
(average) public employee. I abstract from measures of the number of public employees per capita
for two reasons. First, per-capita measures of municipal employment do not account for efficiencies
of scale: running a fixed set of programs requires more employees per capita in small municipal-
ities. Second, classic descriptions of patronage in Latin America include accounts of low-wage
workers filling out the ranks of public employment (Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Grindle, 2012). This
is generally believed to deter bureaucratic quality.
In treating bureaucratic education as a measure of quality, several legal, economic, and political
considerations are warranted. Legally, municipal employees in direct administration should be hired
with civil service provisions, though empirically adherence varies substantially, with many munic-
ipalities relying heavily on contractors. Variation in hiring practices is substantial across municipal
governments, which accords with the wide observed variation in bureaucratic quality (e.g., Toral,
2019).
Average bureaucratic education clearly is driven, in part, by local labor market conditions. The
scope of heterogeneity across Brazilian labor markets is likewise impressive. I account for regional
variation using state fixed effects. I also use flexible covariate specifications to adjust for municipal
population, average municipal education (years of education), formality (percent of workers work-
ing in the formal sector), and per-capita GDP. All of these features correlate with the measure of
bureaucratic quality (see Figure C.3). However, they (collectively) account for less than 20% of the
variation in bureaucratic quality, indicating that this variation is not simply a function of variation
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in local labor markets (see Figure C.4).
Analysis of persistence of this measure of bureaucratic education within municipalities over five
waves of MUNIC (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, and 2018) accords with some qualitative assumptions
of the model. While quality is secularly increasing over time across the sample of (Figure C.2),
within municipalities bureaucratic quality is sticky. The autocorrelation of bureaucratic quality
between waves of the survey is 0.57, in approximately triennial surveys (Table C.2). I further
show that such persistence obtains across the constituent education categories. In the model, q is
treated as exogenous and the politician does not alter bureaucratic quality. The data is consistent
with this assumption. Table C.3 reports the results of first-difference models that regress changes
in bureaucratic quality (from consecutive waves of MUNIC) on indicators measuring a change in
mayor and change in the mayor’s party in an intervening election. I find no consistent evidence that
changes in mayor or mayor’s party yields differential shifts in average bureaucratic quality: point
estimates are near-zero and precisely estimated. Further evidence from visualization of the ECDF of
changes in bureaucratic quality shows no evidence of differential changes in variance (Figure C.5).
This is consistent with the model’s assumption that bureaucratic quality is approximately fixed (or
slow-moving).
Finally, given the importance of separating the implications of the present theory of bureaucratic
quality and accountability from theories premised on a lack of voter information, I examine the
association between bureaucratic quality and local media presence in Figure C.6 and Table C.4. In
the Brazilian municipal context, the presence of community radio is argued to be the most important
form of media for diffusing local news (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; ?; ?). I show that while raw
measures of bureaucratic quality and radio station presence are positively correlated, conditional
on the local labor market covariates and state fixed effects, the conditional association between
bureaucratic quality and radio presence is estimated to be a precise zero. Further, I utilize radio
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presence as an additional covariate to allay possible concerns.
4.3.2 Measuring Politician Allocations
In this analysis, I measure politicians’ allocations to rents, 1 − a, relying on the results of federal
audits of municipal governments. Such audits have gained prominence across Latin America in
the last two decades as a policy, and have been used to measure corruption in academic literature
(Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Chong et al., 2015). In Brazil, the audits I use to measure allocations
are conducted by the federal Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU), through a municipal auditing
program inaugurated in 2003. Because municipalities in Brazil receive the majority of their budgets
from the federal government, such audits cover sizable shares of municipal budgets.9 Audits consist
of visits by a team of federal officials to municipalities to oversee allocation and disbursement of
funds and observe outputs. They report their findings in reports which are disseminated by local
media (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
Brazil’s audits are oft-studied as a natural experiment because the federal government randomly
selects municipalities by lottery. While this random assignment has facilitated studies of the effects
of audits (i.e., Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018), from the perspective of
this paper, it primarily ensures random sampling of municipalities. This sampling ensures support
across all levels of bureaucratic quality.10 Support across the distribution of bureaucratic quality is
essential to making inferences about the theory proposed by this paper, as I describe in more detail
below.
A final consideration about the use of audit data to measure allocations considers whether au-
dits measure the actions of politicians, here, mayors, or the municipal administration generally. I
9Among the sample of municipalities audited in the first rounds of randomized audits, audits covered 60% of local
budgets.
10For the purposes of this paper, the ideal auditing selection would randomly sample at higher rates from the tails of
the distribution of bureaucratic quality to increase statistical power.
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follow existing studies of accountability in attributing corrupt or malfeasant spending to mayors.
This is precisely the inference that experimental studies of accountability ask voters to make (Boas,
Hidalgo, and Melo, 2019; Chong et al., 2015; Arias et al., 2019). In Brazilian municipalities, execu-
tives are responsible for proposing a budget and, alongside the city council, monitoring its execution
(Gonçalves, 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that opposition to audits in the form of lawsuits
have come from elected politicians, not other municipal officials (Seabra, 2018). Furthermore,
studies of the effects of audits find few consequences for bureaucrats, at least in terms of retaining
employment (Ferrali and Kim, 2019).
4.3.3 Measuring Voter Updating and Behavior
I finally measure voter updating and voting behavior in response to provision of information about
politician allocation behavior. The study of information revelation and voter updating has spawned
a large body of recent survey experiments and experiments (for a list of these studies, see Incerti,
2019; Dunning et al., 2019; Bhandari, Larreguy, and Marshall, 2019). I extend a survey experiment
fielded in Brazil as reported in Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2016a); Winters and Weitz-Shapiro
(2016) to measure how voter responses to evidence of politician corruption/lack of corruption vary
in bureaucratic quality. This allows for the cleanest test of the voter updating mechanism in iso-
lation, separated from the effect of a politician’s (strategic) allocation behavior or baseline voter
information.
I then turn to a re-analysis of the effects of audits on voting behavior inspired by (Ferraz and Fi-
nan, 2008), examining how the effect being (randomly) audited on vote share varies in bureaucratic
quality. Recent scholarship emphasizes a learning effect stemming from the CGU audit program
among politicians (Lichand, Lopes, and Medeiros, 2016; Avis, Ferraz, and Finan, 2018). These
effects of audits are argued to stem from the threat of with legal sanction instead of electoral pun-
ishment. I abstract from these dynamics by focusing on the first rounds of audits preceding the 2004
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municipal elections for measurement. This coincides with the period of highest auditing intensity
(most municipalities audited per year) (Seabra, 2018).
In both designs, the manipulation to voter information, parameterized by p in the model, means
that voters observe politician allocations (more specifically, corrupt spending), not public goods.
By design, the mayor (or hypothetical mayor in the survey experiment) did not allocate funds in
anticipation of this revelation. As such, both tests represent partial equilibrium tests of the model
advanced here. The value added of these tests is to examine the plausibility of the accountability
mechanism.
4.3.4 Mapping Theory and Research Design
Empirically, I focus on the beliefs and actions of two actors in the model: the politician and the voter,
examining four predictions of the model. In assessing the plausibility of this model, I compare it to
two less general cases which, I contend, capture arguments in the existing empirical literature:
1. No bureaucratic co-production: Assume that θ = 0 and θ = 1.11 This eliminates both pooling
equilibria and ensures that public goods production is independent of bureaucratic quality. If
voters observe public goods, g, the incumbent’s type is revealed. Per Fearon (1999), this is a
model of pure selection.
2. No electoral accountability: Assume that p = 0. The voter does not observe a signal and thus
does not update. This breaks the link between first-period allocations and electoral fortunes,
implying that any politician that could be induced to allocate first-period funds to public goods
in order to improve her electoral prospects if voters were informed would not do so.
The first case is obviously rather narrow. It refers to a distributive setting in which voters aim to
select politicians who will not appropriate rents. This is certainly far from the only voter objective
11Note that this model falls outside parametric restrictions imposed on θ and θ in the model, so this is not precisely a
“case” of the general model.
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in theories of selection. However, it is consistent with the motivation of many studies based in low-
and middle-income democracies including the studies from Brazil that I extend. Note further that
cases #1 and #2 are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the arguments in which bureaucrats are absent
often coincide with findings of limited accountability.
To adjudicate the general (“unrestricted”) case of the model from these alternatives, I motivate
three reduced-form tests in Table 4.1. Given the measured parameters, the theory does not provide
unambiguous directional predictions for a research design that exogenously manipulates voter infor-
mation. Because studies of this design occupy a very prominent position in the literature, I examine
the evidence on how information changes voting behavior inductively in light of the theory that I
advance.
The tests I propose rely on observation of variation in equilibrium selection at different lev-
els of bureaucratic quality. This presents a challenge because we do not know the true mapping
between q and the empirical measure of bureaucratic quality. For example, it is possible that all
municipalities have sufficiently uniform bureaucratic quality to ensure that all municipalities fall
into one of the equilibria identified in Proposition 4.1. The inferences from the proposed tests rely
upon variation in the underlying equilibria. To this end, I adopt three complementary approaches
to interpretation of the data. First, description of the data and reading of the existing literature pro-
vides some guidance on what is plausible. Second, I leverage insights across the tests described in
Table 4.1. Because these data come from different sources, qualitative consistency across tests is,
in principle, more challenging to achieve and also more informative. Finally and most practically,
I am careful to model bureaucratic quality flexibly in regression specifications given the possibility
of non-linearities suggested by the model.
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4.3.5 Estimation
Table 4.1 suggests three implications of the theory that I proceed to test. In the first test, I exam-
ine the association between politician allocations to rents (corruption) and municipal bureaucratic
quality. To examine this relationship, I estimate an OLS regression of the form:
Ymsl = β0 + β1Qm + γs + λl + δXm + εmsl (4.10)
where Ymsl is the proportion of audited funds allocated to rents in municipality m in state s, as
measured in lottery round l. Qm is the measure of municipal bureaucratic quality and β1 is the
coefficient of interest. γs is a vector of state fixed effects and λl is a vector of lottery round fixed
effects. Xm is a matrix of decile indicators for each of four municipal-level covariates: population,
average education, formality rate, and GDP per capita. The unrestricted model implies that β1 < 0:
corruption declines in bureaucratic quality. I also estimate this specification with tercile and quartile
bins of Qm given the potential for non-linearity suggested by the model.
Second, I examine whether term differences in the allocation of rents varies in bureaucratic
quality. I test this prediction by estimating an OLS regression of the form:
Ymsl = β0 + β1Qm + β2Second termm + β3QmSecond termm + γs + λl + δXm + εmsl (4.11)
where Ymsl is the share of audited funds allocated to rents in municipality m in state s, as measured
in lottery round l. Qm is the measure of municipal bureaucratic quality and Second termm captures
whether the politician is in her second term in the 2001-2004 term (when the audits occurred).
Bureaucratic quality, Qm, is modeled linearly and in quantile bins in different specifications. γs is
a vector of state fixed effects and λl is a vector of lottery round fixed effects. Xm includes the same
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set of flexible controls for local labor markets. The quantity of interest is β̂1 + β̂3Qm, the marginal
effect of being a second term mayor, at a given level of bureaucratic quality. I also use an analogous
regression discontinuity design to decompose selection from shirking effects, which I describe at
greater length in Appendix C.4.
Finally, using survey experimental data, I estimate how the magnitude of voter updating in
response to revelation of a clean mayor varies in bureaucratic quality. Given relevant arms of the
experimental design of Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016), I estimate conditional average treatment
effects (CATEs) of the clean and corrupt signals on updating, using OLS regressions of the form:
Yims =β0 + β1 + β2Clean signali + β3Clean signaliQm+
β4Corrupt signali + β5Corrupt signaliQm + γs + θXm + εims
(4.12)
where Yims is the survey response of individual i in municipality θ in state s. The signal indicators
measure the two treatment arms in the survey experiment. I cluster standard errors at the level at
which Qm is measured: the municipality. The estimator of the relevant CATE is β̂2 + β̂3Qm, which
measures updating on the clean signal at different levels of bureaucratic quality. As in all models, I
also consider binned quantile indicators of the bureaucratic quality measure.
4.4 Results
I present four findings. The first three examine the implications of the model elaborated in Table 4.1
to assess the plausibility of the theoretical model of accountability that I advance. The final result
looks at voter behavior more inductively in light of the evidence amassed in the first three analyses.
4.4.1 Politician Allocations to Rents Decrease in Bureaucratic Quality
In a first observational test of the theory, I examine the relationship between bureaucratic quality
and funds diverted to rents, as measured by municipal audits in 2003. Table 4.2, Panel A, presents
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the bivariate regression of the share of funds allocated to rents (1 − a) to rents on the bureaucratic
quality measure. A one standard deviation increase in bureaucratic quality (context) reduces rents
by 1.4 percentage points or 22.5% of the sample mean. The conditional association of bureaucratic
quality and mayors’ allocations to rents remains substantively similar when including covariates.
Given the right-skewed distribution of the share of corrupt spending, I also look at the logged out-
come, with substantively similar findings in Columns 4-6. Consistent with the model, more flexible
specifications of bureaucratic quality in Panels B and C reveal no evidence of non-monotonicity in
this relationship. Corrupt spending is concentrated in the lowest quantiles of bureaucratic quality.
On average, 7.3% of federal funds in the lowest tercile of municipalities and 7.5% of such funds in
the lowest quartile of municipalities are spent in a corrupt manner. As shown by the tables, these
rates drop in higher quantiles.
Further descriptive examination in Figure 4.1 of the corruption (rents) outcome suggests that
the modal politician allocates was not detected to engage in corruption with the audited federal
funds. Indeed, the median politician only allocates 1.9% of these funds to rents. This is consistent
with a setting with circumscribed corruption. Per the model, this circumscription occurs when
bureaucratic quality is high enough to induce at least one type of politician to invest in public
goods (the separating equilibria or the pooling equilibrium where both types invest). I return to this
observation in the subsequent analyses.
The finding that rent extraction declines in bureaucratic quality is consistent consistent with the
general model advanced here, regardless of whether voters observe signals of an incumbent’s per-
formance. It is inconsistent with the special case of the model in which bureaucratic co-production
of public goods is absent. I proceed to the subsequent tests to further adjudicate between these
alternatives.
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Share of corrupt spending Log(Share of corrupt spending + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. LINEAR BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY MEASURE (Z-SCORE)
Bureaucratic quality -0.014∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.012∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
B. BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY MEASURE TERCILES (RELATIVE TO FIRST TERCILE)
Bureaucratic Quality, Tercile 2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Bureaucratic Quality, Tercile 3 -0.027∗∗ -0.026∗ -0.036∗∗ -0.023∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
B. BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY MEASURE QUARTILE (RELATIVE TO FIRST QUARTILE)
Bureaucratic Quality, Quartile 2 -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 0.000
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Bureaucratic Quality, Quartile 3 -0.019 -0.021 -0.029∗ -0.015 -0.018 -0.024∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Bureaucratic Quality, Quartile 4 -0.029∗∗ -0.030∗ -0.042∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.025∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017)
State FE X X X X
Lottery FE X X X X
Demographic controls X X
Community indicator X X
Outcome Range [0,0.794] [0,0.794] [0,0.794] [0,0.584] [0,0.584] [0,0.584]
Outcome Mean 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.056
Outcome Std. Dev. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.085 0.085 0.085
Num. obs. 448 448 448 448 448 448
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.2: Association between bureaucratic quality, q, and allocations to public goods, a. Funds
diverted from public goods are measured as the share of corrupt spending, as defined by Avis,
Ferraz, and Finan (2018). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
4.4.2 Second-Term Shirking Disappears as Bureaucratic Quality Increases
Recall that in the model, the separating equilibrium in which politicians allocate money to public
goods in the first period but not the second emerges under two conditions. First, intermediate
bureaucratic quality makes public goods production by the incompetent type of politician inefficient
while public goods production is efficient for the competent type. Second, voters are likely enough
to observe the signal that costly diversion of funds to public goods in the first term can improve re-
election prospects. Ferraz and Finan (2011) establish that corruption is, on average, higher among
second-term mayors than first-term mayors. This contrasts directly with the predictions of the model
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of the measure of rents: corrupt spending as a share of total audited federal
funds. The navy dashed line gives the median and the red dotted line gives the mean.
without bureaucratic co-production, in which differences in allocations by term are driven only by
positive selection in the re-election of mayors. I further examine how this difference between (term-
limited) second term and (non-term limited) first term mayors varies in bureaucratic quality. Figure
4.2 shows that second-term shirking – or diversion of funds from public goods – manifests strongly
in municipalities with low bureaucratic quality. However, this difference by term disappears as
bureaucratic quality increases.
This finding is consistent with the suggestion that the lowest observed levels of bureaucratic
quality correspond to the separating equilibrium and higher levels of bureaucratic quality corre-
spond to the pooling equilibrium with public goods allocations from both types. Most importantly,
under the model advanced here, the finding of any difference between first- and second-term mayors
suggests that politicians anticipate that voters could learn about their actions (or outcomes). This
provides evidence against the case of “no accountability” (p = 0). The result in Ferraz and Fi-
nan (2011) is sufficient for this conclusion. The finding that this difference varies predictably in




























































































Figure 4.2: The marginal effect of a second-term politician versus a first-term politician on pro-
portion of audited funds allocated to rents. 90% and 95% confidence intervals constructed on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
bureaucratic quality provides evidence to bolster the plausibility of this model of accountability.
Serving as a first- versus second-term mayor is clearly not randomly assigned. One may be
tempted to rely on a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the conditional (local) ATE of
term.12 Under the present model, however, an RD cannot identify the effect of term alone since sec-
ond term mayors are also more likely to be of high competence than first-term mayors in the posited
parameter space (consistent with the critique in Marshall, 2019). Yet, under the valence assump-
tions in the voting model, an RD-like estimator that narrows the bandwidth to close races provides
a way to decompose term from politician type. By reducing the sample to close races (setting a
small bandwidth on the RD), the share of incompetent types in the pool of second term incumbents
should increase and we would expect more shirking on average (a larger difference between the first
and second terms). By varying the bandwidth in Figure C.8, I show that this prediction is indeed
borne out in the analysis. Consistent with the model’s predictions, in samples where incompetent
types theoretically represent a larger share of second-term mayors (close elections), second period
shirking is more pronounced.
12Note that the difference in conditional LATEs would still not be causally identified without manipulation of bureau-
cratic quality.
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4.4.3 Voters Do Not Update in Response to Revelation of “Clean” Politicians when Bureau-
cratic Quality is High
I extend a survey experiment to study voter updating in response to politician performance informa-
tion at different levels of bureaucratic quality. In recent years, scholars have questioned the corre-
spondence between voter (respondent) responses to information in survey experiments as opposed
to field settings (Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo, 2019; Incerti, 2019). I contend that the two measure two
measure beliefs and actions, respectively. Per the model, the two need not accord. I use the survey
experiment to test whether voters update beliefs in a manner consistent with the theory. Replica-
tion and extension of the survey experiment fielded in 2013 and elaborated by Weitz-Shapiro and
Winters (2016a) and Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016) thus affords a clean test of the updating
mechanism in isolation.
The survey experiment provides respondents with a common vignette about a first-term mayor
of a “different city” seeking re-election. A control condition provides no information about mu-
nicipal audit outcomes. Additional text conveying a “clean” treatment condition indicates that the
mayor was found to not have awarded bribes for city contracts. The “corrupt” treatment condition
conveys that the mayor engaged in such bribery. Importantly, these three arms allow to test how cit-
izens update in response to a signal of no allocation to rents (the “clean” condition) versus a signal
of allocation to rents (the “corrupt” condition).13 I measure the respondents’ prior beliefs about the
vignette via the control condition. I measure beliefs on a seven-point Likert scale.14
Importantly, the survey experiment was conducted with a nationally-representative survey in
140 municipalities. Because random selection of municipalities was weighted by population, the
13Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo (2019) replicate this survey experiment using nearly identical prompts in the state of
Pernambuco during the 2016 municipal elections. However, the survey experimental portion of their study does not
include a “clean” treatment condition, so I cannot test this implication in the context of their data.
14All findings are substantively similar when using Weitz-Shapiro and Winter’s 2016a preferred “vote intention” out-
come, as reported in Figure C.11. For the purposes of this analysis of updating, I seek a more direct measure of beliefs.
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sample skews slightly toward higher levels of bureaucratic quality, though it maintains support over
the distribution of quality, as shown in Figure C.9.15 I estimate conditional average treatment effects
(CATEs), by bureaucratic quality, as a measure of updating. The primary prediction of the model
that I test holds that at high levels of bureaucratic quality, where competent and incompetent pool
and allocate funds to public goods in a first term, voters should not update on the basis of a “clean”
signal. The model does not offer predictions for the “corrupt” signal across the parameter space. At
high levels of bureaucratic quality, diversion of funds from public goods is off the equilibrium path.











































































































































Figure 4.3: The left panel plots the raw data fitted by Loess for each treatment condition. The
right panel estimates the CATEs of both “clean” and “corrupt” signals at different quantiles of
bureaucratic quality. All CATEs are estimated from OLS regression models with the labor market
covariates. Thick and thin lines represent 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality, the level of aggregation at which bureaucratic quality moderator is
measured.
15Because the survey was fielded in 2013, I use the 2011 levels of bureaucratic quality as the moderator of interest.
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Figure 4.3 supports the model’s prediction that voters update on the basis of a clean signal only
at moderate levels of bureaucratic quality. In higher quantiles of bureaucratic quality, respondents’
“average” prior (control) and posterior beliefs upon revelation of a clean mayor are not distinguish-
able.16 Inspection of the data casts doubt on some alternative explanations. First, while the prior
belief increases in bureaucratic quality, there is no evidence of a ceiling effect on the CATE, even
high levels of bureaucratic quality, per the left panel of Figure 4.3. Across quantiles, there is “room”
to observe positive updating on the basis of a clean signal. Second, while demand effects may be of
concern with respect to voter updating about corruption, it is harder to explain why demand effects
for the clean treatment would diminish with municipal bureaucratic quality. Finally, in this analysis,
confounding is a concern with regard to the difference in CATEs at different levels of bureaucratic
quality. However, this is not the relevant test of the theory; the CATEs are causally identified by
the experimental research design (under standard assumptions). Thus, the relevant concern is that
another feature that drives bureaucratic quality drives similar patterns of differential updating.
The strong treatment effects on corruption in lower quantiles of the distribution of bureaucratic
quality are consistent with predictions of a separating equilibrium. At higher level of bureaucratic
quality, the signal provided to voters is “off path” – such voters would not observe a signal about the
politician’s action in equilibrium. The negative updating observed in Figure 4.3 is consistent with
the assumption that such a signal is generated by the incompetent type, though note that this is an
assumption rather than a result.
I do not detect variation in these patterns of updating by individual respondent characteristics.
In particular, these patterns do not vary detectably in citizen education or political knowledge on
factual questions, as defined by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016) (Figure C.12). This helps to ally
16The finding of substantial updating on politician in low quantiles is distinct from the null ATE across the sample that
is reported in Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016).
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concerns that differential patterns of updating are require sufficient political sophistication or are
driven by variation in the educational composition of the electorate that covariates with bureaucratic
quality.
In sum, extension of the survey experiment provides evidence that citizens (voters) respond
to information by updating their beliefs in a manner consistent with the theory. Specifically, “good
news” of a clean record politician only leads to updating when competent and incompetent types are
predicted to take different actions. This suggests that voters internalize expectations about politician
behavior and respond to information in light of these expectations. Per the model, differences in
expectations are driven by bureaucratic quality.
4.4.4 Understanding the Effect of Information Revelation on Voting Behavior
A dominant research design in the study of accountability examines voter responses to the exoge-
nous revelation of politician performance information. The randomized audits provide a natural
experiment that researchers have used to study the effect of revelation of information on voters’
decisions at the voting booth. A fundamental challenge in such research is measuring voters’ prior
beliefs, given that the direction and magnitude of possible updating depends on the this quantity.
Existing approaches include pre-intervention surveys (i.e., Dunning et al., 2019) or more inductive
approaches from the distribution of behavioral responses to information (Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
In terms of the current model, testing the effect of information on voter behavior is complicated by
incidental finding in the survey experiment that voters’ prior appears to correlate with bureaucratic
quality. This does not qualitatively change the general predictions of the model, but it limits the
falsifiability of certain predictions related to the relationship between bureaucratic quality and voter
behavior.
To show that voters appear to vote in a manner consistent with the model predictions, I rely
on three pieces of evidence, which must be interpreted in tandem. The first evidence comes from
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Ferraz and Finan (2008) who establish that voters, on average, punish incumbents found to engage
in corruption when it is revealed before mayoral elections. I replicate this finding for municipalities
audited before the 2004 elections using the metrics for corruption used in this paper in Table C.11.
They further establish that this difference is driven by municipalities with local radio stations. I rely
on these existing findings to provide evidence that voting behavior responds to the content of audits
in the direction predicted by this theory. This is also consistent with the case without bureaucratic
co-production, but is inconsistent with the model in which voters do not observe any signal of voter
type (p = 0).
The second and third pieces of evidence rely on a distinct design that examines the full pool
of mayors contesting for re-election in 2004 from municipalities that could have been selected for
audits (those with a population under 450,000). One prediction of the theory holds that re-election
rates should be lower in the equilibrium where incompetent types contribute to public goods in the
first term by shirk in the second. Section 4.4.2 establishes that this occurs in lower quantiles of
the observed distribution of bureaucratic quality. Observational analyses of re-election rates and
changes in vote share as a function of bureaucratic quality provide relatively noisy evidence that
incumbent electoral performance is weaker in lower quantiles of bureaucratic quality (Table C.12).
For example, incumbents’ re-election totals are 5.7 percentage points lower than their first-term
vote share: on average, a 1 standard deviation increase in bureaucratic quality averts 0.7 percentage
points of this shift, though the within-state comparison reveals a weaker association. As in the
examination of term effects, this finding provides qualified support for the proposition that levels of
bureaucratic quality influence equilibrium voter sanctioning behavior.
Finally, I examine the effect of being audited, unconditional of the information revealed, on
incumbents’ re-election performance using the natural experiment afforded by the random selection
of municipalities into CGU’s audits. First, I establish in Appendix C.13 that there is no evidence
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that contesting re-election varies with of being randomly selected to be audited. Indeed, nearly all
eligible mayors contest re-election. Second, I show formally that when audits are randomly as-
signed, the prediction for this comparison is precisely zero at all levels of bureaucratic quality under
the assumption that priors are an accurate measure of the proportion of competent and incompetent
types in the candidate pool. This prediction provides one way to evaluate the rationality of voters’
(behavioral) responses to information that remains agnostic as to (a) the (unmeasured) prior and (b)
the (unmeasured) level of p. If voters did not update in a Bayesian manner, we would not expect an
ATE of zero. Using equivalence tests, in Figure C.13, I reject standardized ATEs larger than 0.36
following recommendations by Hartman and Hidalgo (2018) in an omnibus test across all munici-
palities with an incumbent contesting re-election, and in general across quantiles of the distribution
of bureaucratic quality.
Obviously, there are other rationales for observing a zero-effect of audits on vote shares and
probabilities of re-election. Hence, these findings must be interpreted alongside the other results
presented. If voters did not encounter the audits, we would similarly expect a zero effect; the results
on directional updating in Ferraz and Finan (2008) are difficult to square with this explanation of
the unconditional ATE of zero. Second, it may be the case that this quality dimension is simply
swamped by other features when voters go to the polls (Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo, 2019). In the
model, this captured by increasing the magnitude of the valence shock, b. If this were the case, we
should also struggle to detect variation in electoral performance as a function of incumbent perfor-
mance information revelation. In sum, the combination of evidence in this paper and predecessors
does not offer evidence against the model I advance.
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4.5 Beyond Brazil
The results in the previous section provide evidence consistent with the model advanced in this
paper for the case of Brazil. To what extent can the model explain empirical patterns beyond this
context? This is an open empirical question. In general, careful operationalization and measure-
ment of variation in bureaucratic quality is necessary to extend the empirical examination to other
contexts. While renewed efforts to measure bureaucratic quality at the national level are underway,
the study of Brazil emphasizes the need to study variation in the quality of bureaucracies overseen
by the politicians under study. Even without such data, however, the model offers some insights for
how we consider evidence from other contexts.
Specifically, the selection of sites/cases poses underappreciated limitations for how we under-
stand accountability and its failures. Drawing from the combined efforts of Enríquez et al. (2019)
and Incerti (2019), I identify 16 experiments or natural experiments on voter information and ac-
countability conducted in eight countries, enumerated in Table C.14. Situating these sites on (na-
tional level) macro indicators of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and public goods provision, Fig-
ure 4.4 suggests that such studies have been confined to democracies with low-to-middling levels
of bureaucratic quality. Further, the motivation of some works suggests selection on features of the
equilibrium, i.e. poor public goods provision or high corruption. This is also the case within coun-
try in many studies when units (i.e., municipalities) are sampled on the basis of the informational
content of messages. Within a study, this non-random selection weakens our ability to leverage the
effects of both “good” and “bad” news in tandem to measure the characteristics of an underlying
equilibrium.
Examining eleven of these studies across all eight countries that: (i) are experimental and (ii)
provide estimates on vote choice for the incumbent subsequent to the revelation of both good and
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Figure 4.4: Correlations between bureaucratic quality (x-axes) and corruption (y-axis, left panel)
and public service provision (y-axis, right panel). All measures are standardized to the set of democ-
racies (defined by the Quality of Government dataset), such that all measures are z-scores. The navy
star indicates Brazil and the red stars indicate other countries in which I identify accountability ex-
periments/natural experiments.
bad news, Figure 4.5 depicts the relationship between national bureaucratic quality and the effects
of information provision. On average, “good news” modestly increases incumbent vote share and
“bad news” modestly reduces incumbent vote share, but only as bureaucratic quality (within sam-
ple) increases. Because all experiments are conducted in different constituencies the implication
here is that the separating equilibrium appears to be more common (across constituencies) at higher
levels of (national) bureaucratic quality. This finding is only suggestive and future research could
strengthen this analysis in three ways. First, future experiments should avoid building the sam-
ple of constituencies by selecting on equilibrium outcomes (corruption or public goods provision).
Second, measurement of the quality of bureaucrats actually managed by the politicians in question
would allow for examining these dynamics much more precisely within cases. Finally, research
designs that study accountability in a parallel fashion across places that with more substantial varia-
tion in bureaucratic quality (see Figure 4.4) would allow for more comprehensive tests of the theory
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Figure 4.5: ITTs on vote choice for the incumbent or incumbent’s party in 11 experiments in 8
countries using survey and/or administrative data. The dependent variable can be interpreted as the
change in incumbent (party) vote share as a function of the revelation of incumbent performance
information. Points are jittered on the x-axis for visibility. Estimates and standard errors come
directly from estimated by these 11 studies.
than are afforded by the existing estimates.17
Considering this evidence from relatively similar studies across multiple sites yields two cen-
tral takeaways. First, the observational equivalencies generated by the model provide new scope
conditions on what inferences we can draw about accountability from partial equilibrium tests of
information and accountability. Absent characterization of the underlying equilibrium, zero or null
results on the effects of information provision provide less evidence that voters are uninformed
or unable to update than is currently implied. Second, under the model I advance, estimates of a
common distribution of treatment effects will be attenuated toward zero when sites fall into either
pooling equilibrium. This is the central finding of two influential meta-analyses (Dunning et al.,
2019; Incerti, 2019). Figure 4.5 provides suggestive evidence as to why such an approach may
17Figure 4.5 ultimately includes only eight country-level estimates of bureaucratic quality, which approximate “clus-
ters” for the purpose of this analysis.
CHAPTER 4. BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND THE OBSERVABILITY OF ELECTORAL
ACCOUNTABILITY 149
not be able to capture the effect of information on accountability. More generally, this reason-
ing suggests a need to define external validity relative to a theory (or argument), as opposed to a
point estimate. This broader conception of external validity opens new avenues for cumulation of
evidence and research design.
4.6 Conclusion
Recent literature on accountability remains mixed on whether a better informed electorate can im-
prove political selection, drawing a (relatively) pessimistic conclusion that empowering voters with
information is, at best, circumscribed in its ability facilitate better governance. The accumulated
evidence tends to describe such outcomes in terms of the deleterious effects of uninformed voters
and the venality of politicians. I contend that this attribution of bad outcomes – corruption and
limited public goods provision – to a form of “bad politics” is particularly widespread in the study
of developing democracies.
The theory advanced in this paper takes a different approach to explaining similar patterns of
outcomes. Indeed, the model of electoral accountability advanced in this paper assumes that politi-
cians uniformly value the provision of public goods. Voters are informed and rational (Bayesian).
Bureaucrats shirk, but are responsive to oversight and are not otherwise corrupt. Yet, the theory pre-
dicts the confluence of corruption, underprovision of public goods, and voter behavior often taken
to motivate claims of circumscribed electoral accountability can emerge with informed, rational
voters when bureaucratic capacity is low. Furthermore, the dissemination of politician performance
metrics conveys no information in the pooling equilibria at very low and high levels of bureaucratic
quality. Extension of multiple existing results from Brazil emphasizes the plausibility of this model,
providing grounds for extension and further testing in other contexts. Examination of treatment
effects from twelve information dissemination experiments provides suggestive evidence consistent
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with the theory in a wider variety of contexts.
This paper advances a broader appeal for theories that treat political actors more symmetrically
across contexts in order to generate comparative insight. To extent that the policy implications of
empirical findings depend on the underlying causal process generating outcomes, a bias toward “bad
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Theoretical Model: Extensions and Proofs
A.1.1 Proofs of Propositions in the Main Text
Proof of Proposition 2.1: E[e∗g] is the expectation of bureaucratic effort for citizens of group g.
Recall that cC is a realization of the random variable Cg with the cdf Fg(·). As such, the proportion
of citizens that would complain if service is not granted is given by Fg( bcP ). Assume that effort is














where E[γgB] and E[γ
g
P ] are the expectations of the bureaucrat’s and politician’s tastes for group
g, respectively. The expectation of bias between groups x and y in the aggregate is defined as























Proof of Proposition 2.2: Without loss of generality, assume that ηS + ηQ > 0. This implies
that per citizen, the politician would devote more effort to monitoring the bureaucrat’s service to
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group x when service is not provided. Note that if ηB ≥ 0, the higher probability of oversight must
increase bias. I solve for the magnitude of bureaucrat’s taste-driven bias at which the magnitude














This implies that for r(ηP+ηQ)2cP > −ηB , the magnitude of bias in effort is increased by the biased
probability of oversight toward group x. For r(ηP+ηQ)2cP = −ηB , the magnitude of bias is not affected
by oversight, and only when r(ηP+ηQ)2cP < −ηB , does the threat of oversight decrease bias. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: Comparative statics.












)− fx( bcP ))− cP (ηP + Fx(
b
cP
)− Fy( bcP ))
c3P
(A.6)
The sign of ∂∆O∂cP depends on the shape of the densities fx(·) and fy(·). However, ∆B does
not vary in cP while ∆O may. Thus, ∂∆∂cP 6= 0 indicates that ∆O 6= 0.
Further, note that Fx( bcB ) − Fy(
b
cB
) ∈ [0, 1], by the assumption Fy(·) FOSD Fx(·). This
implies that ηQ ∈ [0, 1]. As such, for a sufficient increase in cP , ∆O attenuates toward zero.
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> 0 if ηQ + ηP > 0
< 0 if ηQ + ηP < 0
This implies that if ∂∆∂r > 0 if ∆O > 0 and
∂∆
∂r < 0 if ∆O < 0.








A.1.2 Bias in Effort and Inequality in Outputs
Defining Inequality in Outputs: The model implies inequality in outputs as a second quantity
measuring bias beyond bias in effort. Bias in effort is given by Proposition 1.
Inequality in outputs considers differences in expectation of the ultimate levels of service pro-
vision by group. Service provision, S is given by:
S(e, q) =

e+ (1− e)S+γP+1cP if q = 1
e+ (1− e)S+γPcP if q = 0
I measure inequality in outputs as the difference in the expectation of service provision for each
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Inequality in outputs for an individual from each group x and y is therefore defined as:
E[Sx]− E[Sy] =
S + E[γxP ]
cP
+










S + E[γyP ]
cP
+













−r(nQ + 2E[γyP ])(2S + ηQ + 2Fy(
b
cP











) + E[γyP ])− SηB + cP ηB + cB(ηQ + ηP )
cP
A.1.3 Endogenous Requests for Service
In the text, citizen requests of service are treated as exogenous. In this extension, I consider equi-
librium levels of effort when citizens pay a cost to request a service. This adds a first step to the
sequence presented in the main text, in which citizens request the service or not, denotedR ∈ {0, 1}.
Preceding the bureaucrat’s decision to exert effort, this extension includes:
1. Citizen chooses whether or not to request service.
The cost of requesting a service, ξ, is proportional to cC . The cost for requesting service is thus
ξcC .
Denote the ex-ante expected utility for citizens that would complain and citizens that would not
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complain, as C and N :
E[UCC ] = eb+ (1− e)
(
b












Given that the citizen will only complain if cC < bcP , clearly E[U
C
C ] ≥ E[UNC ]. The citizen’s







r(γgP + S + 1)
cBcP
















There are three cases, that I characterize in terms of cut points in the cost of requesting service,
ξ. I denote these cut points as ξ̄ and ξ where 0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξ̄. Assume, without loss of generality, that
the upper support of fg exceeds bcP .
1
Case 1: ξ ≥ ξ̄: There exists some cost ξ̄ ≥ 0 which makes a citizen for whom c = bcP is
indifferent between requesting the service and not. Substituting e∗g and cC =
b
cP
into E[U ]CC = 0
and solving for ξ̄ yields:
ξ̄ =S + γgP +
(cP − S − γgP )(r(S + γ
g




Case 2: ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ̄): Denote the upper support of fg as c̄C . There exists some threshold c̃C ∈
1If this assumption does not hold, the solution collapses to Case 1.
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( bcP , c̄C). A citizen for whom cC ≤ c̃C will request service, while a citizen for whom cC > c̃C will
not.
Case 3: ξ ≤ ξ: There exists some cost ξ ≥ 0 that makes a citizen with cost c̄C indifferent
between requesting the service and not. Substituting e∗g and cC = c̄C into E[U ]NC and solving for ξ
yields:
ξ =





b(cBcP (S + γ
g
P ) + (cP − S − γ
g
P )(r(S + γ
g





Proposition A1. Equilibrium effort with costly requests. If, within a group g, the bureaucrat’s
tastes, politician’s tastes, and citizen costs are independent, as the cost of requesting service, ξ,
increases, the proportion of citizens requesting service decreases. The expectation of equilibrium
effort exerted by the bureaucrat on each request increases (piecewise) in ξ.
Proof:
To characterize the share of citizens in a group g that request service and the expectation of equi-
librium service provided, I assume thatCov(γgB, γ
g
P ) = 0, Cov(γ
g
B, Cg) = 0, andCov(γ
g
P , Cg) = 0
and consider each case.
Case 1: ξ > ξ̄: For any ξ > ξ̄, conditional on requesting service (R = 1), the expectation of
equilibrium effort for group g is:




r(S + 1 + E[γgP ])
cBcP
and the proportion of group g that requests the service is given by:
Fg
(
b(cBcP (S + γ
x
P + 1) + (cP − (S + γxP + 1))(r(S + γxP + 1) + cPγxB))
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Case 2: ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ̄]: For any ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ̄), conditional on requesting service (R = 1), the expectation
of equilibrium effort for group g is:





















∈ (Fg( bcP ), 1). The proportion of group g that requests the service
is given by Fg(c̃C).
Case 3: ξ < ξ: For any ξ ≤ ξ, conditional on requesting service, (R = 1), the expectation of
equilibrium effort for group g is:







) + E[γgP ])
cBcP
This is equivalent to the equilibrium with exogenous (costless) requests characterized in the main
text. As was assumed in the paper, all citizens request service.
Collectively this analysis implies that the proportion of citizens requesting the service decreases
in ξ and that the expectation of equilibrium effort, conditional on requesting the service, increases
(piecewise) in ξ. 
A.1.4 Bias in Effort and Inequality in Outputs
The mapping from bias in effort to inequality in outputs depends on the composition of the bias in
effort (between tastes and complaint-driven bias). For this analysis, make two simplifying assump-
tions. First, within a group g, the distribution of tastes and costs is independent, i.e. Cov(γgB, γ
g
P ) =
0, Cov(γgB, Cg) = 0, and Cov(γ
g
P , Cg) = 0. Second, normalize the tastes and likelihood of com-
plaint for group y to 0, i.e. E[γyP ] = 0, E[γ
y
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Inequality in outputs: Following the definition in Section A1.2, inequality in outputs simplifies
to:
E[Sx]− E[Sy] =








cP cB︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
+
(ηP + ηQ)(−r(2S + ηP + ηQ) + cP (cB − ηB))− cP (ηBS)
c2P cB
(A.9)
While the sign of the remaining term in the sum is ambiguous, it can be shown that within the
parametric assumptions of the model, bias in effort ∆ and inequality in outputs E[Sx]−E[Sy] must
share the same sign. Rewriting:
E[Sx]− E[Sy] =
ηB(cP − 1− S − ηQ − ηP )
cBcP
+
(ηP + ηQ)(cP (cB + r)− r(2S − ηP − ηQ))
c2P cB
Because cP > S + 2, r ∈ (0, 1), and cB > 1, the final term must maintain the same sign as
ηQ + ηP .
Remark A1: Given a neutral bureaucrat, ηB = 0, or a bureaucrat favoring the same group as
that favored by oversight, sign(ηB) = sign(ηP + ηQ), bias in effort favoring group g is sufficient
to ensure that inequality in outputs favor g.
A.1.5 Implications for Complaint Rates in the Observational Data
Here I derive the expected rate of complaint per the baseline model in which the request for service
is exogenous. Assume that Cov(γgB, Cg) = 0, and Cov(γ
g
P , Cg) = 0. The rate of complaint by
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(E[γgP ] + S + 1)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share of “complainers” receiving service













































































The implication of this expression is that if the rate of observed complaint is higher for group x
(with lower costs of complaint), it must be the case that the tastes of the bureaucrat and politician
must not favor group x by too large of a magnitude. If this were the case, the difference in the rate
at which citizens of group x receive service over those from group y would yield a higher rate of
complaint from group y given the lower rate of service provision.
A.2 Cross-National Data
A.2.1 Survey Data
I refer to rates of contact with street-level bureaucrats using cross-national survey data from LAPOP
AmericasBarometer (2014) and AfroBarometer (2016). The sample of countries includes all sur-
veyed countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa with a Polity IV score above 0 in 2015.
This includes both hybrid and democratic regimes.
Figure A.1 depicts the proportion of citizens reporting that they sought service from a street-
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Requests to bureaucrats for services (last 12 months)
Figure A.1: The proportion of survey respondents that sought government services within the last
year. Data is from AmericasBarometer (LAPOP) (2014) and AfroBarometer (2016).
A.2.1.1 AmericasBarometer (2014)
The measure of contact with street-level bureaucrats is constructed from four questions, as follows.
Note that these questions are two parts; the second part of the question asks about petty corruption
(bribes). If the answer indicates that the individual “had dealings” with the relevant entity, I code
this as having sought a service.
1. EXC11 “In the last twelve months, did you have any official dealings in the municipality/local
government?”
2. EXC14 “In the last twelve months, did you have any dealings with the courts?”
3. EXC15 “Have you used any public health services in the last twelve months?”
4. EXC16 “Have you had a child in school in the last twelve months?”
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The proportion of individuals “seeking service” is the proportion of individuals that answered
affirmatively to any of these questions.
The countries included in the graph are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
To justify the claim that interactions with street-level bureaucrats are the “most common form”
of citizen-government interaction, I compare the rate of individuals seeking a service in the last
twelve months (circles) to those citizens who have ever sought assistance from an elected official
(4’s) in Figure A.2. The latter are calculated from the question:
CP4a: “In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a
local public official or local government: for example, a mayor, municipal council, councilman,
provincial official, civil governor or governor?”
Figure A.2 suggests that the proportions engaging bureaucrats in the last 12 months far exceeds
the proportion that have ever engaged a local elected official (triangles).
A.2.1.2 AfroBarometer (2016)
The measure of contact with street-level bureaucrats is constructed from five (largely parallel) ques-
tions, as follows:
1. Q55A “ In the past 12 months have you had contact with a public school?”
2. Q55C “In the past 12 months have you had contact with a public clinic or hospital?”
3. Q55E “In the past 12 months have you tried to get an identity document like a birth certificate,
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vs. local elected officials in Latin America (ever)
Figure A.2: The proportion of survey respondents that sought government services within the last
year (circles) compared to the proportion of survey respondents from Latin America that have ever
sought the services of a municipal politician.
driver’s license, passport or voter’s card, or a permit, from government?”
4. Q55G “In the past 12 months have you tried to get water, sanitation or electric services from
government?”
5. Q55K “In the past 12 months have you had contact with the courts?”
The proportion of individuals “seeking service” is the proportion of individuals that answered
affirmatively to any of these questions.
The countries included in the graph are: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde,
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe.
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AfroBarometer includes an assessment of the difficulty of obtaining service, conditional on hav-
ing sought it. For these measures, I consider assessments of public administrators – those disbursing
identity documents or working at the tax authority (questions Q55E, Q70A, and Q70B).2 I average
perceptions across the three questions. Where answers are missing, I average the assessments that
are reported. I examine the bivariate relationship between this assessment and education graphically
in Figure A.3. Citizens perceive services to be relatively difficult to access. This difficulty declines
























Figure A.3: Perceptions of the difficulty of obtaining services from public administrators by level
of educational attainment. n = 50, 758.
A.2.2 World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) allows for cross-national characteriza-
tions of governance, broadly conceived. Some of these measures measure bureaucratic outputs.
2The tax questions are as follows. Q70A:“Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following
services from government? Or do you never try and get these services from government: To find out what taxes and fees
you are supposed to pay to the government?” Q70B:“Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the
following services from government? Or do you never try and get these services from government: To avoid paying the
income or property taxes that you owe to government?”
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The intent in providing this information is simply to demonstrate where Colombia ranks globally
in standard measures of governance. Using data from 2016 (the most recent WGI data) evaluate
Colombia’s rank, as a percentile, among:
• All countries in the World Bank WGI data (n = 214).
• All Spanish, French, and Portuguese-speaking countries in Latin America (n = 19).
• All OECD countries (n = 37). Note that Colombia joined the OECD in July 2018.
Table A.1 shows Colombia’s rank among the three comparison groups for each of three indi-
cators. While Colombia unsurprisingly performs quite poorly relative to all reference groups on
the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” measure, the other indicators which are
plausibly more relevant measures of bureaucratic outputs. In general, Colombia generally performs
somewhere around the median of all countries, in the top tercile of Latin American countries, and
the bottom decile of OECD countries.
Colombia’s percentile among . . .
World Latin America OECD
Indicator (n = 214) (n = 19) (n = 37)
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism 13.81 5.56 2.78
Rule of Law 41.35 72.22 5.56
Control of Corruption 44.23 72.22 5.56
Voice and Accountability 49.75 55.56 5.56
Government Effectiveness 54.33 66.67 2.78
Regulatory Quality 67.31 77.78 11.11
Table A.1: Colombia’s rankings on each World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator (2016) as a
percentile within the relevant comparison group.
A.3 Original Survey of Bureaucrats
The manuscript cites one descriptive finding from an original survey of street-level bureaucrats in
alcaldiías in Bogotá and Cundinamarca. The details of the survey are as reported here. The survey
was conducted in October and November, 2016. Two parallel surveys were conducted: one of
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citizens awaiting service and one of bureaucrats providing service in select entities. The surveys
were conducted in:
• Alcaldías: local alcaldías in Bogotá and municipal alcaldías in Cundinamarca
• CADES/SUPERCADES: These are District (Bogotá) Centers for Public Service where citi-
zens can seek many public services.
• Local offices of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
• Local notaries (public/private).
The relevant sample cited in the paper includes 73 surveys of bureaucrats from 14 alcaldías.
The alcaldías were purposefully sampled but the timing of the visit was randomly assigned. The
sampling included the first 5-8 bureaucrats that we encountered starting at reception (e.g. street
level bureaucrats) that were willing to take the survey. In this sense, the sample is not random, but
encompasses street-level bureaucrats in these entities present at the time of the survey.
The relevant question cited in the descriptive statistic in the paper was an open response ques-
tion, enumerated and translated as follows:
• “¿Si usted tomara una decisión que su supervisor no apoyara, cuál sería la consecuencia?”
• Translation: “If you made a decision that your supervisor did not support, what would be the
consequence?”
The responses ranged from verbal admonishment to more formal admonishments (in the form
of a memorandum) to unwillingness to renew a contract (contractors only).
A.4 Bogotá Complaint Data
Data on formal complaints from Bogotá is collected by the Veeduría Distrital, an oversight organ of
the city government. Data is available at tablerocontrolciudadano.veeduriadistrital.
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gov.co:3838/BogotaDashboard/. The data consist of 464,387 PQRS petitions submitted
to city entities in Bogotá between January 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018. PQRS stands for “peticiones,
quejas, reclamos, y sugerencias,” translated “petitions, complaints, [another word for] complaints,
and suggestions).” These comprise represent formal written requests, not verbal or informal com-
plaints. Note that the per capita rate of PQRS submission during this period is 5.68%, or one
submission per ≈17.5 people.3
The PQRS are characterized by type, as in Table A.2. Note that there are more words for
complaints in Spanish than in English. I focus on the first three categories (the complaints) in the
subsequent analysis n = 440, 803.
PQRS Type Translation n Proportion
Denuncia Report (of complaint) 2,501 0.005
Queja Complaint 99,302 0.214
Reclamo Complaint 339,000 0.730
Sugerencia o Felictación Suggestion or congratulation 23,584 0.051
Table A.2: PQRS submitted in Bogotá, January 2017-June 2018. The type designation is made by
the Veeduria (or receiving entities). Translations by author.
Of the complaints, 63,330 were registered by alcaldías locales, the entities audited in the exper-
iment. Other complaints were directed to district-wide entities. To assess the correlation between
class and propensity to complain, I examine the relationship between the relative wealth of a locality
and the per-capita rate of complaint submission. To measure the wealth of a locality, I examine the
average estrato (strata) of all residential properties. Strata range from 1 (very low/bajo bajo) to 6
(very upper/alta alta). While these zoning designations are technically made to properties, citizens
identify estrato with class. Equating the two implies an assumption that lower-class Bogotanos are
priced out of rich neighborhoods/dwellings and few middle- and upper-class Bogotanos choose to
3Calculated based on an estimated population of 8,181,047 residents.
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Figure A.4: Rate of complaints filed by locality in Bogotá by average wealth of the locality.
live substantially below their means. The marked degree of differentiation of localities in average
estrato implies high levels of residential segregation.
Figure A.4 plots the rate of complaint submission by wealth of localities. There is a clear posi-
tive relationship between the wealth of the locality and the rate of complaint submission. This occurs
despite the fact that service is believed to be better in wealthy localities, suggesting that this analysis
understates the relationship between class and propensity to complain. The outlier, La Candelaria,
is a very small locality in the center of Bogotá with a vastly disproportionate tourist/foreigner (“ex-
pat”) population. To the extent that “ex-pats” (foreigners from rich countries) choose to live in a
locality with a relatively low estrato, resident wealth is understated by the estrato designation in La
Candelaria.
A.5 Demographic Data Related to Bias Treatments
Colombia’s last national census was conducted in 2005. A new census will be conducted this year
(2018). Given the vintage of the data, I use population projections where relevant and available.
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Otherwise, this section describes historical trends through 2005. All aggregate data in this section
comes from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística and all microdata comes from
IPUMs.
A.5.1 Regional Accents
In this section, I describe the geographic coverage and prevalence of the three accents utilized in
the audit experiment. Figure A.5 shows the departments to which these (generalized) accents are
native. These are among the most densely populated regions of Colombia.
Accent Bogatano Costeño Paisa
Geographic Distribution of Randomly−Assigned Accents
Figure A.5: Geographical coverage of the Bogotano, Costeño, and Paisa accents at the departmental
level. Note that the map of the Bogotá accent includes the department of Cundinamarca. Some
portion of Cundinamarca’s population speaks with a different accent (Cundinaboyacense).
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I approximate the number of speakers of each accent in Colombia in Figure A.6.4 To approxi-
mate these quantities, I consider the most widely-spoken accent in each department. I aggregate the
projected population (2017) by DANE for each department and sum across the departments associ-
ated with each accent. This exercise indicates that nearly 60% of the Colombian population speaks















































Estimated Frequency of Regional Accents in Colombia
Figure A.6: Approximate number of speakers of Colombia’s twelve major accents. The graph
shows that the most widely-spoken accents are the Bogotano, Costeño, and Paisa accents used in
the experiment. Approximately 60% of the Colombian population speaks one of these three accents.
The panels differ in the classification of the accent in the department of Cundinamarca (Bogotano
or Cundinaboyacense).
4Note that several of the accents are also spoken in neighboring countries, e.g. the Llanero accent in Venezuela. These
counts only include speakers of the accent in Colombia.
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A.5.2 Socioeconomic Class
Detailed data on socioeconomic class is not available in Colombia. As such, I present the distribu-













Distribution of Colombian Population by Social Class (Estrato), 2005
Figure A.7: Distribution of classes in the 2005 Colombian census. The social class of the treatments
are denoted by the colored bars.
A.5.3 Migration
In Table A.3, I place lower bounds on the proportion of Colombians that have (a) ever migrated and
(b) migrated within the last five years using census microdata subsamples available from IPUMs.
I bound the share of Colombians that have ever migrated by examining the share of individuals
residing in their municipality of birth. Note that this is a lower bound as reverse-migrants will not
be counted as migrants. I bound the share of individuals who report migrating to a different geo-
graphical unit in the past five years. This similarly does not count reverse-migrants and should be
considered a lower bound.
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In general, the bounds suggest that at least 37% of the Colombian population (2005) has mi-
grated at some point in their lives. This remains relatively stable across time. Furthermore, in past
censuses, 10-17% of Colombians report migrating within the past five years. Note that migration to
other departments is slightly more common than migration within the same department, though both
forms of migration are common. These totals include both ordinary and conflict-induced migration.
Census of
1964 1973 1985 1993 2005
A: MICRODATA SAMPLE SIZE (FROM IPUMS)
Sample Size 349,652 1,988,831 2,643,125 3,213,657 4,006,168
B: LIFETIME MIGRATION (LOWER BOUND), RESIDES IN:
Municipality of Birth 0.635 0.626 0.642 0.594 0.623
Same Department, Different Municipality 0.180 0.160 0.145 0.170 0.152
Different Department 0.181 0.209 0.210 0.225 0.204
(Born Abroad) 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
No Response 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.019
C: MIGRATION IN LAST FIVE YEARS (LOWER BOUND):
Has not Migrated 0.869 0.834 0.905
Migrated within Department 0.056 0.062 0.031
Migrated from a Different Department 0.069 0.084 0.041
Immigrated 0.006 0.004 0.002
No response 0.000 0.016 0.021
Table A.3: Lower bound on lifetime migration and migration within the last five years in Colombian
censuses since 1964. Migration within the last five years was not included in the 1964 or 1973
censuses. Population-weighted means estimated from census microdata.
A.6 Call Sequencing Flow Chart
Confederates were trained, in part, by memorizing a basic flowchart for each call which mirrored the
instrument that they filled in. This graphic provides a translated and vastly simplified version of the
sequence of calls, denoting the point in the call at which each factor was revealed and delineating
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the subsamples. As in the main manuscript three samples are defined and temporally delineated, as
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A.7 Petitions, Correct Answers
The following table lists the questions and correct answers used in the audit experiment translated
to English. There are eight total questions. Because the difficulty of the question and migrant status
are conveyed in the petition, there is effectively a 2× 2 for each of the two programs, SISBÉN and
MFA. The petitions appear in Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively.
All questions were presented in the third person to minimize detection (e.g. a request for the
petitioner’s identification number). Empirically, a substantial proportion of observed calls in gov-
ernment call centers were made on behalf of someone else. Further, in piloting, the responses to
first person versus third person requests were qualitatively similar with the exception of petitions
for an identification number.
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Program Difficulty Migrant Question Correct Answer
1 SISBÉN Easy Migrant I am doing my neighbor a favor and
asking about SISBÉN. She just moved
to this municipality and wants to regis-
ter for SISBÉN. What does she need to
do to register?
1. Go to the SISBÉN office.
2. Ask for an application for the survey for the
first time.
3. She must be a resident of the home, older than
18 years, and present her identification card.
4. (At this time, we are not doing new registra-
tions for SISBÉN.)
2 SISBÉN Easy – I am doing my neighbor a favor and
asking about SISBÉN. She wants to
register for SISBÉN. What does she
need to do to register?
1. Go to the SISBÉN office.
2. Ask for an application for the survey for the
first time.
3. She must be a resident of the home, older than
18 years, and present her identification card.
4. (At this time, we are not doing new registra-
tions for SISBÉN.)
3 SISBÉN Difficult Migrant I am doing my neighbor a favor and
asking about SISBÉN. She just moved
to the municpality and tried to enter
Colombia Mayor and they did not let
her. She has a score of 45. What can
she do to lower her score? She is 65
years old.
1. Go to the SISBÉN office.
2. Check the form of the person to verify that the
data in the system are correct.
3. If there are differences on the form, complete
a petition of disagreement.
4. For the request to be approved, she will need
to ask for a new survey.
5. She must be registered for SISBÉN in this mu-
nicipality and her score must correspond to
the guidelines in this [category of] municipal-
ity.
4 SISBÉN Difficult – I am doing my neighbor a favor and
asking about SISBÉN. She tried to en-
ter Colombia Mayor and they did not
let her. She has a score of 45. What
can she do to lower her score? She is
65 years old.
1. Go to the SISBÉN office.
2. Check the form of the person to verify that the
data in the system are correct.
3. If there are differences on the form, complete
a petition of disagreement.
4. For the request to be approved, she will need
to ask for a new survey.
Table A.4: List of SISBÉN petitions, translated to English.
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Program Difficulty Migrant Question Correct Answer
MFA Easy Migrant I am doing my sister a favor
and asking about MFA. She just
moved to this municipality and
wants to register for MFA. She
has a 6 year old son and a 10
year old daughter. What does
she need to do to register?
1. She must come to the office of the municipal enlace
or point of service.
2. She must bring her document of identification.
3. She must bring the civil registration of all children
under 7 and the identification card for all children
between ages 7 and 18.
4. For children under 6, she should bring a certificate of
children’s attendence at (medical) exams of growth
and development, certified with the name of the at-
tending official.
5. For children in school, the mother should bring proof
of enrollment in school.
6. (At this time, we are not doing new registrations for
MFA).
7. The mother must register for SISBÉN in this munic-
ipality and have a qualifying score for MFA.
MFA Easy – I am doing my sister a favor and
asking about MFA. She wants to
register for MFA. She has a 6
year old son and a 10 year old
daughter. What does she need to
do to register?
1. She must come to the office of the municipal enlace
or point of service.
2. She must bring her document of identification.
3. She must bring the civil registration of all children
under 7 and the identification card for all children
between ages 7 and 18.
4. For children under 6, she should bring a certificate of
children’s attendence at (medical) exams of growth
and development, certified with the name of the at-
tending official.
5. For children in school, the mother should bring proof
of enrollment in school.
6. (At this time, we are not doing new registrations for
MFA).
7. The mother must register for SISBÉN in this munic-
ipality and have a qualifying score for MFA.
MFA Difficult Migrant I am doing my neighbor a favor
and asking about MFA. She just
moved to this municipality. How
does she change her registration
with the program?
1. Go to the MFA office.
2. She must present a signed written request document-
ing that she has moved to the municipality.
3. The mother must register for SISBÉN in this munic-
ipality and have a qualifying score for MFA.
MFA Difficult – I am doing my neighbor a fa-
vor and asking about MFA. Her
sister, who was a MFA recipi-
ent died and left her in charge of
her nephew. How does she be-
come the MFA recipient for her
nephew?
1. Go to the MFA office.
2. She must present her identification document.
3. She must turn in the document of custody and per-
sonal care of the child, issued by the competent au-
thority: the defender or commisary of the family.
4. She must present the document from the civil reg-
istry documenting her sister’s death.
5. The mother must be registered for SISBÉN in this
municipality and have a qualifying score for MFA.
Table A.5: List of MFA petitions, translated to English.
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A.8 Municipal Sampling
I use stratified random sampling in an effort to maximize within variation while limiting the proba-
bility of detection. Table 2 defines the characteristics of the strata. Here, I provide additional details
on sampling of municipalities. The sampling probability for medium and large municipalities is
clearly 1. However, the sampling probability for small municipalities is heterogeneous since sam-
pling was proportional to estimated population (2018). While Eframidis and Spirakis (2006) pro-
vide a numerical solution for sampling probabilities for weighted sampling without replacement, the
closed form probabilities require construction of all combinations, this solution is computationally






I approximate the sampling probabilities for the small stratum as follows:
1. Sample 400 municipalities with weights proportional to estimated population 100,000 times.
2. Calculate the probability that each municipality was sampled across the 100,000 draws.
3. Fit the a function by regressing these probabilities on 2018 population and polynomial terms
(up to a tertic term) in OLS.
4. Predict the sampling probabilities from the fitted model.
Figure A.8 depicts the sampling probabilities for municipalities as a function of population size.
It demarcates the three strata by color. Note that Bogotá, the largest municipality, is divided into
municipalities for the purposes of the experiment.
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Sampling Probabilities by Municipal Population
Figure A.8: The sampling probabilities for municipalities as a function of population. The points
represent individual municipalities in the universe. Note that these points are municipalities; locali-
ties in Bogotá are not represented in the present graph.
Predictably, this sampling procedure gives rise to a sample that is larger, on average, than the
pool of municipalities as a whole, but one that provides support across the distribution of municipal
populations, as depicted in the density plots in Figure A.9. Note that in the experiment, 16 of
Bogotá’s localities are sampled according to the same rules for a total of 618 entities. Bogotá is
represented as a whole in Figure A.9.


























Distribution of Municipalities by Population
Figure A.9: The municipalities in the sample compared by population compared to the full distri-
bution of Colombian municipalities.
A.9 Random Assignment
A.9.1 Factorial Design
The random assignment is generally blocked at the entity level (including both petitions) in order
to maximize the within variation within each entity. The specifications by municipality size stratum
are indicated in Table A.6.
A.9.2 Random Assignment of Enumerators
Enumerators come from each of the three regions corresponding to the regional accents. All enu-
merators are actresses and voice both the low- and neutral-class scripts. Within an accent, calls were
block random-assigned to enumerators. As such, all enumerators cover all of the other factors of
randomization.
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Stratum Attribute Details Restrictions
Large Class • 3 neutral
• 3 low
Blocked by municpality/locality with each of
6 accent+ class combinations represented
Accent • 2 Bogotá
• 2 Paisa
• 2 Costeño
Blocked by municpality/locality with each of
6 accent+ class combinations represented
Difficulty • 4 easy
• 2 hard
Blocked by program (SISBEN and MFA):
easy questions (all) with one SISBEN and one
MFA hard question.
Migrant Status • 3 migrant
• 3 non-migrant
Both easy migrant questions; one hard ques-
tion includes migrant line.
Time of day • 2-4 morning
• 2-4 afternoon
Blocked by program (SISBEN, MFA) and
municipality/locality
Medium Class • 2 neutral
• 2 low
Blocked by program (SISBEN, MFA) and
municipality/locality




Blocked by municipality/locality. Repeated
accent appears in both programs
Difficulty • 2 easy
• 2 hard
Blocked by program (SISBEN/MFA) and
municipality/locality
Migrant Status • 2 migrant
• 2 non-migrant
Blocked by program (SISBEN/MFA) and
municpality/locality
Time • 2 morning
• 2 afternoon
Blocked by program (SISBEN/MFA) and
municipality/locality
Small Class • 1 neutral
• 1 low
Blocked by municpality/locality.
Accent • 2 distinct accents Two distinct accents assigned to each munic-
ipality/locality
Difficulty • 1 easy
• 1 hard
Blocked municipality/locality.
Migrant Status • 1 migrant
• 1 non-migrant
Blocked by municipality/locality
Time of day • 1 morning
• 1 afternoon
Blocked by municipality/locality
Table A.6: Factorial design by stratum with restrictions on the randomization intended to maximize
within-municipality variation. Note that the total number of petitions reflects those sent to both
SISBÉN and MFA (combined).
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 181
A.9.3 Random Assignment of Order of Calls
Calls were randomly assigned to an order for the original call. The assignment of the order proceeds
as follows:
• Assignment to portions of the order distribution:
– Within the large stratum (denoted L), block randomly assign calls within each entity to
six blocks. These correspond to sextiles of the rollout. Denote these blocks as bLi ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
– Within the medium stratum (denotedM), block randomly assign calls within each entity
to four blocks. These correspond to quartiles of the rollout. Denote these blocks as
bMi ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
– Within the small stratum (denoted S), block randomly assign calls within entity to two
blocks. These correspond to halves of the rollout. Denote these blocks as bSi ∈ {1, 2}
• Within each block in the rollout (defined above), randomly assign an integer ordering to the
calls, denoted Oi ∈ {1, ..., |L|6 } for the large stratum, where |L| is the cardinality of the set of
calls in the large stratum.
• Use the following formula to convert the rollout to a continuous measure between 0 and 1,









i − 1) +Oi]
|M|
+
Ii∈S [ |S|2 (b
S
i − 1) +Oi]
|S|
(A.10)
• Assign calls to enumerators (assigned as above) based on their order in the distribution.
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A.10 Distribution of Treatments
The frequency with which treatment cells were utilized in the experiment is reported in Table A.7.
Note that There was a higher probability of assignment to easy than hard questions in the large
stratum, and thus in the experiment as a whole. Otherwise, all cells (within easy and hard) had
equal probabilities of assignment.
Easy Petition
a a a a a a a a a a
Migrant Non-Migrant
Accent Accent
Bogotano Costeńo Paisa Bogotano Costeńo Paisa
Morning Class Lower 44 37 47 46 44 33
Middle 57 37 50 45 48 47
Afternoon Class Lower 28 39 40 42 26 37
Middle 50 52 49 32 36 32
Difficult Petition
a a a a a a a a a a
Migrant Non-Migrant
Accent Accent
Bogotano Costeńo Paisa Bogotano Costeńo Paisa
Morning Class Lower 25 34 28 44 32 43
Middle 36 36 26 27 37 24
Afternoon Class Lower 43 38 35 41 42 40
Middle 29 33 35 34 39 37
Table A.7: Distribution of the frequency of treatment cells in the 2× 3× 2× 2× 2 factorial design.
A.11 Experimental Design Validation
A.11.1 Compliance
With a relatively complex audit experiment and a large team of confederates, compliance with
treatment assignment is a concern for the analysis and interpretation of findings. To address such
concerns, all calls were recorded. Subsequent to the experiment, two trained research assistants
listened to all the calls (a full time job for over a month) and marked what they heard in the calls.
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The research assistants were not apprised of the schedule of treatment assignment.5 I examine
compliance factor by factor in Table A.8.
Factor Validation Data Assignment Coding in Validation data % Compliers
Time Phone log times Mix with
Morning Afternoon ≥ 1 intent
Morning 98.7% 0 1.3% 98.7%
Afternoon 0.3% 98.0% 1.65% 98.0%
Accent Double entry Bogotá Costeño Paisa Indeterminate
Bogotá 99.7% 0% 0% 0.3% 99.7%
Costeño 0.3% 98.7% 0% 1.0% 98.7%
Paisa 0.8% 0.5% 98.4% 0.3% 98.4%
Class Double entry Lower Neutral Indeterminate
Lower 76.7% 11.2% 13.1% 76.7%
Neutral 6.7% 79.3% 14.0% 79.3%
Difficulty Double entry Technical Easy
Technical 99.3% 0.7% 99.3%
Easy 0.8% 99.2% 99.2%
Migrant Double entry Migrant Resident
Migrant 97.3% 2.7% 97.3%
Resident 5.0% 95.0% 95%
Table A.8: Rates of compliance by treatment. Double entry refers to the hand coded data by out-
siders listening to recordings after the fact. The phone log times were automatically recorded and
outside the purview of confederates.
A.11.2 Detection
Of the 1194 answered calls, bureaucrats appeared to detect six of the calls as audits, per the clas-
sification of double coders. These calls are detailed below. Note that all calls that were detected
were detected prior to the statement of the petition. There are no systematic differences in detection
by municipal population stratum (as defined in the sampling of municipalities) or destination of the
5Calls for 10 petitions were lost by the software doing the recordings. These calls represent less than 1% of the total
calls and I have no reason to believe that the missingness is systematic.
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calls (department). Further, there are no systematic differences in the characteristics of the petition
or petitioner except that these calls occurred later in the sequence within a given alcaldía.
Call
Stratum Department Order Program Time Accent Class Difficulty Migrant
1 Large Bogotá 4/6 MFA PM Costeño Lower Easy Resident
2 Large Bogotá 5/6 MFA AM Paisa Lower Easy Migrant
3 Large Cundinamarca 5/6 MFA PM Paisa Lower-Middle Technical Migrant
4 Medium Bolívar 4/4 SISBÉN PM Paisa Lower-Middle Technical Resident
5 Small Bolívar 2/2 MFA PM Costeño Lower Technical Resident
6 Small Cauca 2/2 SISBÉN PM Paisa Lower-Middle Technical Resident
Table A.9: This table documents the calls that were detected, as denoted by the double coders. Both
calls detected in Bogotá were detected in the same locality (alcaldía local).
A.11.3 Joint Test of Interactions between Identity Treatments
The empirical strategy employed in this paper analyzes “along the margins” of the factorial experi-
mental design. In this section, I allay concerns of substitutability or complementarities between the
identity-based attributes used to measure bias. In this analysis, I utilize F -tests of the joint signif-
icance of the relevant interactions. To conduct this analysis, I use the IPW model from the main






i + κp + εipm (A.11)
I then specify an unrestricted model, as in Equation. Note that Mi indicates lower-middle class,






i +κp + χ1MiRi + χ2MiBi + χ3MiCi + χ4RiBi + χ5RiCi+
χ6MiRiBi + χ7MiRiCi + εipm
(A.12)
I test the null hypothesis that χ1 = χ2 = χ3 = χ4 = χ5 = χ6 = χ7 = 0 using an F -test. The
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results of this test are reported in Table A.10. I fail to reject the null hypothesis for 9/10 outcomes at
the α = 0.1 level, providing no evidence that of interactions between the identity-based treatments.
N
Outcome Unrestricted Restricted F -statistic p-value
Dispatcher Gave Name 1186 1179 0.17 0.99
Petition Made 1186 1179 0.43 0.88
Second Official 1186 1179 1.24 0.28
Program Officer 1186 1179 0.23 0.98
Complete 1186 1179 1.44 0.19
Incomplete 1186 1179 0.90 0.50
Any Info. 1186 1179 1.04 0.40
No Info. 1186 1179 1.24 0.28
Alcaldía Only 1186 1179 2.71 0.01
Red Tape 1186 1179 0.80 0.58
Table A.10: Results of F -tests of the significance of interactions between identity-based character-
istics for each of the main outcomes reported in Table 4.
A.12 Personnel Data
A.12.1 Source
The administrative data comes from the compilation of five administrative datasets, obtained by
various means. Table A.11 documents the datasets and how they were obtained.
At the aggregate level, this data overlaps with the experimental sample of 600 alcaldías and
18 alcaldías locales as follows. “No contractor data coverage” indicates that there are no current
contracts (as of the experiment) in the system.
Contractor Data Coverage (SECOP-I, SECOP-II)
Coverage No Coverage
Civil Servant Coverage 550 22
No Civil Servant Coverage 40 6
A.12.2 Identification of Relevant Personnel
The individual data comes from two sources. First, I have a list of program officers furnished by PS
(MFA) and downloaded from DNP (SISBÉN). Second, the list of names comes from the double en-
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Dataset Population Coverage (Experimental) Method Obtained
SIGEP Civil Servants >800 municipalities Obtained from Departamento Administrativo de la
Función Pública by derecho de petición (≈ FOIA
request). Request granted in April 2018.
SIGEP Civil Servants 798 employees in experi-
mental alcaldías
Identified by hand search and scraped from online
database, May 2018.
SIDEAP Civil Servants 20 Bogotá alcaldías lo-
cales
Downloaded in April 2018.
SECOP-I Contractors 1100 alcaldías, Metro
SALUD Medellín
Downloaded in April 2018.
SECOP-II Contractors 20 Bogotá alcaldías Downloaded in April 2018.
SIDEAP Contractors Bogotá alcaldías (for
cross-referencing)
Downloaded in April 2018.
Table A.11: Administrative datasets, coverage, and method used to obtain the data.
tered calls. Enumerators wrote the names shared by officials. Most names in the administrative data
contain four names, two first names and two last names, as is standard in administrative documents.
The names from the calls are often much shorter (often one first name and one last name) and
spelling is approximated by the research assistants. While most Spanish names are quite straightfor-
ward to spell, some Colombians have adopted English names. Spelling of these names varies sub-
stantially. For example, in my data the common name pronounced “Jason” (to an English speaker)
is spelled “Jeison,” “Jeisson,” “Yeison,” and “Yeisson.” This poses a challenge for string matching.
To maximize information before matching to the administrative datasets, I matched the calls to the
administrative data, which would match the hypothetical the name “Yohana Díaz” to “Johanna Luz
Díaz Guerrero.”
I then took the list of unique names (some full and some short) to the dataset of civil servants and
contractors. To identify relevant personnel, I implemented a q-gram matching algorithm, selecting
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matches that maximize the number of common 3-grams within entity. I then revised the matches
with the most q-grams in common by hand, applying a 90% (of the shorter name) threshold or a
phonetic match (i.e. the multiple spellings of “Jason”) to identify employees.
Where no match was located, I searched the online dataset of SIGEP by hand, since the coverage
of the original civil servant dataset was much more limited. If the employee was located on SIGEP,
I wrote a Python program to scrape their information. I applied the same rule for identification to
the SIGEP searches as to the q-gram matches.
In total, I was able to match the following:
Classification Observations Unique Employees
Contractor 1328 1028
Civil Servant 1658 1218
Individual not found 463 375
Neither data source 10 9
No contractor data 40 34
No civil servant data 121 97
Proportion Identified 0.825 0.813
Proportion Identified | ≥ 1 Call answered in municipality 0.831 0.821
Proportion Identified | Administrative Data 0.843 0.843
Proportion Identified | Call data 0.808 0.789
Table A.12: Matched sample of bureaucrats from the calls and program officer data.
Government interviews suggested that the data quality is worse in small and poor municipalities.
Based on their comments, I analyze the correlates of missingness/unidentifiability in the data briefly
showing that the highest rates of unidentifiability occur in very poor municipalities. In Figure A.10 I
examine an index of municipal poverty (2005 census) and estimated 2018 population as predictors of
missingness. Unidentifiability is increasing (monotonically) in the poverty rate in each municipality.
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Figure A.10: The association between the DANE multidimensional municipal poverty index (2005),
estimated population (2018), and failure to identify employees in the database. The left column
is estimated from two separate bivariate regressions. The right column depicts partial associa-
tions from a model with both sets of indicators. Confidence intervals are estimated on the basis of
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
A.12.3 Individual Measures
The main individual measure is an indicator of civil service versus patronage. Within each subset,
I have some covariates (with varying degrees of missingness). For the purposes of contracts, I
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measure the tenure of the individual’s employment as the date since the first contract was signed. I
also note whether this occurred before or after the last transition of municipal government (January
1, 2016).
A.12.4 Municipal-Level Measures
At the municipal level, I measure two variables from the contract data:
• Median length of contracts, in days. Principals can theoretically exercise more control by
holding bureaucrats to shorter contracts.
• Degree of turnover following the last municipal transition of power. I examine the degree of
turnover after the last change of municipal government in 2016. This quantity is the share of
contractors hired during 2016 and 2017 that had previously served as a contractor in public
administration in the alcaldía. Stylized examples from Bucaramanga and Cúcuta two large
cities in the same region illustrate the difference in proportion graphically in Figure A.11. A














































Municipal Employment Contracts in Bucaramanga, Santander
Figure A.11: All contracts in SECOP-I for Cúcuta and Bucaramanga, Colombia.
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A.13 Demographic Data
The demographic data, measured at the municipal level, that is used in analyses come from:
• Population projections as of 2018. I use DANE’s 2018 population projections for municipal-
ities and the Alcaldía Mayor’s projections of Bogotá’s population, by locality, in 2018.
• Census of 2005: Municipal education levels and municipal multidimensional poverty index.
• Census microdata: Rates of migration are obtained from all census microdata available through
IPUMS.
• SISBÉN registrations: Data downloaded from SISBÉN’s open data as of November, 2017.
Available at https://www.sisben.gov.co/Territorios/Paginas/Reportes%
20Base%20Certificada/ano2018.aspx.
• Population of internally displaced persons (IDPs), by municipality. I obtain data on the
number of IDPs per municipality from Unidad de Victímas as of July 1, 2018. Available
at http://cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co/Home/Desplazamiento.
A.14 Election Data
Election data came from the dataset at Universidad de los Andes. This data is compiled from the
Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil by the Centro de Estudios sobre Desarollo Económico. All
candidates in municipal elections are available since 1997. I examine on the municipal elections of
1997, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2015.
Extreme weakness of parties limited serial correlation render standard measures of competitive-
ness poor measures. The correlation between mayoral margins of victory at time t − 1 and t are
depicted in Figure A.12.
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Figure A.12: There is effectively no correlation between mayoral margin of victory at time t − 1
and time t. Each point represents a municipality. The lines are fit with GAM.
Instead I use three measures of municipal political competition from both local mayoral and
council elections.
• Mayoral election effective number of candidates (ENC). This measure is increasing in com-
petitiveness. It is calculated via the following formula, where i index candidates and pi is






• Number of unique council members since 1997. Council members are not term limited. This
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is calculated by the following formula.
Ratio of Unique Concejales =
# Unique winners, 1997-2015
# Council seats, 1997-2015
• The Colombian naming tradition is to give a child two last names. The first is the father’s first
last name; the second is the mother’s first last name. Most candidates use both last names. To
measure concentration of power by family, I examine the ratio of unique last names to total
last names (≈ 2× number of candidates).
Ratio of Unique Last Names =
# Unique last names of concejales, 1997-2015
# Total last names of consejales, 1997-2015
A.15 Sample Selection
As indicated in Table 3, I estimate the bias outcomes on the sample of answered calls. While the
blocking scheme ensures balance across municipalities and within the sample of calls, it is worth
assessing whether or not the resultant sample is imbalanced across the experimental factors. This
is assessed through an F -test of the joint significance of the four unrevealed factors: class, accent,
migrant status, and question difficulty.
I show in Table A.13 that there is no evidence that entering this sample (Columns 3-4) is en-
dogenous to the unrevealed factors. The test of this claim is the F -test on the placebos, for each
estimator. Further, Columns 1-2 and 5 show that the unrevealed factors do not predict how soon or
late a call was answered. In sum, there is no evidence that answering is endogenous to any of the
analyzed treatments.
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Did not Answer First Call Did not Answer Any Calls Number of Calls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Afternoon Call 0.031∗ 0.022 0.039∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.291∗
(0.023) (0.018) (0.023) (0.015) (0.188)
DV mean, Morning 0.639 0.639 0.330 0.330 4.48
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS Tobit
IPW X X X
Entity, Enumerator FE X X
Program Indicator X X X X X
Placebos X X X X X
Placebo F-test∗, p-value 0.898 0.381 0.705 0.163 0.619
Hypothesis test Upper Upper Upper Upper Upper
DV range {0, 1} {0, 1} {0, 1} {0, 1} [1,7]
Censoring Right
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.13: The AMCEs of an afternoon call on measures of absenteeism of the dispatcher. Six
calls were attempted over the course of at least three days; Columns 3-4 indicate that none of the
six calls were answered. Heteroskedasity-robust standard errors for the OLS models in parentheses.
∗For the tobit model, the p-value on the test of joint significance of the placebos is calculated from
a Pearson χ2 likelihood ratio test. The mean outcome in the morning in the fifth column refers to
the latent outcome and is estimated by tobit.
A.16 Robustness of Bias Estimates
A.16.1 Complier AMCE Estimates for the Class Treatment
The results on the class treatment are central to findings of bias. There are two main concerns about
this treatment, with responses below.
1. Can people judge a caller’s class by voice alone?
• The results from the double coding of compliance in Table A.8 suggest as much: 77.5%
of calls were correctly identified; 13.5% were indeterminate; and only 9% were opposite
of the assignment indicator.
2. Class is a compound treatment in any case in Colombia. The scripts that distinguish the
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classes include different salutations, different vocabularies, and different presentation of the
question.
• The pervasiveness of social class in the Colombian context is important; isolating class
from its correlates or constituent parts is not particularly feasible, nor is it particularly
useful in this context.
• The results show that class-based bias happens in certain processes and not others. There
is no evidence that bureaucrats did not understand questions from poor petitioners, as
rates of correct responses are not substantially different between lower- and lower-
middle class Colombians. These facts suggest that there was no systematic response
to the characteristics used to connote class.
To test further concerns about the excludability of treatment assignment in Table A.14, I estimate
complier AMCEs on the class treatment, instrumenting an observed lower-middle class exchange
with assignment to the lower-middle class treatment condition. If results are driven by perceptions
of class and coder ratings of class are correlated with how bureaucrats perceived class, then (non-
zero) point estimates of complier AMCEs should be higher than intent-to-treat AMCEs. I report the
class estimates from Table 4 (Panels A and B) in the main text along their complier analogues.
Note that this test serves as an informal test of excludability. It is also possible that if some
characteristic driving the results that is highly positively correlated with observer judgments of
class is driving bias in behavior, the complier estimates would be higher than the intent-to-treat
estimates. All of the point estimates on the outcomes where there is evidence for bias in the ITT
AMCE estimates in Table 4 in the main text increase in magnitude.
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A.16.2 Regional Accent and Red Tape Robustness Test
Table 4 documents the disproportionate rate at which red tape was demanded from petitioners with
a Paisa regional accent. Because the regional accent did not vary within an enumerators’ calls,
I conduct tests that drop enumerators one by one as well as in trios (one enumerator per accent)
to examine the robustness of this finding. Figures A.13 and A.14 show the point estimates when
dropping one enumerator and one trio of enumerators, respectively. They suggest that the inference






























































Figure A.13: AMCE of Bogotá and Costeño accents relative to a Paisa accent when dropping one
enumerator. The enumerator codes are labeled on the points and indexed by accent (“B”, “C”,
or “P”) and number. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals calculated on heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors.
A.16.3 Regional Accents in Home Region
In the main results, I analyze regional accents without regard to the match between the accent of the
petitioner and the accent native to the municipality where the audit was conducted. This analysis
redefines the treatment indicator for accent as being an “in-region” (home) accent. Because the






































































































































































Figure A.14: AMCE of Bogotá and Costeño accents relative to a Paisa accent when dropping each
permutation of three enumerators (one per accent). Note that by dropping three enumerators si-
multaneously, the effective sample is approximately 75% of the main sample reported in Table 4,
inflating standard error estimates accordingly. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals calculated
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
experimental accent treatment only includes 3 of ≈ 12 regional accents, I subset to the regions of
Colombia in which there is common support for the treatment. Table A.15 clarifies the definition
of the region for purposes of analysis as well as the total number of petitions in the subsample. In
sum, this sample represents about 55% of all answered calls.
With both adjustment strategies (IPW and entity fixed effects), the region indicator is interacted
with all factors and an indicator for the program. Results are reported in Table A.16. The main
takeaways are as follows:
• We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the conditional AMCE = 0 for the pooled subsample
or any subgroup therein.
• For some outcomes, there are statistically significant differences between regions. If anything,
these differences seem to be driven by the fact that, Costeño confederates seem to receive
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n of Petitions
Accent Region Departments Total “In-region” “Out-region”
Bogotá Centro Oriente (subset) (Bogotá) 198 65 133
Cundinamarca












Table A.15: Definition of regions for the analysis of “in-region” accents. The sample from which
these municipalities are drawn is the 1194 answered calls. Note that by construction, 13 of calls
should be “in-region”; this proportion is maintained in this subsample.
slightly “worse” service “in region” in the Atlantic Coast (Caribe). This was not anticipated.
A.16.4 Migrant Status in the “Call Answered” and “Petitioned” Samples
Migrant status was not revealed until petitions were made (see Table 3), however the main analysis
analyzes outcomes based on migrant status within the sample of all answered calls (Table 6). This
serves to inflate the effective rate of noncompliance for the migrant factor. This attenuates the
resultant intent-to-treat estimates. The F -tests in Tables 4 and 6 (columns 1-4) suggest that there is
no reason to believe that migrant status was revealed prior to the petition. As such, the estimates in
the smaller sample should be larger in magnitude than those in the main text. Table A.17 supports
this interpretation.
A.16.5 Survey Outcomes
In this section, I examine the responses of enumerators to survey questions about their experience
of each call. The survey consisted of five questions, translated to English as follows:































































































































Table A.16: Estimates of the conditional AMCE of an “in region” accent petition. Bars repre-
sent 95% confidence intervals constructed on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. The panels
correspond to the adjustment strategy used in estimation.
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1. Satisfaction: On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “not at all satisfied” and 5 is “very satisfied,”
how satisfied are you with the service given by the public servant during the call?
2. Confidence (in answers): On a scale from 1-4, where 1 is “not confident” and 4 is “very
confident,” how much confidence did you have in the responses given by the public servant?
3. Actionable information: On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very easy” and 5 is “very diffi-
cult,” how hard would it be to carry out the process (service) you asked about on the basis of
the information you received?
4. Knowledge: On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very low” and 5 is “very high,” what level
of knowledge did the public servant have when responding to the request?
5. Respect: On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “very little respect” and 5 is “lots of respect,”
how respectful was the public servant while responding to the request?
Due to an issue in the programming of the survey, responses are missing for 59/1194 answered
calls and 30/911 of the calls in which a petition was made. In these cases, the survey did not appear
at the end of data input. The differential proportions of missing survey responses indicate that this
error occurred as part of the sequence in the survey. This may be endogenous to some of the experi-
mental manipulations, if through the trajectory of the call. However, missingness is balanced across
the factors.
My main measure of service provision is a z-score index comprising the five measures enumer-
ated above. Component # 3 is reversed such that higher scores on the scale map onto higher values
of the index (better service). I also report the standardized measure of respect given arguments
made in the paper. Estimates of AMCES of the experimental manipulations on these outcomes are
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reported in Table A.18.
Note that the enumerator effects reported seem to correspond to idiosyncracies in how individ-
ual enumerators assess service. The estimates are not robust to dropping one enumerator at a time. I
focus on the within-enumerator estimates in columns (3) and (6) of both panels as the main measure
of the relationship between petition and petitioner attributes and service provision.
A.17 Supporting Tables for Tests of the Mechanism
This section provides tables to support the graphical analysis in Section 6 of the main text. The
first tests examine the cost of effort and employee type (contractor/civil servant). For covariates
with within-alcaldía variation, I do not run the specification with alcaldía fixed effects, since this
reduces the effective sample dramatically. Instead, I run a second specification with indicators for
stratum (to account for differential probabilities of assignment) and enumerator.
A.17.1 Distinguishing Bureaucrat Taste-Driven from Oversight-Driven Bias
Table A.19 shows that bias in information provision by class was attenuated to zero on technical
questions. While the interaction is not generally significant, differences are quite stark. Note,
however, that the theory implies a one-tailed test while the table reflects (conservative) two-tailed
p-values.
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY DIFFICULTY OF PETITION; IPW ESTIMATES
Lower-Middle Class 0.039 0.080∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.015) (0.034)
Hard: Lower-Middle Class −0.034 −0.067 −0.101∗ 0.009 −0.064
(0.035) (0.057) (0.058) (0.034) (0.048)
Conditional Effect, Technical Petition 0.004 0.013 0.017 -0.031 -0.029
(0.023) (0.042) (0.044) (0.030) (0.034)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY DIFFICULTY OF PETITION; STRATUM + ENUMERATOR FE
Lower-Middle Class 0.030 0.068∗ 0.098∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ 0.030
(0.026) (0.037) (0.038) (0.015) (0.034)
Hard: Lower-Middle Class −0.021 −0.049 −0.070 0.004 −0.054
(0.034) (0.056) (0.057) (0.034) (0.048)
Conditional Effect, Technical Petition 0.010 0.019 0.029 -0.033 -0.024
(0.023) (0.042) (0.043) (0.030) (0.033)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.19: Estimates of the conditional AMCE of a lower-middle class petitioner by the difficulty
of the question. The base category is the “easy”/inscriptions questions. The experimental treat-
ment technical petition is interacted with all factors and a program indicator. “Conditional effect”
refers to the conditional effect of lower-middle class. Heteroskedasticity- robust standard errors in
parentheses.
Table A.20 shows that bias in information provision by class was attenuated to zero for MFA
petitions. While the interaction is not generally significant, differences are large and robust to differ-
ent estimators. Note that the theory implies a one-tailed test while the table reflects (conservative)
two-tailed p-values.
A.17.2 Isolating Complaint-Driven Bias
Table A.21 examines the conditional effect of class by level of municipal poverty. Panels A and B
show the estimates using both of the main estimators in the manuscript. Panels C and D demonstrate
that these findings are robust to the use of flexible, interactive controls for municipal population.
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY DIFFICULTY OF PETITION; IPW ESTIMATES
Lower-Middle Class 0.003 0.030 0.033 −0.021 0.019
(0.021) (0.040) (0.041) (0.020) (0.031)
SISBÉN: Lower-Middle Class 0.036 0.031 0.067 −0.029 −0.034
(0.035) (0.057) (0.058) (0.033) (0.049)
Conditional Effect, SISBÉN 0.039 0.061 0.100∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.015
(0.028) (0.041) (0.041) (0.026) (0.037)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY DIFFICULTY OF PETITION; STRATUM + ENUMERATOR FE
Lower-Middle Class 0.007 0.022 0.029 −0.019 0.019
(0.020) (0.039) (0.040) (0.019) (0.031)
SISBÉN: Lower-Middle Class 0.028 0.047 0.075 −0.032 −0.029
(0.035) (0.056) (0.057) (0.031) (0.048)
Conditional Effect, SISBÉN 0.035 0.069∗ 0.104∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.010
(0.029) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025) (0.037)
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.20: Estimates of the conditional AMCE of a lower-middle class petitioner by the audited
program (MFA or SISBEÉN). The base category is MFA. The program indicator is interacted with
all factors in the experimental design. “Conditional effect” refers to the conditional effect of lower-
middle class. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
One alternative explanation for the positive association between class-bias and poverty rate is
clientelism. I conduct three tests to show that the evidence is inconsistent with this explanation.
First, I show that levels of service given to the lower middle class do not vary in municipal poverty
rates. If a politician were simply co-opting a social program to devote services clentelistically as
in Weitz-Shapiro (2012), we would expect lower levels of service by bureaucrats across the board
(e.g. even for the lower middle class). If this happens disproportionately in poor places, then there
should be a negative association between municipal poverty rates and service outcomes for the lower
middle class. Table A.22 indicates that this is not the case. There is little evidence of a correlation,
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE; IPW ESTIMATES
Lower-Middle Class 0.013 −0.024 −0.011 −0.027 −0.007
(0.029) (0.046) (0.051) (0.028) (0.045)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.019 0.085 0.105 −0.025 0.062
(0.042) (0.067) (0.070) (0.043) (0.062)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.001 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ −0.012 −0.032
(0.045) (0.066) (0.070) (0.040) (0.060)
Conditional Effect in M 0.032 0.061∗ 0.094∗∗ -0.051∗ 0.055∗
(0.028) (0.047) (0.046) (0.034) (0.039)
Conditional Effect in H 0.014 0.115∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.038∗ -0.039
(0.035) (0.045) (0.044) (0.026) (0.040)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE; ENTITY + ENUMERATOR FE
Lower-Middle Class 0.019 −0.024 −0.005 −0.020 −0.013
(0.036) (0.050) (0.053) (0.030) (0.054)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.025 0.091 0.117 −0.039 0.080
(0.051) (0.077) (0.077) (0.050) (0.074)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class −0.001 0.151∗∗ 0.150∗∗ −0.030 −0.033
(0.057) (0.077) (0.076) (0.048) (0.075)
Conditional Effect in M 0.044 0.067 0.111∗∗ -0.058∗ 0.067∗
(0.037) (0.061) (0.060) (0.042) (0.054)
Conditional Effect in H 0.018 0.127∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.047
(0.048) (0.060) (0.059) (0.039) (0.056)
PANEL C: CAMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE WITH INTERACTIVE POPULATION CONTROL; IPW ESTIMATES
Lower-Middle Class 0.010 0.019 0.029 −0.033 0.004
(0.036) (0.056) (0.056) (0.036) (0.058)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.028 0.037 0.065 −0.012 0.054
(0.052) (0.080) (0.081) (0.056) (0.077)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class −0.009 0.111 0.102 −0.005 −0.034
(0.053) (0.082) (0.082) (0.057) (0.083)
Conditional Effect in M 0.039∗ 0.056 0.095∗∗ -0.045∗ 0.057∗
(0.031) (0.050) (0.047) (0.036) (0.040)
Conditional Effect in H 0.001 0.130∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ -0.038 -0.030
(0.036) (0.048) (0.049) (0.032) (0.048)
Interactive Population Decile Bins X X X X X
PANEL D: CAMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE WITH INTERACTIVE POPULATION CONTROL; ENTITY + ENUMERATOR FE
Lower-Middle Class 0.023 −0.003 −0.011 −0.030 −0.020
(0.045) (0.069) (0.062) (0.041) (0.072)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.028 0.054 0.113 −0.021 0.087
(0.065) (0.096) (0.083) (0.062) (0.094)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class −0.028 0.146 0.159∗ −0.017 −0.021
(0.071) (0.105) (0.093) (0.067) (0.107)
Conditional Effect in M 0.051∗ 0.051 0.101∗∗ -0.051 0.067∗
(0.040) (0.065) (0.060) (0.045) (0.053)
Conditional Effect in H -0.005 0.144∗∗ 0.147∗∗ -0.048 -0.041
(0.049) (0.065) (0.063) (0.044) (0.065)
Interactive Population Decile Bins X X X X X
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.21: Estimates of the conditional AMCE by tercile of poverty. The base category is the
first tercile (lowest rate of poverty). All covariates and moderators (poverty tercile indicator and
demeaned poverty decile bins) are interacted across all factors in the design. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level since this is the level of measurement of the poverty moderator.
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and if anything, there is weak evidence of a a positive correlation between municipal poverty and
information provision. This correlation is not robust to alternate functional forms (Panel B) or to
dropping Bogotá (Panels C-D), which accounts for a disproportionate share of observations. This
provides no evidence in favor of a clientelism explanation for observed findings.
Second, I draw on documentation of clientelism in Colombia to identify variation in the pre-
sumed intensity of clientelism across municipalities. I show that the positive association between
class-bias and poverty rate is robust to controlling interactively for these measures. The tests are as
follows. First, I show that there is no association between documented threats to electoral integrity.
These threats include clientelism, fraud, intimidation, and electoral violence. To the extent that an
emerging literature on clientelism suggests that clientelism includes both “carrots” and “sticks,” this
provides a measure of both instruments (Mares and Young, 2018). Using data from the Misión de
Observacion Electoral in Colombia, I control for a binary indicator for a general predicted threat to
the 2018 national elections (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2018). Where a threat is identified, I
code this variable as a “1.” This creates two categories, which I demean and interact across all fac-
tors and the program indicator. Panels A and B of Table A.23 suggest that results are not sensitive
to estimating effects within levels of electoral threat.
Writing on clientelism in Colombia suggest that clientelism is practiced in distinct patterns in
different regions (Ocampo, 2014). To account for these patterns, I include interactive department
(n = 30) fixed effects in Panels C and D of Table A.23. Note that some departments have few mu-
nicipalities and few calls, so Panel D, in particular represents a subset of the sample in departments
where there is variation in both population category within department. Nevertheless, results are
consistent with the broader patterns documented in the main text and in Table A.21. These analyses
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Linear Association between Poverty and Outcomes, Lower-Middle Class Petitioners Only
Poverty rate −0.011 0.268∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ −0.017 −0.098
(0.060) (0.104) (0.105) (0.043) (0.080)
Observations 600 600 600 600 600
Panel B: Quadratic Association between Poverty and Outcomes, Lower-Middle Class Petitioners Only
Poverty rate 0.195 0.775 0.970 0.445 −0.091
(0.360) (0.616) (0.593) (0.283) (0.499)
Poverty rate2 −0.182 −0.449 −0.631 −0.409∗ −0.006
(0.311) (0.535) (0.508) (0.238) (0.428)
Observations 600 600 600 600 600
Panel C: Linear Association between Poverty and Outcomes, Lower-Middle Class Outside of Bogotá
Poverty rate −0.008 0.053 0.044 −0.028 −0.136
(0.066) (0.107) (0.593) (0.047) (0.091)
Observations 559 559 559 559 559
Panel D: Quadratic Association between Poverty and Outcomes, Lower-Middle Class Outside of Bogotá
Poverty rate 0.264 −0.747 −0.483 0.477 −0.379
(0.419) (0.645) (0.591) (0.311) (0.586)
Poverty rate2 −0.233 0.685 0.452 −0.432∗ 0.208
(0.350) (0.554) (0.505) (0.255) (0.484)
Observations 559 559 559 559 559
Factors (not Class) X X X X X
Program Indicator X X X X X
Estimator IPW IPW IPW IPW IPW
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.22: Estimates of the association between municipal poverty rates and service devoted to
the lower middle class. The sample includes only calls made by lower-middle class petitioners, and
in Panels C and D, only calls made outside of Bogotá. All covariates and and a program indicator
are interacted across all factors in the design. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level
since this is the level of measurement of poverty rates.
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provide no evidence that clientelism is driving the observed association between poverty and bias.
Figure A.15 shows no evident variation in class-based bias as a function of local political com-
petition. The three columns use three alternate measures of local political competition. The left
column uses the ratio of unique councilors to total councilors (1997-2015); the middle column uses
the effective number of mayoral candidates in the last 3 elections; and the last column uses an in-
verse covariance weighted index of the first two plus unique last names (apellidos) over council
elections from 1997-2015.
A.18 Robustness of Link to Administrative SISBÉN Enrollment
For the analysis of SISBÉN enrollment and bias in Section 7, I examine the robustness of the classi-
fication of “plausibly intended enrollment.” In the main text, this category encompasses any munic-
ipality for which enrollment falls between the number of individuals in poverty and the population.
However, the “plausible” category could also include places with substantial over-enrollment. I
examine the robustness of the finding to redefinition of this category. Specifically, I define this
category as:
Plausible ∈ [Poverty Rate,min{j + Poverty Rate, 1}] (A.13)
for j ∈ [0.4, 1]. Note that the main definition assumes that j = 1. The revised scatter plot illustrat-
ing this coding is graphed in Figure A.16.
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Complete Incomplete Any Info. Alcaldía Only Red Tape
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY WITH INTERACTIVE ELECTORAL THREAT CONTROLS
Lower-Middle Class 0.010 −0.023 −0.013 −0.017 −0.017
(0.029) (0.050) (0.046) (0.030) (0.047)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.026 0.090 0.116∗ −0.041 0.081
(0.044) (0.074) (0.068) (0.044) (0.064)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class −0.007 0.147∗∗ 0.140∗∗ −0.014 −0.028
(0.044) (0.070) (0.068) (0.040) (0.061)
Conditional Effect in M 0.036∗ 0.067∗ 0.103∗∗ -0.059∗∗ 0.064∗
(0.029) (0.048) (0.047) (0.033) (0.041)
Conditional Effect in H 0.003 0.124∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.032∗ -0.045
(0.035) (0.046) (0.046) (0.026) (0.041)
PANEL B: CONDITIONAL AMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTYWITH INTERACTIVE ELECTORAL THREAT, POPULATION CONTROLS
Lower-Middle Class 0.015 0.020 0.034 −0.041 0.012
(0.035) (0.059) (0.054) (0.037) (0.059)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.024 0.042 0.066 −0.005 0.048
(0.050) (0.083) (0.080) (0.054) (0.075)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class −0.033 0.123 0.089 0.018 −0.060
(0.052) (0.087) (0.087) (0.057) (0.087)
Conditional Effect in M 0.039∗ 0.061 0.101∗∗ -0.046∗ 0.060∗
(0.031) (0.050) (0.048) (0.036) (0.041)
Conditional Effect in H -0.018 0.142∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.023 -0.048
(0.036) (0.050) (0.050) (0.034) (0.048)
Interactive Population Decile Bins X X X X X
PANEL C: CAMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE WITH INTERACTIVE DEPARTMENT FIXED EFFECTS
Lower-Middle Class −0.034 0.032 −0.003 −0.035 0.010
(0.041) (0.061) (0.056) (0.036) (0.058)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.072 0.059 0.131 −0.028 0.077
(0.054) (0.080) (0.080) (0.054) (0.077)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.072 0.097 0.169∗ −0.042 −0.006
(0.066) (0.098) (0.091) (0.062) (0.084)
Conditional Effect in M 0.038 0.091∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.033) (0.051) (0.052) (0.038) (0.045)
Conditional Effect in H 0.038 0.129∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ 0.005
(0.040) (0.059) (0.055) (0.037) (0.049)
PANEL D: CAMCE BY TERCILE OF POVERTY RATE WITH INTERACTIVE DEPARTMENT FIXED EFFECTS, POPULATION CONTROLS
Lower-Middle Class −0.068 0.160∗∗ 0.091 −0.041 0.027
(0.055) (0.077) (0.073) (0.037) (0.072)
Medium Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.116 −0.077 0.039 −0.005 0.066
(0.071) (0.095) (0.096) (0.054) (0.091)
High Poverty: Lower-Middle Class 0.114 −0.105 0.009 0.018 −0.036
(0.092) (0.129) (0.126) (0.057) (0.115)
Conditional Effect in M 0.048∗ 0.083∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.046∗ 0.094∗∗
(0.036) (0.054) (0.053) (0.036) (0.046)
Conditional Effect in H 0.046 0.055 0.101∗ -0.023 -0.008
(0.046) (0.071) (0.069) (0.034) (0.061)
Interactive Population Decile Bins X X X X X
Estimator IPW IPW IPW IPW IPW
Observations 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194 1,194
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.23: Estimates of the conditional AMCE by tercile of poverty, controlling for electoral
threats, department, and poverty. The base category is the first tercile (lowest rate of poverty).
All covariates and moderators (poverty tercile indicator, demeaned, poverty decile bins, demeaned
electoral threat indicators, and demeaned department indicators) are interacted across all factors in
the design. All estimates use the IPW estimator. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality
level since this is the level of measurement of the poverty moderator.




























































































































Figure A.15: There is no evidence that class-based bias varies in measures of local political compe-
tition. Lines estimated by local polynomial regression (Loess) with 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.16: Visualization of the redefinition of “plausible enrollment” for j = 0.4.
Re-estimating Panel A of Table 5 with this specification, Figure A.17 indicates the the point
estimates for Plausible Enrollment and the difference (lower panel) are remarkably similar
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Estimate Difference Plausible Enrollment Under−Enrolled
Figure A.17: Robustness of the results in Table 5, Panel A to redefining plausible enrollment.” The
x-axis corresponds to j in Equation A.13. The stars represent the estimates reported (or implied) by
Table 5 Panel A. 90 and 95% confidence intervals calculated on the basis of cluster robust standard
errors.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Consider three cases, defined in terms of partitions of the politician type space, θP .
• Case #1: θP > 1:
First, note that a citizen of the politician’s type, θ = θP > 1 could never be induced to








(q + ep)(1− ρ(1, 0)
2
2




(q + ep)(1− ρ(0, 0)
2
2












Optimal monitoring rates ρ∗(0, 0) = (1 − q − pe)2, ρ∗(0, 1) = 0, ρ∗(1, 0) = (1 − q − pe),
and ρ∗(1, 1) = 0 follow from inspection of Equation B.1. Substituting ρ∗(0, 0) and ρ∗(1, 0),
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the bureaucrat’s IC constraint in Equation 3.9 simplifies to:
∆ ≥ 2d
2p(1− q − p)
=
d
p(1− q − p)
Note that dp(1−q−p) ∈ (∆M ,∆H ]. As such, effort incentives can only be provided if ∆ = ∆H .
The bureaucrat’s additional IC constraints in Equations 3.13 and 3.15 are satisfied because
ρ∗(0, 0) = ρ∗(1, 0). Define the two resultant contracts (without and with effort incentives)
as:
%∅ = {ρ(0, 0) = 1− q, ρ(0, 1) = 0, ρ(1, 0) = 1− q, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ <
d
p(1− q − p)
}
%E = {ρ(0, 0) = 1− q − p, ρ(0, 1) = 0, ρ(1, 0) = 1− q − p, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ ∈ [
d
p(1− q − p)
,∆H ]}
The difference in the politician’s expected utility with and without bureaucratic effort is:




Thus, for ∆ = ∆H , the politician will implement these monitoring rates of ρ(0, 0) =
ρ(1, 0) = 1 − q − p and set ∆ ∈ [ dp(1−q−p) ,∆H ]. For ∆ ∈ {∆L,∆M}, the politician
will implement these monitoring rates of ρ(0, 0) = ρ(1, 0) = 1− q and set ∆ ∈ [0,∆].
• Case #2: θP ≤ q+pq+p+(1−p−q)2 :
First, consider a politician of a type that could always be induced to complain, i.e. θP → 0 if
ω = 1 and a = 0. Substituting ρ(0, 0), ρ(0, 1), and ρ(1, 0) into the politician’s objective, the
politician maximizes:







(q + ep)(1− ρ(1, 0)
2
2




(q + ep)(1− ρ(0, 0)
2
2









Maximization of Equation B.2 yields ρ∗(0, 0) = 0, ρ∗(0, 1) = 1, ρ∗(1, 0) = (1−q−ep), and





(1− q − ep)
1
<
1− q − pe
q + pe
Violation of this constraint implies that the bureaucrat would not exert effort (e = 0) and
would (i) allocate a = 1 to all citizens for whom θ ≤ 1, per Equation 3.13. Further, the
inequality in Equation 3.15 is not satisfied so the bureaucrat allocates a = 0 to all citizens for
whom θ > 1 regardless of his investigation.
Per the result in Prendergast (2003), the politician can pursue two alternative contracts. First,
consider the case when the politician sets ∆ = 0 and maintains the optimal monitoring prob-
abilities. Denote this contract %I :
%I = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) = 1, ρ(1, 0) = 1− q, ρ(1, 1) = 0,∆ = 0}
In the absence of a penalty, the bureaucrat exerts no effort (e = 0) and (by assumption) breaks
indifference by following his investigation. The politician’s expected utility is given by:
E[UP (%I)] =
2 + q + q2
4
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E[UP (%I)]−E[UP (%∅)] =
q−q2
4 > 0 indicating that any politician of type θ < 1 prefers %I to
%∅. Note that any deviation to ∆ > 0 induces the to bureaucrat accede to the citizen with cer-





Thus, the politician cannot increase ∆ while maintaining optimal monitoring rates.
Alternatively, the politician can provide effort incentives and adjust monitoring rates such that
the bureaucrat cannot profitably accede to a prospective complainant. Equation 3.13 provides
the relevant IC constraint to ensure that the bureaucrat does not accede to a legible citizen.
Maximizing Equation B.2 subject to the constraint implied by Equation 3.13 yields:
ρ∗(0, 0) = 0, ρ∗(0, 1) =
q + pe
q + pe+ (1− q − pe)2
,
ρ∗(1, 0) =
1− q − pe
q + pe+ (1− q − pe)2
, ρ∗(1, 1) = 0
Substituing ρ)∗(0, 1) and ρ)∗(1, 0) into the bureaucrat’s (other) IC constraint in Equation 3.9
yields:




Define this contract as:
%IE = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) =
q + p
q + p+ (1− q − p)2
, ρ(1, 0) =
1− q − p







The politician’s expected utility is:
E[UP (%IE)] =
1 + 4p3 + 3q − 4q2 + 4q3 + 4p2(−1 + 3q) + p(3− 8q + 12q2)
4(q + p+ (1− q − p)2)
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The politician cannot profitably deviate by forgoing information asE[UP (%IE)]−E[UP (%E)] >
0. For ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H}, the politician adopts the contract %IE if E[UP (%IE)] ≥ E[UP (%I)].
Define p̂(q) as the solution to E[UP (%IE)] = E[UP (%I)], expressed as a function of q. Note
that p̂(q) ∈ [0, 12 ] ∀q ∈ [
1
2 , 1) and p̂(q) < 1− q ∀q ∈ [
1
2 , 1).
Note that with incentives, the marginal complainant, is θ = q+p
p+q+(1−p−q)2 . Thus, for any
politician of type θP ≤ q+pp+q+(1−p−q)2 , the equilibrium contract is given by:
% =

%IE if ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H} and p ≥ p̂(q)
%I else
• Case #3: θP ∈ ( q+pq+p+(1−p−q)2 , 1]:
Finally, consider politicians of intermediate types, θP ∈ ( q+pq+p+(1−p−q)2 , 1]. Per Equation,
3.7, such a citizen can be induced to complain when ρ(0, 1) − ρ(0, 0) ≥ θP . As such, the
objective is identical to the previous case. In this case, the contract without incentives (%I )
implies that a citizen of type θ ∈ ( q+p
q+p+(1−p−q)2 , 1] can be induced to complain. This contract
follows directly from the proof of the previous case and is thus omitted.
For a contract with effort incentives, however, the politician can only induce complaints by
monitoring at higher rates than the contract %IE . Noting that the optimal ρ(0, 0) = 0 as
above and Equation 3.7, the politician must monitor at the rate ρ(0, 1) = θPy to incentivize
complaint from her type of citizen. In this interval, it is straightforward to see that θPy >
q+p
q+p+(1−p−q)2 . Substituting ρ(0, 1) into Equation 3.13, and rearranging, the politician must
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set ρ(1, 0) = θP (1−p−q)q+p to satisfy the bureaucrat’s “truth-telling” constraint. Substituing
ρ(0, 1)∗ and ρ(1, 0)∗ into the bureaucrat’s (other) IC constraint in Equation 3.9 yields:
∆ ≥ 2d(q + p)
pθP
∈ (∆L,∆M ]
in the relevant parameter space. Thus, denote the contract with effort incentives:
%IE = {ρ(0, 0) = 0, ρ(0, 1) =
θP
y
, ρ(1, 0) =







The politician’s expected utility is:
E[UP (%IE)] =2θP (q − q2)(1 + θP )− θ2P + (q3 + p3)(4y2 + θ2) + p2(−2θ(y + θ) + 3q(4y2 + θ2))+
p(2θ(y + θ)− 4qθ(y + θ) + 3q2(4y2 + θ2))
As in the previous case, he politician cannot profitably deviate by forgoing information as
E[UP (%IE)]−E[UP (%E)] > 0. For ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H}, the politician adopts the contract %IE
if E[UP (%IE)] ≥ E[UP (%I)]. Define p̄(q) as the solution to E[UP (%IE)] = E[UP (%I)],
expressed as a function of q. Note that p̄(q) ∈ [0, 12 ] ∀q ∈ [
1
2 , 1); p̄(q) < 1 − q ∀q ∈ [
1
2 , 1);
and p̄(q) < p̂(q).
Thus, for any politician of type θP ∈ ( q+pq+p+(1−p−q)2 , 1], the equilibrium contract is given by:
% =

%IE if ∆ ∈ {∆M ,∆H} and p ≥ p̄(q)
%I else

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Proof of Remark 3.1
For E[C] = 1, E[C|θ] = 1∀θ. First, consider Contract %∅. Under this contract E[C] = 1 ⇒
q + (1− q)2 = 1. The unique solution is q = 1.
Second, consider contract %E . E[C] = 1 ⇒ q + p + (1 − q − p)2 = 1, which implies q + p = 1.
Adoption of %E does not occur when q + p = 1 because, as p+ q = 1,∆H →∞.
Third, consider Contract %E . To achieve E[C] = 1, it must be the case that (i) E[C|θ ≤ y] = 1
and F (1) = 1 or (ii) E[C|θ ≤ y] = E[C|θ > y] = 1. (i) requires that 2−q+q
2
2 = 1, which




2 ⇒ q = 1.
Fourth consider contract %IE . To achieveE[C] = 1 it must be the case that q+p+
1−p−q
2(p+q+(1−p−q)2) =
1 and F ( 1−p−q
2(p+q+(1−p−q)2)) = 1. q + p+
1−p−q
2(p+q+(1−p−q)2) = 1 implies that q + p = 1.
Finally consider contract %IE . To achieve E[C] = 1 it must be the case that q+ p+
θP (1−p−q)
q+p = 1
and F (q + p+ θP (1−p−q)q+p ) = 1. q + p+
θP (1−p−q)
q+p = 1 implies that q + p = 1.

Proof of Proposition 3.2
Following Table 3.1, the measure of implementation capacity in the presence of information trans-
mission is given by the following expression. With some abuse of notation, the I subscript refers to
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any equilibrium contract (in a given parameter space) with information transmission.
F (θ̃)E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[C(%I)|θ < θ̃]
In the absence of information transmission, implementation capacity is given by:
E[C(%¬I)]
where the ¬I subscript refers to any equilibrium contract (in a given parameter space) without in-
formation transmission.
Denote by λ the share of the legible population, F (θ̃), at which implementation capacity is equiva-
lent in contracts with and without information, formally:
λ(E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃]) + (1− λ)E[C(%I)|θ < θ̃] = E[C(%¬I)]
A sufficient condition for λ ∈ [0, 1] is E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] ≥ E[C(%¬I)] and E[C(%I)|θ > θ̃] ≤
E[C(%¬I)].
Proceed by considering cases defined by regions of the parameter space denoted in Proposition 3.1,
using the implementation capacity calculations from Table 3.1.
• Case #1: ∆ = ∆L
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 222
In this case, compare implementation capacity under Contract %I to Contract %∅:
E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] =
2− q + q2
2
E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] =
1 + q2
2
E[C(%∅)] = 1− q + q2
Clearly, for any q ∈ [12 , 1),
1+q2
2 < 1− q + q
2 < 2−q+q
2
2 , which is sufficent for λ ∈ [0, 1].
• Case #2: ∆ = ∆M and p < p̂(q):
This case is identical to the previous case for any θP and is thus omitted.
• Case #3: ∆ = ∆M and p ∈ [p̂(q), p(q)):
In this case, compare implementation capacity under Contract %IE to %∅:
E[C(%IE)|θ ≤ θ̃] = q + p+
1− p− q
2(q + p+ (1− p− q)2)
E[C(%IE)|θ > θ̃] =
1
2
E[C(%∅)] = 1− q + q2
For any q ∈ [12 , 1), p ∈ (p̂(q), 1− q],
1
2 < 1− q + q
2 < q + p+ 1−p−q
2(q+p+(1−p−q)2) . The latter
inequality holds when p = 0 and note that dE[C(%IE)|θ≤θ̃]dp > 0.
The comparison between Contract %I and Contract %∅ is equivalent to Case #1 and is therefore
omitted.
• Case #4: ∆ = ∆M and p ≥ p(q):
The analysis of %IE and %∅ is identical to the previous case.
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Compare implementation capacity under Contract %IE to Contract %∅:
E[C(%IE)|θ ≤ θ̃] = q + p+
θP (1− p− q)
2(q + p)
E[C(%IE)|θ > θ̃] =
1
2
E[C(%∅)] = 1− q + q2
For any q ∈ 12 , 1), p ∈ (p̂(q), 1 − q],
1
2 < 1 − q + q
2 < q + p + θP (1−p−q)2(q+p) . By Propositoin
3.1, in this parameter region, θP (1−p−q)2(q+p) > q + p +
1−p−q
2(q+p+(1−p−q)2) from the previous case.
Combined with the previous case, this is sufficient for the the inquality to hold.
• Case #5: ∆ = ∆H , p < p̂(q): Compare implementation under Contract %I to Contract %E as
follows:
E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] =
2− q + q2
2
E[C(%I)|θ ≤ θ̃] =
1 + q2
2
E[C(%∅)] = q + p+ (1− p− q)2
For any q ∈ 12 , 1), p ∈ (p̂(q), 1 − q],
1+q2
2 < q + p + (1 − p − q)
2. If p < 12(1 − 2q +√
1− 2q + 2q2), 2−q+q
2
2 > q+ p+ (1− p− q)
2. This condition is satsfied for any p < p̂(q).
• Case #6: ∆ = ∆H , p ∈ [p̂(q), p(q)):
The comparison of Contracts %I to %E is identical to the previous case, though note that
p < 12(1− 2q +
√
1− 2q + 2q2) is also satisfied for any p < p(q).
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Compare implementation capacity under contracts %IE and %E :
E[C(%IE)|θ ≤ θ̃] = q + p+
1− p− q
2(q + p+ (1− p− q)2)
E[C(%IE)|θ > θ̃] =
1
2
E[C(%E)] = q + p+ (1− q − p)2




q + p+ 1−p−q
2(q+p+(1−p−q)2) .
• Case #7: ∆ = ∆H , p ≥ p(q): The comparison of implementation capacity under Contracts
%IE and %E is equivalent to the previous case.
Compare implementation capacity under contracts %IE and %E :
E[C(%IE)|θ ≤ θ̃] = q + p+
θP (1− p− q)
2(q + p)
E[C(%IE)|θ > θ̃] =
1
2
E[C(%E)] = q + p+ (1− q − p)2




q + p+ θP (1−p−q)2(q+p) .

Proof of Proposition 3.3
First, note that the area of the triangle defined by the coordinates in Definition 3.2 is given by:
µ2
(
(0, 0), (F (θ̃),
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]







F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[a†|θ > θ̃]
− F (θ̃)
)
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Consider each of the five contracts. For Contracts %∅ and %E ,E[a
†|θ] is equivalent for all a. This
implies that the point F (θ̃) = F (θ̃)E[a
†|θ≤θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ≤θ̃]+(1−F (θ̃))E[a†|θ>θ̃]




Under Contract %I :
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[a†|θ > θ̃]
=
F (1)(2− q + q2)
F (1)− F (1)q + (2− q)q
⇒ TAI(%I) =
F (1)(2− q + q2)
F (1)− F (1)q + (2− q)q
− F (1)
=
F (1)(1− F (1))(1− q)
F (1)(1− q) + (2− q)q
> 0
Note that ∂TAI(%I)∂q =
(F (1)−1)F (1)(2−2q+q2)
(F (1)(q−1)+(q−2)q)2 < 0.
Under Contract %IE , E[a
†|θ < q+p
q+p+(1−q−p)2 ] = 0. Therefore:
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[a†|θ > θ̃]
= 1
⇒ TAI(%IE) = 1− F
(
q + p
q + p+ (1− q − p)2
)




(p+q+(1−p−q)2)2 . f(·) is the pdf of θ and is non-negative.
As such ∂TAI(%4)∂q ≤ 0.
Finally, under Contract %IE , E[a
†|θ < θPy ] = 0. Therefore:
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃]
F (θ̃)E[a†|θ ≤ θ̃] + (1− F (θ̃))E[a†|θ > θ̃]
= 1









Comparing TAI across the contracts with information transmission, TAI(%IE) > TAI(%I) can be




q + p+ (1− q − p)2
)
>
F (1)(2− q + q2)
F (1)− F (1)q + (2− q)q
− F (1)
Note that 1 > F (1)(2−q+q
2)





≤ F (1). Similarly, TAI(%IE) >







F (1)(2− q + q2)
F (1)− F (1)q + (2− q)q
− F (1)
as 1 > F (1)(2−q+q
2)







Proof of Proposition 3.4
Optimal contracts and incentives, by citizen type, follow directly from Proposition 3.1 and are rep-
resented in Table B.1.
Parameter region Citizen type, θ
Contract ∆ p θ ≤ q+p
p+q+(1−p−q)2 θ ∈ (
q+p
p+q+(1−p−q)2 , 1] θ > y
ς1 ∆L any %I %I %∅
∆M p < p̂(q)
ς2 ∆M p ∈ [p̂(q), p̄(q)) %IE %I %∅
ς3 ∆M p > p(q) %IE %IE %∅
ς4 ∆H p < p̂ %I %I %E
ς5 ∆H p ∈ [p̂, p) %IE %I %E
ς6 ∆H p ≥ p %IE %IE %E
Table B.1: Optimal contracts, by citizen type.
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Each contract imposes monitoring rates of ρ(0, 1) > ρ(0, 0) for some citizen type by employing
contracts %I , %IE or %IE . Given the assumption F (1) ∈ (0, 1), ρ(0, 1) > ρ(0, 0) induces some
citizen to complain.
Per Definition 3.2, a sufficient condition for TAI > 0 is that ∃θ′, θ′′ ∈ supp(f) such thatE[a†|θ′] 6=
E[a†|θ′′]. The expressions for E[a†|θ] in 3.1, indicate for any F (1) ∈ (0, 1) and q < 1, TAI > 0
for contracts %1 to %6.
Finally, compare the levels of inequality generated by the contracts in Table B.1 to inequality gen-
erated by their any constituent contract with information. For contract with two “constituent” con-
tracts (ς1 and ς4), these comparisons are straightforward:
TAI(ς1)− TAI((%I) =
F (1)(1 + q − q2)
1 + F (1)(q − q2)
− F (1)−
[
F (1)(1 + q − q2)





F (1)(1 + q − q2)
1 + F (1)(q − q2)
− F (1)−
[
F (1)(1 + q − q2)




In the case of contracts ς2, ς3, ς5, and ς6 there exist two thresholds defining different contracts that
are applied across the population. Geometrically, the area measure relevant to the calculation of TAI
is depicted for the quadrilateral representing ς3 in Figure B.1.
Given the notation in the Figure, TAI(%) is equivalent to:
2µ2
(
(0, 0), (F (θ̃1), a1




†(1− F (θ̃1)) + F (θ̃2)(a1† − 1)
Note two observations about contracts ς2, ς3, ς5, and ς6. Each includes contract %IE for some













1F (θ̃1) F (θ̃2)
a1
a2
Figure B.1: Geometric representation of inequality measure with three partitions of the type space
(x-axis). Note that TAI is equivalent to double the shaded area.
segment of the population. In this case, F (θ̃1) is equivalent as the marginal complainant under
contract %IE is the same. As such, TAI is greater under %IE than under any contract in: ς2, ς3, ς5,
ς6 if:
1− F (θ̃1) > a†2(1− F (θ̃1)) + F (θ̃2)(a
†
1 − 1)
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B.2 Empirical Motivation, Continued
The text provides three possible reasons for variation in complaint rates across geographic units in
the same city. I will refer to these units as “neighborhoods.”
1. Different rates of service utilization as a function of characteristics of the composition of
neighborhood residents. Some neighborhoods’ populations may be more reliant on specific
government services (or types of government services) than others.
2. Different quality of service provision across different neighborhoods. Lower quality services
may yield more complaints.
3. Citizens vary in their costs of complaint in a manner that correlates with the neighborhoods
they live in.
To assess these possibilities, I descriptively examine rates of complaint across geographic units
in Bogotá and New York, by wealth of residents. I use this measure because wealth is believed to
correlate positively with service provision (#2) in both cities. The relative magnitude of this corre-
lation across the cities, however, is not evident.
To examine #1, I disaggregate complaints by the agency to which complaints were directed.
This is provided in both datasets. I plot this data descriptively in Figure B.2. Clear gradients emerge
in the usage of some services as a function of neighborhood (unit) wealth. In particular, departments
of housing are the most frequent recipient of complaints in poorer neighborhoods. This makes sense
as their services are disproportionately used by lower-income citizens in both cities. This supports
the argument in #1 but it does not speak to variation in rates of complaint.
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Figure B.3 looks at variation in the volume of complaint by neighborhood wealth with and
without housing-related complaints. In Bogotá, despite widespread evidence and perceptions that
services are better in rich localities, they also file substantially more complaints than poor locali-
ties. The relationship looks quite similar with and without housing complaints given the low rate of
complaints from poor localities in general.
In New York, the relationship between census tract wealth and complaint-filing is less clear.
Overall, there appears to be slight non-monotonicity in complaint rates by neighborhood wealth.
This occurs even though popular wisdom holds that service quality is increasing in neighborhood
wealth. When health complaints are omitted, a positive correlation between neighborhood wealth
and complaint rate emerges, albeit at a lower magnitude than in Bogotá.
The inverse relationship between service quality and complaint rates in both cities, even when
adjusting (symmetrically) for different types of service utilization, suggests variation in the propen-
sity of citizens to make complaints. The model captures these tendencies in terms of costs of com-
plaint.
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Figure B.2: Proportion of total complaints directed to each city government agency in Bogotá and
New York, by neighborhood wealth. The x-axis is increasing in neighborhood wealth. The com-
plaints are aggregated over the January 2017-June 2018 period in both cities.
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Figure B.3: Per-capita rate of complaint-making by neighborhood wealth. The x-axis is increasing
in neighborhood wealth. The rows index the two cities and the columns report the rate of “all
complaints” and all non-housing complaints.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs
First, note that Lemma C.1 is useful in the proofs of Propositions 4.1 and 4.3.
Lemma C.1. The incumbent’s probability of victory, τ(µ,a)µ is weakly increasing in the voter’s pos-
terior belief, µ, ∂τ(µ,a)∂µ ≥ 0.




E[gi2|θ = θ]− E[gi2|θ = θ]
2b
E[gi2|θ = θ] ≥ E[gi2|θ = θ] follows from the parametric assumption θ > θ and Equation 4.7.
Therefore, ∂τ(µ,a)∂µ ≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1
This proof proceeds in two sections. I first prove the existence of the equilibria characterized in
Proposition 4.1, then I prove uniqueness.
Existence
First, suppose that q < 1
θ
and consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of
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both types allocate a1 = 0 and a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period;
the voter re-elects the incumbent if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(gt = 0) = π;
• Off the equilibrium path, an observation that g1 = q implies that µ(gt = q) = 1.
By inspection, µ is derived via Bayes’ rule. The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from
inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation
4.9. Given the voter’s posterior belief µ = π, τ(π, a) = 12 . q <
1
θ
implies that E[g1] < a1∀θ, such
that a politician of either type allocates a1 = 0. The competent type cannot profitably deviate by
allocating a1 = 1 because:
1 + τ(π, a) ≥ θq + pτ(1, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
In this region where q < 1
θ
, θq < 1 and τ(µ, a) = 12∀µ when a1 = a2 = 0∀θ. Since θ > θ, it
therefore holds that the incompetent type similarly cannot profitably deviate by allocating a1 = 1.







and consider the following strategy and
belief profile: a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ
allocates a1 = a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes
to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that g1 = q, µ(g1 = q) = 1;
• Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(g1 = 0) = π(1−θ)π(1−θ)+1−π .
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The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a
politician of type θ = θ will not deviate from a1 = 1 to a1 = 0 since:
θq +
(
pθτ(1, a) + p(1− θ)τ( π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + 1− π







π(1− θ) + 1− π
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
)
θq.







since θq > 1 and, by Lemma
C.1, τ(1, a) > τ( π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+1−π , a). A politician of type θ = θ cannot profitably deviate to allocate




π(1− θ) + 1− π
, a
)
+ (1− p)τ(π, a) >
θq + pθτ(1, a) + p(1− θ)τ
(
π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + 1− π
, a
)
+ (1− p)τ(π, a)
⇔ q < 2b(1− πθ)
θ(2b(1− πθ) + pθ(1− π))









and consider the following strategy
and belief profile: a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ
allocates a1 = 1 and a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter
votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that g1 = q, µ(g1 = q) = πθπθ+(1−π)θ ;
• Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(g1 = 0) = π(1−θ)π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) .
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The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a





πθ + (1− π)θ
, a) + p(1− θ)τ( π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)







π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
)
θq.









given that θq > 1 and, by
Lemma C.1, τ( πθ
πθ+(1−π)θ , a) > τ(
π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ , a). A politician of type θ = θ cannot prof-
itably deviate by allocating a1 = 0 if:
θq + pθτ(
πθ
πθ + (1− π)θ , a) + p(1− θ)τ(
π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) >
1 + pτ(
π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)




πθ + (1− π)θ , a)− τ(
π(1− θ)







2b((θ − θ)π + θ)(−1 + (θ − θ) + θ)
θ[2b((θ − θ)π + θ)(−1 + (θ − θ) + θ)) + (θ − θ)θp(1− π)π]
This inequality holds for any q ≥ 2b(1−πθ)
θ(2b(1−πθ)+pθ(1−π)) , which is sufficient to ensure that the in-






Finally, suppose that q ≥ 1θ and consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of
both types allocate a1 = a2 = 1; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; this
yields no public goods gt = 0∀t; the voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] > E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s
beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that g1 = q, µ(gt = q) = πθπθ+(1−π)θ ;
• Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(gt = 0) = π(1−θ)π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) .
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
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is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a
politician of type θ = θ will not deviate from a1 = 1 to a1 = 0 since:
θq + pθτ(
πθ
πθ + (1− π)θ , a) + p(1− θ)τ(
π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) >
1 + pτ(
π(1− θ)
π(1− θ) + (1− π)(1− θ)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
This inequality holds for any q ≥ 1θ because θq > 1 and, by Lemma C.1, τ(
πθ
πθ+(1−π)θ , a) >
τ( π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) , a). This is condition, combined with the parametric assumption that θ > θ, is
sufficient to ensure that a politician of type θ = θ similarly does not deviate.
Uniqueness Consider first the candidate pooling equilibria and then the possible separating equilib-
ria. First, note that a1 = 1⇒ g1 ∈ {0, q} and a1 = 0⇒ g1 = 0. This implies that off-path beliefs
are only invoked in an equilibrium in which both types allocates a1 = 0. Per the intuitive crite-
rion refinement, I impose the off-path belief that µ = 1 upon observation that g1 = q in any such
equilibrium. There are three possible equilibria in which both types allocate a1 = 0 that emerge
in different regions of the parameter space, depending on a politician’s second-period allocation
behavior. The first is an equilibrum (the first case of Proposition 4.1), the others are not, as shown
below:







Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 0
and a politician of type θ = θ = 1 allocates a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates
a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect
if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
– If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(0) = π;
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– Off the equilibrium path, an observation that g1 = q implies that µ = 1.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
1 + τ(π, a) ≥ θq + pθτ(1,a) + p(1− θ)τ(π,a) + (1− p)τ(π,a)
However, this inequality is never satisfied since θq ≥ 1 and τ(1, a) > τ(π, a). Thus, this
strategy and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
• Second, suppose q ≥ 1θ .
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 0
and a politician of both types allocate a2 = 1. All other beliefs and strategies are equivalent
to the previous case.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
1 + τ(π, a) ≥ θq + pθτ(1,a) + p(1− θ)τ(π,a) + (1− p)τ(π,a)
However, this inequality is never satisfied since θq ≥ 1 and τ(1, a) > τ(π, a). Thus, this
strategy and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
Now consider possible candidate pooling equilibria in which both types allocate a1 = 1. There are
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three possible equilibria in which both types allocate a1 = 0 that emerge in different regions of
the parameter space, depending on a politician’s second-period allocation behavior. The third is the
final case of Equilibrium 4.1.
• First, suppose q < 1
θ
.
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 2
and either type of politician allocates a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in
each period; the voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as
follows:
– If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that g1 = q, µ(g1 = q) = θπθπ+(1−π)θ ;
– Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(g1 = 0) = (1−θ)π(1−θ)π+(1−θ)(1−π) .
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + pθτ(
θπ
θπ + (1− π)θ
, a) + p(1− θ)τ( (1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + (1− θ)(1− π)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) ≥
1 + pτ(
(1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + (1− θ)(1− π)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
In any equilibrium in which a2 = 0∀θ, τ(µ,a) is equivalent for any µ, per Equation 4.9.
Combined θq < 1 in this parameter space, this inequality never holds. Thus, this strategy and
belief profile is not an equilibrium.
• Second, suppose q ∈ [1
θ
, 1θ ).
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 240
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 0
and a politician of type θ = θ allocates a2 = 1 and a politician of type θ = θ allocates a2 = 0.
All other strategies and beliefs are identical to the previous case.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + pθτ(
θπ
θπ + (1− π)θ
, a) + p(1− θ)τ( (1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + (1− θ)(1− π)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) ≥
1 + pτ(
(1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + (1− θ)(1− π)
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
The threshold is derived in the third case of Proposition 4.1. This profile of strategies and
beliefs cannot be sustained as an equilibrium for a lower value of q.
Finally, consider candidate separating equilibria. First, note that because θ > θ, there cannot exist
an equilibrium in which a politician of type θ = θ allocates at = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ
allocates at = 0. Thus, consider equilibria in which in which a politician of type θ = θ allocates
a1 = 1 and a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = 0 in the parameter spaces q < 1θ and q ≥ θ.
• Suppose q < 1
θ
: Consider the following strategy and belief profile: θ = θ allocates a1 = 1
and a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = 0; either type of politician allocates a2 = 0;
the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect if
E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
– If the voter does not observe g1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that g1 = q, µ(g1 = q) = 1;
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– Upon observation that g1 = 0, µ(g1 = 0) = (1−θ)π(1−θ)π+1−π .
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + pθτ(1, a) + p(1− θ)τ( (1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + 1− π
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) ≥
1 + pτ(
(1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + 1− π
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
In any equilibrium in which a2 = 0∀θ, τ(µ,a) is equivalent for any µ, per Equation 4.9.
Combined with θq < 1 in this parameter space, this inequality never holds. Thus, this strategy
and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
• Suppose q ≥ 1θ : Consider the following strategy and belief profile: θ = θ allocates a1 = 1 and
a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = 1; either type of politician allocates a2 = 0. All other
strategies and beliefs are identical to the previous case. The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort
follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice is optimal given her posterior
belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation strategies follow from
inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a. A politician of type
θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + θq
[
pθτ(1, a) + p(1− θ)τ( (1− θ)π
(1− θ)π + 1− π







(1− θ)π + 1− π
, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
]
By Lemma C.1 and qθ ≥ 1 when q ≥ 1θ , this inequality is never satisfied. Thus, this strategy
and belief profile is not an equilibrium. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.2
This follows directly from Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
This proof proceeds in two sections. I first prove the existence of the equilibria characterized in
Proposition 4.3, then I prove uniqueness.
Existence
First, suppose that q < 1
θ
and consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of
both types allocate a1 = 0 and a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period;
the voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)], and voter beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(a1 = 0) = π;
• Off the equilibrium path, an observation that a1 = 1 implies that µ(a1 = 1) = 1.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. Given the voter’s posterior belief µ = π,
τ(π, a) = 12 . q <
1
θ
implies that E[g1] < a1∀θ, such that a politician of either type allocates
a1 = 0. The competent type cannot profitably deviate by allocating a1 = 1 because:
1 + pτ(π, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) > θq + pτ(1, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
In this interval, θq < 1 and τ(µ, a) = 12∀µ when a1 = a2 = 0∀θ. Since θ > θ, it thus holds that
the incompetent type cannot profitably deviate by allocating a1 = 1.







and consider the following strategy and belief profile:
a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates
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a1 = a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect
if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[UV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that a1 = 1, µ(a1 = 1) = 1;
• Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(a1 = 0) = 0.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a
politician of type θ = θ will not deviate from a1 = 1 to a1 = 0 since:
θq + (pτ(1, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)) θq ≥ 1 + (pτ(0, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)) θq.







since θq ≥ 1 and, by Lemma C.1, τ(1, a) ≥
τ(0, a). A politician of type θ = θ cannot profitably deviate to allocate a1 = 1 to increase her
chances of re-election when:
1 + pτ(0, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) > θq + pτ(1, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a)
⇔ q < 2b
θ2b+ pθ








and consider the following and strategy and belief
profile: a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates
a1 = 1 and a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to
re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
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• Upon observation that a1 = q, µ(a1 = 1) = π;
• Off the equilibrium path, an observation that a1 = 0 implies that µ(a1 = 0) = 0.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting the equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a
politician of type θ = θ will not deviate from a1 = 1 to a1 = 0 since:
θq + (pτ(π, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a))θq > 1 + (pτ(0, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a))θq









given that θq > 1 and, by Lemma C.1,
τ(π, a) ≥ τ(0, a). A politician of type θ = θ cannot profitably deviate by allocating a1 = 0 if:












since π ∈ (0, 1).
Finally, suppose that q ≥ 1θ and consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of
both types allocate a1 = a2 = 1; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the
voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] > E[u
V
2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
• If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
• Upon observation that a1 = 1, µ(a1 = 1) = π;
• Off the equilibrium path, an observation that a1 = 0, implies that µ(a1 = 0) = 0.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s choice
is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period allocation
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 245
strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation strategy, a, a
politician of type θ = θ will not deviate from a1 = 1 to a1 = 0 since:
θq + τ(π, a) > 1 + (pτ(0, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a))θq
This inequality holds for any q ≥ 1θ because θq > 1 and τ(π, a) ≥ τ(0, a) per Lemma C.1. This is
sufficient to ensure that a politician of type θ = θ similarly does not deviate.
Uniqueness
I consider all possible pooling equilibria and then examine other possible separating equilibria.
Off path beliefs are only invoked in a pooling equilibrium in which both types allocate the same a1.
In an pooling equilibrium in which both types allocate a1 = 0, per the intuitive criteria, I impose
the off-path belief that µ = 1 upon observation of a1 = 1 in any such equilibrium. There are
three possible equilibria in which both types allocate a1 = 0 that emerge in different regions of
the parameter space, depending on a politician’s second-period allocation behavior. The first is an
equilibrum (the first case of Proposition 4.3), the others are not, as shown below:







Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 0
and a politician of type θ = θ = 1 allocates a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates
a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect
if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
– If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(a1 = 0) = π;
– Off the equilibrium path, an observation that a1 = 1 implies that µ(a1 = 1) = 1.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 246
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
1 + τ(π, a) > θq + pθτ(1,a) + p(1− θ)τ(π,a) + (1− p)τ(π,a)
However, this inequality is never satisfied since θq ≥ 1 and τ(1, a) > τ(π, a). Thus, this
strategy and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
• Second, consider q ≥ 1θ .
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 0
and a politician of both types allocate a2 = 1. All other beliefs and strategies are equivalent
to the previous case.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
1 + τ(π, a) > θq + pθτ(1,a) + p(1− θ)τ(π,a) + (1− p)τ(π,a)
However, this inequality is never satisfied since θq ≥ 1 and τ(1, a) > τ(π, a). Thus, this
strategy and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
In an pooling equilibrium in which both types allocate a1 = 1, per the intuitive criteria, I im-
pose the off-path belief that µ = 0 upon observation of a1 = 0 in any such equilibrium. There are
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possible equilibria in which both types allocate a1 = 0 that emerge in different regions of the pa-
rameter space, depending on a politician’s second-period allocation behavior. One is an equilibrum
(the final case of Proposition 4.2), the others are not, as shown below:
• First, suppose q < 1
θ
.
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: politicians of both types allocate a1 = 1
and a politician of either type allocates a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ
in each period; the voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are
as follows:
– If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(0) = π;
– Off the equilibrium path, an observation that a1 = 0 implies that µ = 0.
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + τ(π, a) > 1 + pτ(0,a) + (1− p)τ(π,a)
In this equilibrium,E[g2|θ = θ] = E[g2|θ = θ] = 0 since a2 = 0 for both types. This implies
that τ(µ,α) for any µ. Thus τ(π, a) = τ(0, a). Because θq < 1 in this parameter space, the
inequality is never satisfied. Thus, this strategy and belief profile is not an equilibrium.
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This equilibrium is equivalent to the third case of Proposition 4.3. This equilibrium can be
sustained for any q ∈ [q ≥ 2b
2θb+θpπ
, 1θ ).
As in the proof of Proposition 4.1, note that because θ > θ, there cannot exist an equilibrium in
which a politician of type θ = θ allocates at = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates at = 0.
Thus the candidate separating equilibria are as follows.
• First, suppose q < 1
θ
.
Consider the following strategy and belief profile: a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = 1
and a2 = 0 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 0; the bureaucrat exerts
effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect if E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)];
and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
– If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that a1 = 1, µ(a1 = 1) = 1;
– Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(a1 = 0) = 0;
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
θq + pτ(1, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) ≥ 1 + τ(π, a)⇔ q ≥ 1
θ
Thus, this profile of strategies and beliefs cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
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• Second, suppose q ≥ 1θ Consider the following strategy and belief profile: a politician of type
θ = θ allocates a1 = a2 = 1 while a politician of type θ = θ allocates a1 = 0 and a2 = 1;
the bureaucrat exerts effort proportional to θ in each period; the voter votes to re-elect if
E[uV2 (i)] ≥ E[uV2 (c)]; and the voter’s beliefs are as follows:
– If the voter does not observe a1, µ = π;
– Upon observation that a1 = 1, µ(a1 = 1) = 1;
– Upon observation that a1 = 0, µ(a1 = 0) = 0;
The bureaucrat’s equilibrium effort follows from inspection of Equation 4.1. The voter’s
choice is optimal given her posterior belief and Equation 4.9. The equilibrium second-period
allocation strategies follow from inspection of Equation 4.7. Denoting equilibrium allocation
strategy, a. A politician of type θ = θ will not deviate if:
1 + pτ(0, a) + (1− p)τ(π, a) ≥ θq + τ(π, a)
As θq > 1 and τ(0, a) < τ(π, a) by Lemma C.1, this cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 4.4
This follows directly from the proof of Proposition 4.3.
Formal Motivation of Empirical Tests
The tests described in Table 4.1 follow directly from Propositions 4.1 and 4.3. However, in an
empirical context, politicians represent a mix of first- and second-period politicians. As such, it is
necessary to examine the composition of second vs. first-period incumbents in deriving predictions.
Note two features of the model with respect to re-election, denoted R(q):
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• In the model characterized in Proposition 4.1, for any q ≥ 1
θ
, Pr(R|θ = θ, q) ≥ Pr(R|θ =
θ, q). For any q < 1
θ
, P r(R|θ = θ, q) = Pr(R|θ = θ) = 12 .
• The rate at which incumbents are re-elected, Pr(R|q) = πPr(R|θ = θ, q)+(1−π)Pr(R|θ =



















, Pr(R|q) = 12−
θq(1−π)





Some of these re-election probabilities are cumbersome to write. For the purposes of reduced-form
predictions the two bullet points suffice to illustrate the logic.
1. Politician allocations to rents (1− a) weakly decrease in bureaucratic quality (q):
This result follows from the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 4.1. In the unre-
stricted model, expected allocations to rents are given by:
E[1− a] =

1 if q < 1
θ
1−π
















0 if q ≥ 1θ
(C.1)
Note that Pr(R|θ = θ, q) is greater in the second case than in the third.
In the case in which θ = 1 and θ = 0, E[1− a] = 1−π2 + Pr(R|θ = θ, q).
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In the case in which p = 0, expected allocations to rents are given by:
E[1− a] =

1 if q < 1
θ






0 if q ≥ 1θ
(C.2)
2. Politicians allocate more to rents in their second term (t = 2) than in their first term (t = 1).
This difference is attenuated to zero at very low and high levels of bureaucratic quality.
In the unrestricted model, the difference in allocations to rents, by period are given by:
E[1− a2]− E[1− a1] =

0 if q < 1
θ
















0 if q > 1
θ
(C.3)
Note that in the third case Pr(R|θ = θ, q) ≤ 12 .
In the case in which θ = 1 and θ = 0:
E[1− a2]− E[1− a1] =

0 if q < 1
θ






0 if q > 1
θ
(C.4)
In the case in which p = 0, the diference in allocations to rents, by term, is E[1−a2]−E[1−
a1] = 0.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 252
3. At high levels of bureaucratic quality, a voter’s posterior belief (µ) is equivalent to her prior
(π) upon receiving a signal that a politician allocated no funds to rents (a = 1).
This follows from Proposition 4.3 since politician actions are conveyed in the signal. For the
purposes of the survey experiment, assume p = 1, though the qualitative results carry through
for any p > 0.
µ(a = 1) =

1 if q < 1
θ
(Off path assumption.)












In the case in which θ = 1 and θ = 0, µ(a = 1) = 1.
C.2 Bureaucratic Quality Measure
C.2.1 Operationalization
The bureaucratic quality question is coded from counts of public employees in direct municipal
administration according to Table C.1.
Category (Portuguese) Highest education N Value (v)
1 Sem instrução Incomplete primary N0 v0 = 0
2 Ensino fundamental Complete primary N1 v1 = 1
3 Ensino médio Complete secondary N3 v2 = 2
4 Ensino superior Complete undergraduate N4 v3 = 3
5 Pós-graduação Complete post-grad N5 v4 = 4
Table C.1: Classification of educational composition of municipal employees as reported MUNIC
surveys.
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Denote average education in municipality θ in year t as qmt. The z-score standardization, denoted





where µqmt denotes the mean of qmt and σqmt denotes the standard deviation of qmt. In estimation,
all quantiles refer to the full distribution of Qmt (equivalent to the quantiles of qmt, not quantiles
within the sample.
C.2.2 Description
Figure C.1 describes the bureaucratic education data graphically. Figure C.2 depicts the distribution
of the raw (unstandardized) measure of bureaucratic quality over time.
Figure C.3 depicts the relationship between the set of covariates intended to adjust for variation
in local labor markets. and bureaucratic quality. These provide a visualization of the fixed effects
used in (non-interactive) specifications. I plot the explanatory power of these covariates in Figure
C.4, showing that these covariates account less than 20% of the variation in the bureaucratic quality
measure.
C.2.3 Persistence of bureaucratic quality
Measuring the persistence of the bureaucratic quality measure is important for two reasons. First,
per the model, q is an exogenous parameter assumed to be outside the short-term policy options
available to an incumbent. While Figure C.2 shows gradual increases in education (quality) over


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.1: Proportion of bureaucrats in categories 1-4 (per Table C.1), over time. The interquartile
range (IQR) is given by the gray boxes. The confidence intervals are given by the Median±1.58 IQR√
n
,
where n is the number of observations.

























































































































































Figure C.2: Distribution of the bureaucratic quality measure (not standardized), by year. The in-
terquartile range (IQR) is given by the gray boxes. The confidence intervals are given by the Median
±1.58 IQR√
n
, where n is the number of observations.

















































































































































































































































Avg. Bureaucratic Education (Quality)
Figure C.3: Conditional means of the 2005 bureaucratic quality measure (not standardized) at
deciles of municipal population, average years of education, percentage of formal employees in
the workforce, and GDP per capital as well as by state. The segments represent 95% confidence
intervals.














































Figure C.4: This plot shows the explanatory power of the state fixed effects and binned economic
covariates in predicting the bureaucratic quality measure. Each point represents the adjusted R2
of a model regressing standardized bureaucratic quality on the set of covariates shown below the
x-axis. Note that state FE have the highest predictive power and a substantial portion (>80%) of the
variation in bureaucratic quality is not explained by these covariates.
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Measure Raw count/measure Per-capita measure
Total officials in direct administration 0.977 0.851
Highest education: primary school complete 0.866 0.437
Highest education: secondary school complete 0.951 0.400
Highest education: undergraduate degree 0.975 0.473
Highest education: postgraduate degree 0.889 0.537
Average education of officials (quality) 0.574 –
Table C.2: Autocorrelation of bureaucratic education/quality measures over five waves of MUNIC.
The per-capita measure of total officials uses municipal population (measured in the preceding cen-
sus) as a denominator. The per-capita measures of highest education level use the number of officials
in direct administration as a denominator.
time, I seek to understand whether these changes are driven by variation in the local political envi-
ronment. It is important to clarify whether changes in politician (or party) yield differential changes
in bureaucratic quality. Second, given the years in which education is reported in the MUNIC
surveys do not align perfectly with the years in which the other data occurred/was collected, it is
important to show that relative measures of bureaucratic quality are “sticky.” I provide two analyses
to respond to these considerations empirically.
Table C.2 reports the autocorrelation of the measures used in the construction of the bureaucratic
quality measure. It indicates substantial autocorrelation across waves of the MUNIC survey for all
component counts of the bureaucratic quality measure
Table C.3 conducts a first-difference analysis of changes in bureaucratic quality as a function of
changes in municipal administration. Since all elections are simultaneous, the “treatments” of inter-
est are (1) whether the mayor changes (71% of observations); and (2) whether the party of the mayor
changes (68% of observations). Note that due to comparatively high rates of party switching, there
are cases in which a mayor is re-elected under a different party label. I conduct a first-difference
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analysis of the form:
Qms,t=1 −Qm,t=0 = β0 + β1New mayorm + β2Different partym + γs + κQm,t=0 + εms
Table C.3 estimates this equation with OLS for each election (specifications 1-9) and then on the
pooled sample. Columns 10-12 estimate this expression on the pooled sample, clustering standard
errors at the municipality level. All coeficients are very small in magnitude and are generally in-
distinguishable from 0. In the pooled sample with covariate adjustment (Column 12), we can reject
any effects outside of the [-0.003, 0.018] interval for a new mayor and outside the [-0.010, 0.011]
interval for a mayor of a different party. In sum, this analysis provides no evidence that, on average,
changes in leadership lead to substantive changes in bureaucratic quality.
To be sure that the effect of changing a mayor or mayoral party is not obscured by examining
only mean shifts, I plot the ECDFs of the differenced bureaucratic quality outcome by each political
“treatment” in Figure C.5. There is no evidence of effects on the variance.
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∆ Bureaucratic Quality
2008-2011 2011-2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in mayor −0.011 −0.007 −0.004 0.008 0.009 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Change in party 0.013 0.003 0.002 −0.017 −0.019∗ −0.016∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
State FE X X X X
Lagged bureaucratic quality X X
DV Mean, no change 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.084 0.084 0.084
DV St. Dev, no change 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.251 0.251 0.251
Adj. R2 0.000 0.026 0.360 0.000 0.003 0.255
Num. obs. 4932 4932 4932 4719 4719 4719
Election year 2008 2008 2008 2012 2012 2012
2014-2018 Pooled
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Change in mayor −0.014 −0.015 −0.003 −0.014∗∗ −0.011∗ 0.008
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Change in party 0.003 0.002 −0.001 0.002 −0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
State FE X X X X
Lagged bureaucratic quality X X
DV Mean, no change 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.109 0.109 0.109
DV St. Dev, no change 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.255 0.255 0.255
Adj. R2 -0.000 0.003 0.319 0.000 0.007 0.293
Num. obs. 4362 4362 4362 14013 14013 14013
N Clusters 5293 5293 5293
Election year 2016 2016 2016 All All All
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.3: First difference analysis of the effects of changing a mayor or partisan affilia-
tion of the mayor in an election on bureaucratic quality. The cross-sectional specifications use
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and the panel specification clusters standard errors at the
municipal level.
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Figure C.5: These graphs plot the ECDF of differences in bureaucratic quality for each of the
political “treatments” examined in Table C.3.
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Finally, I examine correlation between bureaucratic quality and the presence of community ra-
dio. Community radio is the the medium through which information from audit investigations is
purported to diffuse (Ferraz and Finan, 2008). Note that, in general, existing evidence suggests
that community radio simply diffuses informational signals if they emerge, i.e., the results of local
audits. There is not evidence that the presence of a community radio station alone increments the
probability of revelation (p in the model).
I gather data on community radio from ANATEL, Brazil’s National Telecommunications Agency.
I use ANATEL’s database of historical licensing of FM radio stations to collect the data.1 I examine
the radio stations that were licensed on December 31 of the preceding year.
To ensure that bureaucratic quality is not simply capturing community radio presence, I examine
the association between bureaucratic quality and radio presence in each year that I study. Figure C.6
plots the association between bureaucratic quality and community radio presence in 2004/2005 and
2011. The top row reveals a positive correlation between bureaucratic quality and municipal radio
presence. However, when examining a residualized measure of the radio presence that partials out
state indicators and the demographic/economic indicators used in all models, there is no association
between bureaucratic quality and community radio. Table C.4 provides a more formal test of the
relationship in the scatter plots, reaching a similar conclusion.
1See http://sistemas.anatel.gov.br/se/public/view/b/srd.php for data.







































Figure C.6: This graph plots the correlation between bureaucratic quality and presence of commu-
nity radio in 2004/2005 (left) and 2011 (right), the years used in the empirical tests. The bottom
panel looks at a residualized presence of community radio, with the set of economic covariates
(municipal population, education, formality, and GDP per capita decile bins) and state fixed ef-
fects. While there is a positive association between the raw measures of bureaucratic quality, this
association is absent with the standard set of covariates used in this paper.
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Community radio in municipality (Indicator)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bureaucratic Quality (z-score) 0.053∗∗∗ −0.000 0.059∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Sample (year) 2004 2004 2011 2011
State FE X X
Demographic covariates X X
Adj. R2 0.015 0.451 0.015 0.439
Num. obs. 5349 5347 5230 5230
RMSE 0.437 0.326 0.477 0.360
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.4: Association between bureaucratic quality and community radio presence. The demo-
graphic covariates include municipal population, education, formality, and GDP per capita decile
bins. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
C.3 Bureaucratic Quality and Allocation to Rents
C.3.1 Plots of Raw Data
The bivariate relationship between bureaucratic quality (Z-score) and share of funds spent in a





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure C.7: Scatter plot depicting bureaucratic quality and the share of audited funds spent in a
corrupt manner. These graphs plot the raw data from Table 4.2.
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Share of spending
Granted to corrupt bids Misallocated Spent on overbudget projects
Bureaucratic quality (Z-score) −0.008 −0.007 −0.011∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.007∗∗ −0.008∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DV Mean 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.001 0.001 0.001
DV Std. Dev. 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.01 0.01 0.01
Range, DV [0,0.672] [0,0.672] [0,0.672] [0,0.584] [0,0.584] [0,0.584] [0,0.143] [0,0.143] [0,0.143]
Adj. R2 0.010 0.061 0.074 0.013 0.056 0.059 0.002 0.001 0.009
Num. obs. 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448 448
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.5: Decomposition of sources of corrupt spending in Table 4.2. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses.
C.3.2 Decomposition of corrupt spending
One potential concern with the results in Table 4.2 is that low bureaucratic quality corresponds
to worse record-keeping that would manifest in audits as corrupt spending. If this were the case,
we may expect similar effects across types of malfeasant spending. This is not the case when
we decompose the sources of rents in Table C.5. Increases in bureaucratic quality correlate most
strongly with reductions in misallocated spending.
C.3.3 No heterogeneity by community radio presence
Diffusion of pre-2004 audit reports was believed to be facilitated by the presence of a municipal
radio station in Brazilian municipalities. Note that Ferraz and Finan (2008) show that community
radio magnified the electoral effects of revelation of audit information. They do not find that ra-
dio stations alone make voters more likely to sanction politicians. This section evaluates whether
the presence of a local radio station influences the a politician’s allocation behavior when audits
were not yet anticipated. If radios do not alone increase p (absent audits) as in Ferraz and Finan
(2008), then there should be no difference in allocation behavior as a function of the presence of a
community radio station.
I collect historic FM radio station registrations from ANATEL and create an indicator mea-
suring whether each municipality had an FM radio station registered in 2003. Table C.6 finds no
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Share of corrupt spending Log(Share of corrupt spending + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bureaucratic Quality (Z-score) −0.015∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Radio −0.005 0.007 0.009 −0.005 0.006 0.008
(0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Bureaucratic Quality×Radio 0.002 0.001 −0.002 0.002 0.001 −0.002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
State FE X X X X
Lottery FE X X X X
Demographic controls X X
Outcome Range [0,0.794] [0,0.794] [0,0.794] [0,0.584] [0,0.584] [0,0.584]
Outcome Mean 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.056 0.056
Outcome Std. Dev. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.085 0.085 0.085
Adj. R2 0.014 0.081 0.097 0.015 0.092 0.108
Num. obs. 448 448 448 448 448 448
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.6: Heterogeneity in the association of bureaucratic quality and corruption as a function
of community radio presence. 177 of the sampled communities registered community radios in
December 2003 4.2. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
heterogeneity by radio presence. I interpret this as evidence that incumbents did not differentially
anticipate revelation of performance information as a function of radio presence/absence when mak-
ing allocations.
C.4 First-term vs. Second-term Allocation to Rents
Given the estimator in Equation 4.11, the quantity of interest is β̂1 + β̂3Qm. Table C.7 suggests that
this quantity is positive at low quantiles of bureaucratic quality but indistinguishable from 0 at high
quantiles. The estimates of β1 are consistently positive and statistically significant. The significance
of the interaction term varies, though its sign is consistently negative. Ultimately the inference that
I draw is on the quantity β̂1 + β̂3Qm, not simply β̂3.
To decompose the compound mechanism behind term effects, I use a RDD in an attempt to
vary the composition of the second period mayors by varying bandwidths. As I am interested in
average differences, as opposed to CATEs at the threshold where the margin of victory is equal to
zero, I use zero-degree polynomials in contrast to increasingly standard practice in RDs. I estimate
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Share of corrupt spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LINEAR BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY MEASURE (Z-SCORE)
Second term 0.021∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Bureaucratic quality (Z-score) -0.007 -0.009 -0.015∗ -0.007 -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Second term × BQ -0.019 -0.012 -0.007 -0.018 -0.016
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY TERCILES
Second term 0.050∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.034∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 2 0.011 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.009
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 3 -0.017 -0.021 -0.035∗ -0.018 -0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.017)
Second term × BQ tercile 2 -0.052∗∗ -0.042 -0.033 -0.053∗∗ -0.053∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
Second term × BQ tercile 23 -0.029 -0.017 -0.009 -0.028 -0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033)
BUREAUCRATIC QUALITY QUARTILES
Second term 0.053∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.035 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.010) (0.011)
Bureaucratic quality, quartile 2 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.008 0.012
(0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019)
Bureaucratic quality, quartile 3 -0.009 -0.018 -0.030 -0.011 -0.011
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018)
Bureaucratic quality, quartile 4 -0.01 -0.020 -0.035 -0.016 -0.015
(0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021)
Second term × BQ quartile 2 -0.046 -0.043 -0.034 -0.051∗ -0.054∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Second term × BQ quartile 3 -0.032 -0.018 -0.005 -0.031 -0.029
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Second term × BQ quartile 4 -0.044 -0.033 -0.021 -0.043 -0.043
(0.030) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.038)
State FE X X
Lottery FE X X X X
Demographic covariates X X
Covariate × term interactions X X
Num. obs. 448 448 448 448 448
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.7: Conditional associations between politician term and rent allocation, by levels of bu-
reaucratic quality. The interactive specifications in Columns 4 and 5 use the estimator proposed
in Lin (2013). All models are estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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Figure C.8: Results of an experimental analogue (e.g. polynomial degree zero) of a RD specification
at varying bandwidths. At low bandwidths, incompetent types are more common among re-elected
politicians and differences by term are exaggerated.
Equation 4.11 at different bandwidths in terms of the 2000 margin of victory, starting with 0.1,
which is smaller than the bandwidth selected in (Ferraz and Finan, 2011).2 At smaller bandwidths,
incompetent types should theoretically represent a larger share of the second-term politicians. Since
these are the mayors predicted to extract rents in their second term, the marginal effect of term
should be larger at small bandwidths, but only at low levels of bureaucratic quality. This is consistent
with the point estimates (and differences between the narrowest and widest bandwidths) in Figure
C.8.
2To maintain a common set of covariates across bandwidths, I omit the covariates except for lottery fixed effects in
this analysis. The estimates are substantively similar with covariates but I lack degrees of freedom to estimate effects at
the narrowest bandwidths.
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C.5 Survey Experimental Test of Voter Updating
This paper uses a subset of treatment conditions from Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2016a) and Win-
ters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016). The full seven-arm design is enumerated in Table C.8. Because
“clean” and “corrupt” are both experimental manipulations of interest, I omit treatment conditions
that are not fully crossed for both types of information. I use the control (no information) condition







None Unspecified Unspecifed Opposition Party Federal Audit
Implicated
Official







N per arm: 286 286 286
Table C.8: Design and specification of treatment conditions utilized in extension of the survey
experiment.
The vignette used as the material for the three treatments of interest is quoted in Table C.9.
Arm Vignette Text
Control “Imagine that you live in a neighborhood similar to your own but in a different city in Brazil. Let’s
call the mayor of that hypothetical city in which you live Carlos. Imagine that Mayor Carlos is
running for reelection. During the four years that he has been mayor, the municipality has experi-
enced a number of improvements, including good economic growth and better health services and
transportation.” (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2016a: p.66)
Clean Control text + “Also, it is well known in the city that Mayor Carlos has not accepted any bribes
when awarding city contracts.” (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2016a: p.66, emphasis added).
Corrupt Control text + “Also, it is well known in the city that Mayor Carlos has accepted bribes when
awarding city contracts.” (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2016a: p.66, emphasis added).
Table C.9: Vignette text for each treatment condition.
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Sampling and Blocking
Per Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2016b), the sampling procedure for cities and individuals was as
follows:
“140 cities were sampled using a probability-proportional-to-size (PPS) method within
25 strata that are defined by 25 of Brazil‘s 27 states. (The survey rotates on a monthly
basis among three small states in the northern region of the country.) Census tracts were
selected using PPS with stratification across zones of major metropolitan areas. Enu-
merators recruited individual respondents in public or semi-public places according to
a quota scheme designed to produce a representative sample of the national population
in terms of age, gender, and employment characteristics (sector of the economy and
employment status).” (Weitz-Shapiro and Winters, 2016b: p. 4)
Because larger cities are more likely to be chosen when municipal sampling is proportional to pop-
ulation and larger cities have higher average bureaucratic quality (see Figure C.3), sampled munic-
ipalities have a slightly higher level of bureaucratic quality, as depicted in Figure C.9. Importantly,
however, there is support across most of the distribution of bureaucratic quality. Table C.10 con-
firms that adjusting for municipal population eliminates this imbalance, consistent with the account
of municipal sampling.
The survey experiment blocks assignment to the experimental manipulations on municipality
and maintains equal probabilities of assignment in each municipality.
Robustness and Extensions
This section provides three extensions of the analysis reported in the paper, as follows:
• 129/140 municipalities in the survey experimental sample recorded bureaucratic education
in 2011. I also constructed an predicted measure from an additional 10 municipalities that














Figure C.9: Distribution of bureaucratic quality in sampled and unsampled municipalities.
Municipality in survey sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bureaucratic quality (z-score) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Bureaucratic quality w/ imputation (z-score) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Population percentile X X
Adj. R2 0.006 0.223 0.006 0.213
Num. obs. 5230 5230 5507 5507
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.10: Municipal sampling in survey experiment. Adjustment for municipal population ac-
counts for differences in bureaucratic quality in sampled and non-sampled municipalities.
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recorded bureaucratic education in 2008. Figure C.10 replicates Figure 4.3 from the main
analysis with this slightly larger sample of municipalities.
• Figure C.11 replicates the analysis in Figure 4.3 with an alternate dependent variable, a 4-item
scale measuring who voters intended to vote for in the hypothetical election.
• Figure C.12 disaggregates the result in Figure 4.3 by respondent education/political knowl-
edge. While the subgroups reduce sample sizes and add noise, we do not see substantial




























































Sample ● Imputed Not Imputed Vignette ● ●Clean Corrupt
Figure C.10: Main results from Figure 4.3 replicated alongside results from a larger number of
sampled municipalities with imputed measures of bureaucratic quality predicted from 2008 levels.


































































































































Figure C.11: Recreation of the Figure 4.3 using a “vote intent” outcome that is preferred by Weitz-
Shapiro and Winters (2016a). All substantive results are identical, though ceiling effects appear to

























































Sample ● High ed./knowledge Low ed./knowledge Vignette ● ●Clean Corrupt
Figure C.12: Disaggregating results by subjects with high education or high political knowledge
(n = 216) versus not (n = 642) reveals little heterogeneity in updating by respondent characteris-
tics.
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Re-Elected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of corrupt spending −0.75∗∗ −0.80∗∗∗ −0.71∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.33)
Any corrupt spending −0.14∗ −0.12 −0.16∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Vote Share2004 - Vote Share2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of corrupt spending −0.20∗ −0.16∗ −0.20∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Any corrupt spending −0.03 −0.04∗ −0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
2000 Vote share X X X X
2000 Number of candidates X X X X
State FE X X
Community radio indicator X X
Lottery Round FE X X
Num. obs. 186 186 186 186 186 186
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.11: Replication of Ferraz and Finan (2008) for the audited municipalities with an incumbent
running for re-election using the corruption metrics used in this paper.
C.6 Effects of Information Provision
C.6.1 Corruption and electoral performance in the sample
Table C.11 replicates Ferraz and Finan (2008) for the sample of audited municipalities with an in-
cumbent running. Consistent with that paper, electoral performance is decreasing in corruption.
Note that this table is intended only to demonstrate that the sign of the association between (en-
dogenous) corruption and vote share is consistent with predictions.
C.6.2 Bureaucratic quality and electoral performance of incumbents
Table C.12 examines the relationship between bureaucratic quality and re-election. I find modest
evidence that incumbents in places with higher levels of bureaucratic quality perform better consis-
tent with the idea that any incumbency disadvantage occurs in lower quantiles of the sample. The
difference in vote share is generally better powered than the binary indicator for re-election.
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Re-Elected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bureaucratic quality (Z-score) 0.013 0.015 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 2 0.003 0.011 −0.001
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 3 0.035 0.039 0.005
(0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
Vote Share2004 - Vote Share2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bureaucratic quality (Z-score) 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 2 −0.000 −0.006 −0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Bureaucratic quality, tercile 3 0.017∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
2000 Vote share X X X X
2000 Number of candidates X X X X
State FE X X
Demographic controls (binned) X X
Num. obs. 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228 2228
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.12: Bureaucratic quality and electoral performance among municipalities with an incum-
bent running.
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 276
C.6.3 The effect of information
Here, we are interested in the effect of being audited (regardless of the outcome of the audit) on
the probability of re-election. Denoting re-election by R ∈ {0, 1} and assignment to a randomized
audits as Z = 1, the ATE is defined as:
E[R|Z = 1]− E[R|Z = 0]
I provide a slight adaption to the model to account for the research design introduced by the
audits. I assume that after voters observe (resp. does not observe g1), they probabilistically receive
another signal that reveals the politician’s allocation if assigned to treatment, Z = 1. Specifically,
with probability pn, citizens observe the signal realizationN via observation of public goods per the
model characterized in Proposition 4.1. When assigned to treatment, with probability pa, a citizen
observes the realization A ∈ {0, 1}, which is given by an exogenous report of the politician’s first
period allocation a1 ∈ {0, 1}. I assume that N ⊥ A. I assume that the prior may be heterogeneous,
but is an accurate assessment of the proportion of types in the candidate pool.
Consider the four cases of the Equilibrium in Proposition 4.1:
• q < 1
θ
: Here, the posterior belief, upon realization of N is µ = π. Upon realization of A, the
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posterior belief is similarly µ = π. It is thus trivial to show that:




π (papnτ(π, a) + pa(1− pn)τ(π, a) + pn(1− pa)τ(π, a) + (1− pa)(1− pn)τ(π, a)) +


















• q ∈ [1
θ
, 2b(1−πθ)
θ(2b(1−πθ)+pθ(1−π))): Here, the posterior belief upon realization of N is µ = 1 if
public goods are observed, and µ = π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+1−π if public goods are not observed. The
posterior beliefs upon realization of A are µ = 1 if a = 1 and µ = 0 if a = 0.
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: In this region, the posterior belief upon realization
of N is µ = πθ
πθ+(1−π)θ if public goods are observed, and µ =
π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) if public
goods are not observed. Realization of A provides no additional information since both types
allocate to public goods, so the posterior is equivalent to the prior (if N is not realized) or
the posterior (if N is realized). Note that in this case, τ(·) accounts for the fact that the
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incompetent type will shirk in the second period.
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• q ≥ 1θ . In this region, the posterior belief upon realization of N is µ =
πθ
πθ+(1−π)θ if public
goods are observed, and µ = π(1−θ)
π(1−θ)+(1−π)(1−θ) if public goods are not observed. Realization
of A provides no additional information since both types allocate to public goods, so the
posterior is equivalent to the prior (if N is not realized) or the posterior (if N is realized).
This differs by from the previous case in the second period allocation of the incompetent
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type, which enters in τ(·).
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First, I show that there is no evidence that incumbents in audited and un-audited municipalities
run at different rates in Table C.13. Because the audits were rolled out in sequential waves (lotteries),
I also estimate marginal effects of each lottery round (each municipality was audited only once) to
ensure that the decision the ATE is not obscuring heterogeneity as a function of audit timing. All
models include state fixed effects because each lottery effectively blocked on state and the sample
comprises all municipalities with a population under 450,000. Following Hartman and Hidalgo
(2018), a two one-sided t-test test rejects the null hypothesis of that |ATE| ≥ ±0.36σ at p < 0.001,
where σ is the variance of the outcome.
To examine evidence that the ATE of audits on incumbent electoral performance, I employ
equivalence testing as in Hartman and Hidalgo (2018). The theoretical prediction is that ATE =
0, so a traditional null hypothesis is an inappropriate test of the prediction. As such, I test the
evidence against a null of an |ATE| ≥ 0.36σ, a hypothesis recommended by Hartman and Hidalgo
(2018). I examine both raw (i.e. difference-in-means) and covariate-adjusted specifications. In





Audited, round 2 −0.02
(0.11)
Audited, round 3 −0.07
(0.07)
Audited, round 4 −0.02
(0.07)
Audited, round 5 −0.06
(0.07)
Audited, round 6 0.06
(0.07)
Audited, round 7 −0.07
(0.07)
Audited, round 8 −0.01
(0.07)
Audited, round 9 −0.03
(0.07)
Audited, round 10 −0.08
(0.06)
Audited, round 11 0.06
(0.07)
State FE X X
Mean, un-audited municipalities 0.426 0.426
Num. obs. 5496 5496
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table C.13: This table examines whether audited incumbents contest re-election at a differential
rate than unaudited incumbents. Column 1 examines the ATE of audits on contesting re-election.
Column 2 estimates the marginal effects of auditing in each round (a measure of treatment timing).
The unit is the municipality. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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principle, covariate-adjustment is needed to adjust for the blocking randomization strategy used in
the CGU lotteries. I use two electoral dependent variables: an indicator for re-election and change
in incumbent vote-share.
Figure C.13 rejects the null hypothesis of |ATE| ≥ 0.36σ at the p < 0.005 level in all speci-
fications. We reject this null for all subsamples of bureaucratic quality except for the “re-elected”
outcome in Tercile 2. Note however, that the power of the test is limited (analytically 0.63) for this
specification. Moreover, there is no evidence of such an effect on change in vote share in the same
tercile. This provides one way to test the prediction of an ATE of 0 in a frequentist framework.3
3An alternate test would use permutation tests/randomization inference. However, the assumption of a constant treat-
ment effect for all units is inconsistent with this setting or the data where we expect (and Ferraz and Finan (2008) find)
evidence of heterogeneity.







−0.3 0.0 0.3 −0.3 0.0 0.3
Change in vote share
Elected
Change in vote share
Elected
Change in vote share
Elected
Change in vote share
Elected
Standardized Effect Size of ATE
Figure C.13: Visualizations of two one-sided T-tests. The top panel presents the omnibus test across
all municipalities where an incumbent contested re-election in 2004, N = 2228. The bottom three
panels disaggregate by tercile. Points represent the standardized estimated ATE. The gray rectangles
correspond to the inverted equivalence range that is ascertained from the data. The vertical lines
represent the null hypothesis against which I am testing.
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C.7 Existing studies of information and accountability
I identify 16 studies examining information and accountability for the purposes of Figure 4.4. Table
C.14 provides the relevant citations.
Country Citation Design Metaketa-I Included in Fig. 4.5
1 Benin Adida et al. (2017) E X X
2 Brazil Ferraz and Finan (2008) NE
3 Brazil Boas, Hidalgo, and Melo (2019) E X X
4 Burkina Faso Lierl and Holmlund (2019) E X X
5 India Banerjee et al. (2011) E X
6 India George, Gupta, and Neggers (2018) E X
7 Philippines Cruz, Keefer, and Labonne (2018) E
8 Philippines Cruz et al. (2019) E X
9 Mexico Chong et al. (2015) E X
10 Mexico Arias et al. (2019) E X X
11 Mexico Enríquez et al. (2019) E X
12 Mexico Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder Jr. (2020) NE
13 Senegal Bhandari, Larreguy, and Marshall (2019) E X
14 Uganda Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) E
15 Uganda Buntaine et al. (2018) E X X
16 Uganda Platas and Raffler (2019) E X X
Table C.14: Studies of information and accountability and their locations. Under design, “E” corre-
sponds to an experiment and “NE” corresponds to a natural experiment (one where the investigators
did not manipulate provision of information).
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